پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

In the Middle Ages and early modern period, intensive contact between Georgia and the Islamic world helped introduce Islam into Georgia. After the conquest of Tbilisi by Arabs in the 8th century, the city became the capital of an Islamic emirate for some four decades. (Nisba3 at- Tiflisi4, or at-Taflisi, as the city was called, is first mentioned in Arabic sources around that time.)5 From that point on, there has always been a Muslim community in Tbilisi, even after Georgia’s King David IV (David the Builder) retook the city in 1122 and made it the capital of a reunified Georgian Christian state. Historically, Tbilisi’s Muslims were usually afforded a variety of privileges by the Georgian state, including exemption from certain taxes.

Tbilisi’s population was partly Christian faith in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ottoman Turks and Iranian Safavids controlled much of the country.

According to the French traveler J. de Turnefort, among the 20,000 inhabitants of Tbilisi in 1701,only 3,000 were Muslim.6 Nevertheless, invasions by Muslim nomads and occupation by Turks and Persians inflicted considerable damage on the country’s Georgian-speaking natives, to the point where in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Georgians as an ethno-linguistic community were on the verge of extinction. Particularly threatening was the practice of seizing Georgian youth and selling them as slaves to Muslim owners.7

It was during this period that Islam began to spread to segments of the rural population. It came first to the southwest region of Georgia (Samtskhe-Saatabago), when the Ottomans conquered the region and created the pashalik of Akhaltsikhe (Childir). Thereafter, other ethnolinguistic minorities in the country came to embrace Islam as well. In addition, waves of Turkicspeaking Muslims began to move into the country, migrants who became known as “Tatars” in the Tsarist era and would then be reclassified as “Azerbaijanis” under the Soviets.

ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF GEORGIA: Turkish and Persian domination

The fall of Constantinople (modern Istanbul, Turkey) to the Ottoman Empire in 1453 isolated Georgia from western Christendom. In 1510 the Ottomans invaded Imereti and sacked the capital, Kʿutʿaisi. Soon afterward, Shah Ismāʿīl I of Iran (Persia) invaded Kartli. Ivan IV (the Terrible) and other Muscovite tsars showed interest in the little Christian kingdoms of Georgia, but the Russians were powerless to stop the Muslim powers—Ṣavafid Iran and the Ottoman Empire, both near their zenith—from partitioning the country and oppressing its inhabitants. In 1578 the Ottomans overran the whole of Transcaucasia and seized Tbilisi, but they were subsequently driven out by Iran’s Shah ʿAbbās I (reigned 1587–1629), who deported many thousands of the Christian population to distant regions of Iran. There was a period of respite under the viceroys of the house of Mukhran, who governed at Tbilisi under the aegis of the shahs from 1658 until 1723. The most notable Mukhranian ruler was Vakhtang VI, regent of Kartli from 1703 to 1711 and then king, with intervals, until 1723. Vakhtang was an eminent lawgiver and introduced the printing press to Georgia; he had the Georgian annals edited by a commission of scholars. The collapse of the Ṣafavid dynasty in 1722, however, led to a fresh Ottoman invasion of Georgia. The Ottomans were expelled by the Persian conqueror Nādir Shah, who gave Kartli to Tʿeimuraz II (1744–62), one of the Kakhian line of the Bagratids. When Tʿeimuraz died, his son Erekle II reunited the kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti and made a brave attempt at erecting a Caucasian multinational state based on Georgia. Imereti under King Solomon I (1752–84) succeeded in finally throwing off the domination of the declining Ottoman Empire.

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 26, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی | The international media has finally caught up with the events of Kashmir. While the imbecilic politicians of the PPPP and PMLN are busy fiddling in Dubai and twiddling their thumbs in London the Kashmiris have made their voice heard around the planet. While Mr. Sharif and Mr. Zardari battle it out for the presidency, the flames of Parachanar are now visible even to the deaf and blind. While the Indian Voltaire Andhurti Roy lists the slogans that the Kashmiris are shouting, the deaf and dumb media in Islamabad is napping.

 

A Jihad Grows in Kashmir By PANKAJ MISHRA New Delhi

FOR more than a week now, hundreds of thousands of Muslims have filled the streets of Srinagar, the capital of Indian-ruled Kashmir, shouting “azadi” (freedom) and raising the green flag of Islam. These demonstrations, the largest in nearly two decades, remind many of us why in 2000 President Bill Clinton described Kashmir, the Himalayan region claimed by both India and Pakistan, as “the most dangerous place on earth.”

  

Mr. Clinton sounded a bit hyperbolic back then. Dangerous, you wanted to ask, to whom? Though more than a decade old, the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir, which Pakistan’s rogue intelligence agency had infiltrated with jihadi terrorists, was not much known outside South Asia. But then the Clinton administration had found itself compelled to intervene in 1999 when India and Pakistan fought a limited but brutal war near the so-called line of control that divides Indian Kashmir from the Pakistani-held portion of the formerly independent state. Pakistan’s withdrawal of its soldiers from high peaks in Indian Kashmir set off the series of destabilizing events that culminated in Pervez Musharraf assuming power in a military coup.

After 9/11, Mr. Musharraf quickly became the Bush administration’s ally. Seen through the fog of the “war on terror” and the Indian government’s own cynical propaganda, the problem in Kashmir seemed entirely to do with jihadist terrorists. President Musharraf could even claim credit for fighting extremism by reducing his intelligence service’s commitment to jihad in Kashmir — indeed, he did help bring down the level of violence, which has claimed an estimated 80,000 lives.

Since then Pakistan has developed its own troubles with Muslim extremists. Conventional wisdom now has Pakistan down as the most dangerous place on earth. Meanwhile, India is usually tagged as a “rising superpower” or “capitalist success story” — clichés so pervasive that they persuaded even so shrewd an observer as Fareed Zakaria to claim in his new book “The Post-American World” that India since 1997 has been “stable, peaceful and prosperous.”

It is true that India’s relations with Pakistan have improved lately. But more than half a million Indian soldiers still pursue a few thousand insurgents in Kashmir. While periodically holding bilateral talks with Pakistan, India has taken for granted those most affected by the so-called Kashmir dispute: the four million Kashmiri Muslims who suffer every day the misery and degradation of a full-fledged military occupation.

The Indian government’s insistence that peace is spreading in Kashmir is at odds with a report by Human Rights Watch in 2006 that described a steady pattern of arbitrary arrest, torture and extrajudicial execution by Indian security forces — excesses that make the events at Abu Ghraib seem like a case of high spirits. A survey by Doctors Without Borders in 2005 found that Muslim women in Kashmir, prey to the Indian troops and paramilitaries, suffered some of the most pervasive sexual violence in the world.

Over the last two decades, most ordinary Kashmiri Muslims have wavered between active insurrection and sullen rage. They fear, justifiably or not, the possibility of Israeli-style settlements by Hindus; reports two months ago of a government move to grant 92 acres of Kashmiri land to a Hindu religious group are what provoked the younger generation into the public defiance expressed of late.

As always, the turmoil in Kashmir heartens extremists in both India and Pakistan. India has recently suffered a series of terrorist bombings, allegedly by radicals among its Muslim minority. Hindu nationalists have already formed an economic blockade of the Kashmir Valley — an attempt to punish seditious Muslims and to gin up votes in next year’s general elections. In Pakistan, where weak civilian governments in the past sought to score populist points by stirring up the emotional issue of Kashmir, the intelligence service can only be gratified by another opportunity to synergize its jihads in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

What of the Kashmiris themselves, who have repeatedly found themselves reduced to pawns in the geopolitical games and domestic politics of their neighbors? In 1989 and ’90, when few Kashmiris had heard of Osama bin Laden, hundreds of thousands of Muslims buoyed by popular revolutions in Eastern Europe regularly petitioned the United Nations office in Srinagar, hoping to raise the world’s sympathy for their cause. Indian troops responded by firing into many of these largely peaceful demonstrations, killing hundreds of people and provoking many young Kashmiris to take to arms and embrace radical Islam.

A new generation of politicized Kashmiris has now risen; the world is again likely to ignore them — until some of them turn into terrorists with Qaeda links. It is up to the Indian government to reckon honestly with Kashmiri aspirations for a life without constant fear and humiliation. Some first steps are obvious: to severely cut the numbers of troops in Kashmir; to lift the economic blockade on the Kashmir Valley; and to allow Kashmiris to trade freely across the line of control with Pakistan.

India’s record of pitiless intransigence does not inspire much hope that it will take these necessary steps toward the final and comprehensive resolution of Kashmir’s long-disputed status. In fact, an indefinite curfew has already been imposed and Indian troops have again killed dozens of demonstrators. But a brutal suppression of the nonviolent protests will continue to radicalize a new generation of Muslims and engender a fresh cycle of violence, rendering Kashmir even more dangerous — and not just to South Asia this time.

Pankaj Mishra is the author, most recently, of “Temptations of the West: How to Be Modern in India, Pakistan, Tibet and Beyond.”

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 26, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  Some truths are self evident in the course of human events. Some realities that should be self evident to one and all. Amazingly it is clear as mud for foreign media and even part of the domestic media in Pakistan. The choices are clear as crystal for Pakistanis. The peccant flagitious and reprobate forces of vicious evil are arrayed against the forces of good.

There should be no ambiguity. There should be no confusion. They have been identified, labeled and boxed in.

ABONABLE EVIL FORCES: The unrighteous black forces of wicked evil are the demoniacal marauding hordes of iniquitous Indians-- the imprecatory Indian agents that cross the sacrosanct borders of the land of the pure. The anathematic forces of pernicious evil are the sinful diabolical and maleficent Karzai hoodlums who bring carnage and destruction to the innocent population of Pakistan. The guileful forces of maliciously evil are labeled The Tehrik e Talibal e Pakistan (TTP) and the BLA. This pestilent terror outfit and their noxious evil serpentine puppet Bait Mehsud is an miscreant of immoral India and malignant Karzai.

GOOD FORCES OF THE CRESCENT AND STAR: The propitious laudable forces which are good are the brave tribals of FATA, Pasktunkhwa and Baluchistan who are holding the Crescent and Star. The beatific forces of good are the men in khaki who are defending the borders.

The beatific patriotic tribals of Pakistan are rising up against the foreigners and the destructive forces of hell.

PAKISTAN: Border Villages Rise Up Against Taliban Ashfaq Yusufzai

PESHAWAR, Aug 26 (IPS) - "We are trend-setters. Others are following us," boasts Rauf Khan, mayor of Pakistan’s Buner district, where villagers killed six militants in the Dara Shalbandi area on Aug. 14.

In some parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), people are enlisting in anti-Taliban squads to take on the extremists who are blamed for a spate of abductions and arson attacks on girls’ schools, rural clinics and cyber cafes.

Rauf Khan is leading the village defence squads in Buner, a small valley between Peshawar and Swat. On Aug. 8, the Taliban had attacked the Pir Baba police station in Buner and killed nine policemen.

The village defence squad retaliated with indiscriminate firing that resulted in the deaths of eight militants, including Kamran Khan, the so-called chief of the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in adjacent Mardan district.

"Villagers had asked the militants to surrender before they laid siege," Khan told IPS. "But the militants requested safe passage. That was denied. Then the militants threw a hand-grenade in the direction of the villagers to break the siege," he recounts.

Pakistan’s border regions -- the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and NWFP – are infested with armed groups that espouse a radical Islam, influenced by Afghanistan’s erstwhile Taliban rulers. The Taliban had crossed the porous border into Pakistan when they were ousted by U.S. troops from Kabul in end-2001.

Violence has spiralled in recent months, particularly in Swat, the stronghold of the TTP. About 186 primary and middle schools for girls were torched in the district over the last two months, according to the NWFP Education Minister, Sardar Hussain Babak.

"We fear the Taliban could replicate the same in Buner if they were given a free hand. We have held several meetings and decided that we wouldn’t let Buner go Swat’s way," says Fareedullah, a local elder, who was part of the defence squad that killed Taliban on Aug. 14.

Initially the local people -- ethnic Pakhtoon or Pashtun cousins of the Afghan Taliban – welcomed the guests from across the border. But in 2005, the U.S., in the pursuit of its so-called ‘war on terror’ on militant Islam, began putting pressure on the Pakistan government to evict the outsiders, and FATA became a battleground for the military.
The following year the U.S. launched unmanned drone attacks on North and South Waziristan, forcing thousands to flee their villages. The Taliban capitalised on the strong anti-U.S. sentiment to challenge the Pakistan military.
Fear of intensifying military action in Swat and neighbouring Bajaur Agency, FATA, have triggered the current backlash against the Islamic fighters.
"We are seeing the writing on the wall. If we don’t prevent the Taliban at this stage, there is every possibility the military would launch an operation and the 11million population would be migrating in a state of helplessness to safer areas," says Rauf Khan.
On Aug. 15, a jirga (assembly) of elected councillors in Mardan district (NWFP) decided to set up anti-Taliban squads on the Buner model.

"The Taliban had already bombed about a dozen girls’ schools besides bombing 50 CD shops and attacking police stations," says Shakoor Khan of Bakhshali locality who participated in the jirga. "Before the Taliban resorts to torching more schools, we have decided to resist them," he told IPS.

In Upper Dir, NWFP, the jirga met with the local Taliban on Aug. 15, and asked them to leave the district immediately.

Upper Dir has been flooded with some 100,000 internally displaced by the military operations in adjacent Bajaur Agency. "We are not going to let the Taliban play with the future of our people. We don’t want schools to be burnt and our coming generations uneducated," asserts Gulzar Khan, a local leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami Party.
In Swabi district of NWFP, similar jirgas have established anti-Taliban squads which patrol the villages at night. "The good news is that all the political parties are supporting the move, because it has paid off in the context of Buner," observes Rehman Shah, a local leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) whose leader, Benazir Bhutto’s murder last December is blamed on the Pakistan Taliban. The PPP is in power in Islamabad.
"All the criminals in these areas are carrying out anti-social activities in the garb of the Taliban. The Taliban, used to be students of religious schools, who guided the people on the right path. But now the situation is quite the opposite. They are leading anti-social activities," comments Himayatullah Mayar, the mayor of Mardan.

A local jirga in Buner district has advised the police to stop night patrols. "We will kill any person seen after midnight. We have advised the local population not to come out of their houses," warns mayor Rauf Khan.

The Awami National Party-led provincial government has emerged a strong supporter of the anti-Taliban squads. On Aug 12, the provincial government had dispatched two helicopters to Buner to bombard Taliban hideouts within one hour of a request from the district administration.

Elsewhere in Lakki Marwat and Hangu districts, villagers have purged their areas of the Taliban. They have warned that all suspected Taliban fighters would be shot at sight. The NWFP government issued a quarter-page advertisement in all national Urdu dailies after the incident in Buner on Aug. 14, congratulating the village defence squads and urging other districts to put a stop to the spread of the Taliban.

It stated: "Militants bring destruction wherever they go. For a bright future, prosperity and development, follow the wise decisions of formation of anti-Taliban squads in Buner, Hangu, Dir, Swabi, Mardan, Lakki Marwat where the people have decided to cleans their areas of militants at their own." (END/2008)

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  The Russians in 1860 destroyed the independent Islamic Emirate of Abhkazia and killed or deported all the Muslims of the state. At the time, the West was quiet and celebrated the death of massacres and deportation of the Muslims. It is ironic that today the progeny of the Czars invade Georgia as champions of Abhkazia and Ossetia.

Islamic Emerite of Georgia 8th-1122 AD still haunts Russia: The West condemns Russia over Georgia: Western leaders have condemned strongly Russia's decision to recognise the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. US President George Bush warned his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, that his "irresponsible decision" was exacerbating tensions in the region.  Georgia said Russia was seeking to "change Europe's borders by force". Earlier, Mr Medvedev told the BBC that Russia had been obliged to act because of Georgia's "genocide" of separatists.

He also said Moscow had felt obliged to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as other countries had done with Kosovo earlier this year.

Russian president speaks to BBC. The president said Russia's relations with the West were deteriorating sharply and a new Cold War could not be ruled out., but that his country did not want one. "There are no winners in a Cold War," he told the BBC's Bridget Kendall in an exclusive interview in the Russian town of Sochi.

The separatist authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have had de facto independence since the early 1990s, have thanked Russia. Fighting between Russia and Georgia began on 7 August after the Georgian military tried to retake South Ossetia by force. Russian forces subsequently launched a counter-attack and the conflict ended with the ejection of Georgian troops from both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and an EU-brokered ceasefire.

'No easy choice'

In an announcement on Russian television, President Medvedev said he had signed a decree recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and called on other states to follow his example. This is 21st century brutal invasion, and 21st century large-scale ethnic cleansing Mikhail Saakashvili Georgian President

Mr Medvedev said he had "taken into account the expression of free will by the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples" and accused Georgia of failing over many years to negotiate a peaceful settlement. "That was no easy choice to make, but it is the sole chance of saving people's lives," he added.  International dismay at Russia's declaration came almost immediately.

President Bush said Russia should "reconsider this irresponsible decision" and "live up to its international commitments". "This decision is inconsistent with numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia has voted for in the past, and is also inconsistent with the French-brokered six-point ceasefire agreement which President Medvedev signed," he said in a statement.

"Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations," he added.

ISLAM IN ABKHAZIA-The Muslims survived the Muhajiroba (the Georgian inquisition): Prior to the mid-eighteenth century,Christianity co-existed in Abkhazia with Islam and local pagan beliefs. With the establishment of Ottoman rule, however, the Georgians attempted to weaken Muslim position in the region, and they accordingly set about demolishing Abkhazia’s mosques and.60. It backfired.  Islam became more widespread as a result, at least until the muhajiroba of the 1860s when Muslims were driven out of Abkhazia into Turkey by Russian imperial authorities.

61
Despite the muhajiroba, observers at the time observed few signs of tension between the
religious communities in Abkhazia. Christian missionaries reported that most Muslim Abkhaz
practiced Islamic rites and observed Islamic celebrations, including fasting during the month of Ramadan and the celebration of the qurban. They would also invite mullahs to preside over burial ceremonies. But most embraced various Christian traditions as well, including the celebration of Christmas and Easter and commemoration of the holy days of the Virgin Mary and Saint George.

According to reports by the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the
Caucasus, efforts to propagate Islam in Abkhazia increased in the late nineteenth century.62 At the time, however, many Muslims were also converting to Christianity. According to data gath21 ered by the Society, between 1866 and 1902 a total of 21,336 Muslim Abkhaz became Christian.

Moreover, the missionaries complained that marriages between Christians and Muslims were common, even more so in Abkhazia than in other parts of the Caucasus. As a result, they argued that the most salient cleavage for the Abkhaz was social status, not religion.63 There was also little evidence during the Soviet period of religiosity among the Abkhaz.

As Nestor Lakoba, the Communist Party first secretary of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia in the 1920s and 1930s, remarked, “Religion for the Abkhazian is meaningless. The Abkhaz by his nature and historically is an atheist and nonbeliever.”64
The ongoing struggle over sovereignty between the Abkhaz and Tbilisi make it impossible
to study the religious situation in the region today. In the last few years, ties to Muslim
communities in the North Caucasus, as well as the return of the descendants of the muhajirs from Turkey, appear to have led to a modest increase in the role of Islam among the Abkhaz.

SOUTH OSSETIA & ABKHAZIA

South Ossetia   Population: About 70,000 (before recent conflict)

Capital: Tskhinvali President: Eduard Kokoity

Abkhazia Population: About 250,000 (2003)

Capital: Sukhumi President: Sergei Bagapsh

"In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions that remain in force, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are within the internationally recognised borders of Georgia, and they must remain so."

France, the current holder of the presidency of the European Union, also condemned Russia's decision and called for a political solution.

"We think it is against the territorial integrity of Georgia and we cannot accept it," Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said.

Nato's Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said the announcement was a "direct violation" of numerous UN Security Council resolutions on Georgia which Russia itself had endorsed.

Earlier, Russia cancelled a visit by Mr de Hoop Scheffer, one of a series of measures to suspend co-operation with the alliance.

Russia's ambassador to Nato said the trip would be delayed until relations between the two were clarified.

'Completely illegal'

Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili accused Russia of trying to "break the Georgian state, undermine the fundamental values of Georgia, and to wipe Georgia from the map".

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Georgian president speaks to BBC

"Today's step by Russia is completely illegal and will have no legal basis, neither for Georgia nor for the rest of the world," he said.

Mr Saakashvili described the declaration as "the first attempt in Europe after Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union to... change the borders of Europe by force".

Speaking later to the BBC, he said the move had been "a blatant attempt to legalise the results of ethnic cleansing [which] Russian troops are continuing to commit, right now as we speak, and that have been committed during the last several years".

The president accused Russian troops of "throwing out the remaining population, destroying the villages, killing and raping and looting people" in the breakaway regions.

"This is 21st century brutal invasion, and 21st century large-scale ethnic cleansing," he said. "How can the world allow them to get away with this?"

Earlier, the head of European security organisation, the OSCE, Alexander Stubb, also accused Russia of "trying to empty" South Ossetia of Georgians.

Mr Saakashvili said the international community had to challenge "Russian aggression" in the strongest possible terms.

"This is not between Georgia and Russia anymore," he said. "This is an unparalleled challenge by Russia of international law and order."

He said the response required Western aid to help Georgia recover, an international peacekeeping force on the ground, and the speeding up of his country's integration of Nato.

In the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, however, Moscow's move was warmly welcomed.

The leader of South Ossetia's separatist government, Eduard Kokoity, said he would ask Moscow to set up a military base on his territory.

In the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali there were scenes of jubilation while residents in Abkhazia took to the streets to celebrate the news, firing into the air.

Cold War fears

In an interview with the BBC at his residency in Sochi, on the border with Abkhazia, Mr Medvedev later said Russia had been obliged to act following a "genocide" started by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili against separatists in South Ossetia in August.

HAVE YOUR SAY Making peace is like clapping your hands. You can't clap with 1 hand MaxMaxmilianMaximusI], Indian Caesar in, Singapore

The president compared Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008.

He also denied that Russia had breached the ceasefire agreement with Georgia, saying pursuing the security of the two regions included addressing their status.

"The most important thing was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe to save the lives of people for whom we are responsible, because most of them they are Russian citizens," he said. "So we had to take a decision recognising the two states as independent."

Although most of Russia's forces pulled out of the rest of Georgia last Friday, it is maintaining a presence both within the two rebel regions and in buffer zones imposed round their boundaries.

Some Russian troops also continue to operate near the Black Sea port of Poti, south of Abkhazia, where Russia says it will carry out regular inspections of cargo.

The US said on Tuesday that its warships would deliver aid to Georgia's port of Poti, which is under Russian control. The move could mean US and Russian forces coming face to face.

پاکستان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 26, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   The Financial Times reports that Mr. Zardari has has dementia, major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Does these mental diseases handicap Mr. Zardari? For a mad man, Mr. Zardari surely has been able to outwit The Tubelight--Mr. Sharif and has run circles around Mr. Musharraf as well as the other politicians in Pakistan

Doubts cast on Zardari’s mental health

By Michael Peel in London and Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad Published: August 25 2008 23:31 | Last updated: August 25 2008 23:31

Asif Ali Zardari, the leading contender for the presidency of nuclear-armed Pakistan, was suffering from severe psychiatric problems as recently as last year, according to court documents filed by his doctors.

The widower of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was diagnosed with a range of serious illnesses including dementia, major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder in a series of medical reports spanning more than two years.

 

Mr Zardari, the co-chair of the Pakistan People’s party, and its candidate to succeed president Pervez Musharraf, who stepped down last week, spent 11 of the past 20 years in Pakistani prisons fighting corruption allegations, during which he claims to have been tortured.

While Mr Zardari was not available to comment, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan’s high commissioner to London, speaking on his behalf, said he was now fit and well.

News of his medical records came as Nawaz Sharif, head of the junior partner in the government, pulled his party out of the coalition, partly because of differences over Mr Zardari’s presidential candidacy.

In court documents seen by the Financial Times, Philip Saltiel, a New York City-based psychiatrist, said in a March 2007 diagnosis that Mr Zardari’s imprisonment had left him suffering from “emotional instability” and memory and concentration problems. “I do not foresee any improvement in these issues for at least a year,” Mr Saltiel wrote.

Stephen Reich, a New York state-based psychologist, said Mr Zardari was unable to remember the birthdays of his wife and children, was persistently apprehensive and had thought about suicide.

Mr Zardari used the medical diagnoses to argue successfully for the postponement of a now-defunct English High Court case in which Pakistan’s government was suing him over alleged corruption, court records show.

The case – brought to seize some of his UK assets – was dropped in March, at about the same time that corruption charges in Pakistan were dismissed. However, the court papers raise questions about Mr Zardari’s ability to help guide one of the world’s most strategically important countries following the resignation last week of Mr Musharraf, under whose rule the corruption cases against the PPP leader and his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, were pursued.

Mr Zardari and Ms Bhutto, who was murdered in December while leading the PPP in elections that gave it the most seats in Pakistan’s parliament, were also the target of corruption investigations in Switzerland and Spain. The Geneva prosecutor said on Monday that money laundering charges against Mr Zardari were being dropped.

Mr Hasan, a long-standing political ally and friend of the Zardari/Bhutto family, told the Financial Times on Monday that Mr Zardari had subsequent medical examinations and his doctors had “declared him medically fit to run for political office and free of any symptoms”.

“You have got to understand that while he was in prison on charges that were never proven, there were attempts to kill him,” Mr Hasan said. “At that time, he was surrounded by fear all the time. Any human being living in such a condition will of course suffer from the effects of continuous fear. But that is all history.

“In fact, many people were very impressed to see Mr Zardari go through the trauma of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but still hold himself together, hold his family, especially his children, close to him at this very difficult time.”

پاکستان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 26, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   India is losing its dilapidated manufacturing base to the factory of the world, also called China. China is also overtaking the $41 Billion software industry of India.  Now Indonesia and other countries are taking away major Japanese manufacturers.

 

Sanyo to pull out of Indian TV venture: TOKYO: Japan’s Sanyo Electric Co is pulling the plug on a loss-making joint venture in India producing cathode-ray tube televisions, a spokesman said Monday. Sanyo closed a factory in Bangalore run jointly with Indian electronics company BPL last month and will shift the production to Indonesia, disbanding the joint venture by March next year. “Because of the increasingly fierce competition, we don’t expect the business performance there to improve in the future,” said Sanyo spokesman Ryo Hagiwara, adding that cathode-ray tube TVs no longer meet the market’s demands. afp

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

Georgia was a Muslim Emirate with most of the people of the Islamic faith.

For mostly strategic reasons, Russian imperial authorities attempted to change the demographic balance in some of Georgia’s border regions in the nineteenth century by encouraging emigration of Christians. The attempt was only partially successful, however, and was soon abandoned. By and large, Russian imperial authorities were tolerant of Georgia’s Muslims.

By the end of the imperial period, the population of Georgia was some 20 percent Muslim.
Soviet authorities were considerably less tolerant. The militantly atheistic Soviet state
launched a campaign against religious institutions and ecclesiastical authorities in the 1920s and 1930s. A measured accommodation was reached with the USSR’s traditional religions during the Second World War, including Islam, at which point the Soviets established four Muslim Religious Boards (dukhovnoe upravlenie) to oversee Muslim affairs in the USSR. The one for the 5 entire South Caucasus region was based in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan.8 Thus both official Islamic institutions and unofficial practices and religiosity survived the Soviet period. Georgia,

like other parts of the Soviet Union, witnessed a notable “Islamic revival” in the Gorbachev era and the early post-Soviet periods.

The centrality of Orthodox Christianity in the Georgian national consciousness, however,
has increased in recent years, indeed to the point where the national flag was changed after the “Rose Revolution” of November 2003 from the secular design of the first independent Georgian Republic (1917–1921) to one with five crosses, a change that the new authorities hoped would underline Georgia’s place in the Christian (that is, “Western”) world. Nevertheless, the Georgian national narrative celebrates the country’s traditional confessional diversity and tolerance, and its post-Soviet constitution provides for a secular state and freedom of religion. Today, the country’s “traditional” confessions (Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, Armenian Gregorian Christianity, Sunni and Shiite Islam, Judaism) are widely accepted, even by most Georgian nativists, as legitimate elements of Georgian society and history. There is, however, considerable popular
hostility toward non-traditional confessions, such as the increasingly active Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baha’is, Seventh Day Adventists, and Hare Krishnas. Nevertheless, Georgia, unlike Russia, has not adopted a law on religion, although one has been under consideration by parliament for eight years. The law, particularly its provisions on non-traditional confessions, has been a topic of considerable controversy.

The size of Georgia’s Muslim population is difficult to estimate. The last Soviet census,
which was conducted in 1989, gave the following breakdown of traditionally Muslim nationalities in the republic: Azeris (308,000), Abkhaz (96,000, although only a portion of Abkhaz were traditionally Muslim), Kists (12,000), Avars (4,200), Tatars (4,100), Kazakhs (2,600), Uzbeks (1,300), and Tajiks (1,200).9 There are, however, significant numbers of Muslims among other nationalities in the republic, particularly among Georgian-speakers in the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria in Georgia’s southwest.

The 1989 Soviet census did not inquire into religious identity or practices, and while a census was conducted in 2002, its results are considered unreliable 6 given the extent of disorder in the country. In short, the number of people who consider themselves
adherents of Islam, whether among traditional Muslims or Georgians, is unknown.
Moreover, it is inherently difficult to classify individuals as believers or non-believers,
since there are degrees of religiosity, and the distinction between believer and non-believer is to a degree an arbitrary one. In general, it is possible to distinguish four groups of Georgian Muslims on the basis of religiosity. The first consists of those who execute all religious rituals and believe that the non-observance of the religious prescriptions of Allah will mean severe punishment.

For them, fasting, the ritual of sacrifice (qurban), and recitation of religious passages
(mevlud) mean that God will forgive their sins, which will allow them to enter Paradise upon their death. Second are those who believe in God but pray or visit mosques only intermittently.

Third are those who believe in God but observe religious rituals as a family or in the name of national tradition only. Finally, some are agnostic with respect to faith but nevertheless consider themselves to be “Muslim” in the sense that Islam is seen as part of their culture.

With these caveats in mind, Georgian scholars have estimated that the number of “Muslims ” in the republic in 1989 was as high as 640,000, or 12 percent of Georgia’s population at the time (then some 5.4 million). Today, most estimates are considerably lower, at around 400,000, a decrease that results in part from emigration and, in part, from a more considered distinction between believer and non-believer.10 The percentage of Muslims in the total population appears to have changed little, however, because the total population has declined by over one million (the 2002 census identified some 4.4 million Georgians).

Kvemo Kartli (Lower Kartli, Georgian: ქვემო ქართლი) is a historic province and current administrative region in southeastern Georgia. The city of Rustavi is a regional capital. The population is mixed between Azeris (45,1%) and Georgians (44%), who constituted a majority of the population.^[1]

Adjara (Georgian: აჭარა — ach'ara; Russian: Аджария; Turkish: Acara), officially the Autonomous Republic of Adjara (აჭარის ავტონომიური რესპუბლიკა — ach'aris avtonomiuri respublika), (also known as Ajaria, Ajara, Adjaria, Adzharia, Adzhara, and Achara) is an autonomous republic of Georgia, in the southwestern corner of the country, bordered by Turkey to the south and the eastern end of the Black Sea. Formerly it was known as Acara under the Ottoman rule and Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Adjar ASSR) under the Soviet Union.

The Ottomans conquered the area in 1614. The people converted to Islam in this period. They were forced to cede Ajaria to the expanding Russian Empire in 1878.

After a temporary occupation by Turkish and British troops in 1918–1920, Ajaria became part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1920. After a brief military conflict in March 1921, Ankara's government ceded the territory to Georgia due to Article VI of Treaty of Kars on grounds that autonomy is provided for the Muslim population. The Soviet Union established the Adjar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921 in accord with this clause. Thus, Adjara was still a component part of Georgia, but with considerable local autonomy.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ajaria became part of a newly independent but politically divided Republic of Georgia. It avoided being dragged into the chaos and civil war that afflicted the rest of the country between 1991–1993 due largely to the authoritarian rule of its leader Aslan Abashidze. Although he successfully maintained order in Adjara and made it one of the country's most prosperous regions, he was accused of involvement in organised crime – notably large-scale smuggling to fund his government and enrich himself personally – as well as human rights violations.^{[citation needed]} The central government in Tbilisi had very little say in what went on in Adjara; during the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, it seemed convenient to turn a blind eye to events in Adjara.

This changed following the Rose Revolution of 2003 when Shevardnadze was deposed in favour of the reformist opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili, who pledged to crack down on separatism within Georgia. In the spring of 2004, a major crisis in Ajaria erupted as the central government sought to reimpose its authority on the region. It threatened to develop into an armed confrontation. However, Saakashvili's ultimatums and mass protests against Abashidze's autocratic rule forced the Adjaran leader to resign in May 2004, following which he went into exile in Russia. After Abashidze's ousting, a new law was introduced to redefine the terms of Ajaria's autonomy – a measure which some^[who?] have criticised as an effective elimination of most of the region's autonomous powers.

For many years, Russia maintained the 12th Military Base (the former 145th Motor Rifle Division) in Batumi.^[1] This was a source of great tension with Georgia, which had threatened to block access to the facility. Following talks in March 2005, the Russian government proposed to begin the process of withdrawal later the same year; Russia returned the base to Georgia on November 17, 2007, more than a year ahead of schedule.

In July 2007, the seat of the Georgian Constitutional Court was moved from Tbilisi to Batumi

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Is this the First War between Russia and a Former Soviet State?

The world is looking to the Caucasus region with dismay. President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia has sent his country's. forces into the breakaway region of South Ossetia, and its protector, Russia, has retaliated by sending in tanks and aircraft. Is a region that is home to all of 75,000 people about to become the scene of a hot war?

The South Ossetian coat of arms depicts a snow leopard raising its paw in a threatening gesture, against a backdrop of impregnable mountains. The warlike South Ossetians' most famous son was a man whose name alone instills fear: Josef Stalin.

But none of this was enough to deter Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili when he ordered his army to invade

Tskhinvali, the capital of separatist South Ossetia, a region in the center of Georgia, on Thursday night. Skirmishes had been going on for weeks, and on Thursday evening Saakashvili had even announced a ceasefire. But then, at around midnight, Georgian forces attacked in an effort "to reestablish constitutional order," as a high-ranking Georgian general described it.

Within hours Georgian units, using rockets and fighter jets, had apparently demolished entire streets of Tskhinvali. The "president" of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, a former freestyle wrestler, said on Friday evening that an estimated 1,400 people had died and characterized the Georgian invasion as ethnic cleansing. Saakashvili, however, announced the mobilization of 100,000 reservists.

POPULATION: According to the 2002 census, the population of Adjara is 376,016. The Adjarians (Ajars) are an ethnographic group of the Georgian people who speak a group of local dialects known collectively as Adjaran. The written language is Georgian.

The Georgian population of Adjara had been generally known as "Muslim Georgians" until the 1926 Soviet census which listed them as "Ajars" and counted 71,000 of them. Later, they were simply classified under a broader category of Georgians as no official Soviet census asked about religion.

Ethnic minorities include Laz, Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Abkhaz, etc

Religion

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of Georgia's independence accelerated re-Christianisation, especially among the young,^[3] a process allegedly encouraged by the governmental officials. However, there are still remaining Sunni Muslim communities in Adjara, mainly in the Khulo district. According to the 2006 estimates by the Department of Statistics of Adjara, 63% are Georgian Orthodox Christians, and 30% Muslim,^[2] while according to the BBC, "nowadays about half the population professes the Islamic faith".^[4] The remaining are Armenian Christians (0.8%), Roman Catholics (0.2%), and others (6%).^[2]

====================================

Islam in AJARA:

Muslim Ajaria was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early seventeenth century and was fully a part of of the Ottoman Empire in 1820s. The Ottomans ceded Ajaria to Russia in 1878, some 6,000 Muslim Ajarians fled the region in search of refuge in Turkey.
7
Orthodox Christian missionaries also began actively proselytizing in the region in the late nineteenth century. The long-standing Christian presence in the region remains as such today.11

The Muslims of Ajaria are, virtually without exception, Sunnis. Sufism, however, is rare,
despite its widespread presence in Turkey to the west and among other Muslims of Georgia.
Moreover, in general Islamicization in Ajaria competed with  Georgian Christianity.
For the most part, Ajarians have traditionally thought of themselves as “Georgians” (their
native language was Georgian). Turkish was spoken in the region, particularly after the 1860s.

There were no religious institutions of higher learning in Ajaria under the Ottomans.
Instead, the children of the Ajarian nobility were often sent to religious schools in Turkey and other Muslim countries, and as a result, the clerical elite tended to have a pro-Turkish orientation.

Most Ajarians had only limited opportunities to learn Turkish or Arabic, thus most continued to speak Georgian. In Batumi, the Ajarian capital, there was one madrasa that combined primary and secondary schools and where instruction was conducted in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. In Ajaria’s second largest city, Kobuleti, where at the end of the nineteenth century the population consisted almost entirely of Georgian-speakers, there was another madrasa, where again teaching was conducted in Arabic and Turkish.13 Even so, Arabic was incomprehensible to most of the madrasa’s students, who typically memorized religious texts without knowing their meaning. The recitation of prayers and reading of holy texts in Arabic in mosques was not understandable even to many mullahs, let alone to lay worshippers.
8
The first mosques appeared in Ajaria in seaside regions when the Turks began to deploy
military garrisons in the early nineteenth century. Over the years, their numbers gradually increased, although relatively few were built in mountainous regions, where Christianity maintained a strong presence.14

Tensions between Muslims and Christians in Ajaria appear to have increased in the
second half of the nineteenth century. In 1855, during the Crimean War, most Ajarians fought on the side of the Turks. During the Turkish-Russian war of 1877–78, Ajarians held a number of top positions in the Ottoman armed forces, and some 6,000 to 10,000 served as soldiers.15

During World War I, Ajarian muhajirs (emigrants to Turkey) formed a division within the Turkish army.16 An anti-Russian terrorist organization known as “The Avengers” appeared in Ajaria after the Turkish defeat in 1878. Financed by both the Ottomans and the British, the organization attempted to kill Russian officers and officials, along with Ajarians who collaborated with the imperial presence.17 Nevertheless, many Ajarians during this period continued to identify politically with Russia, indeed to the point where some advocated unification with the tsarist state.

During the war of 1877–78, the Russian general Komarov informed the commander-in-chief of the Transcaucasian army that the “disposition of Ajarians towards Russians is perfect, and the region is waiting to connect to Russia.”18

Ajaria was incorporated into Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, at
which point Batumi was made into a free trade zone.19 Article 6 of the earlier Treaty of San Stefano was left unchanged, according to which the population living in areas conquered by Russia was forced to sell property and immigrate to Turkey. As a result, many of the Muslims of the region were forced to emigrate (the muhajiroba), a process that continued through the end of the 1880s.

Russian sovereignty proved a hardship for many. Previously the Turkish border played an
important role in the economic life of the region, as Ajarian men left for Turkey seeking seasonal work. After accumulating savings, they would typically return to their native villages. With the establishment of Russian border guards and tariff posts, however, movement across the border 9 became difficult. These and other restrictions proved a heavy burden. At the same time, because they feared that local Muslims would prove disloyal to the Tsar, the authorities attempted to populate the region with peoples—mostly Christians—from other parts of Russia. They also used both official and informal means to encourage the emigration of Muslims to Turkey. Members of the feudal Muslim nobility who were emigrating forced dependant peasants to leave with
them, while the local Muslim clergy encouraged emigration on religious grounds. (Eventually many reconciled themselves to Russian rule, however, calling on their congregations to cooperate with the new authorities.) The burning of Ajarian villages by departing Turkish troops also promoted Muslim emigration.20

It is difficult to estimate the number of refugees during this period. Our best guess is
around 10,000—6,000 of whom were Ajarians (many of the rest were Abkhaz—see below). 21 An indicator of the extent of the decrease in the Muslim population can be found in demographic data from Batumi. Of the 4,970 inhabitants in 1872, approximately 4,500 were Muslim (Georgian-speakers, Turks, Circassians, and Abkhaz). By the time the census of 1897 was taken, the city’s population had grown enormously, but now the Orthodox Christian population was 15,495 (mostly Slavs). Muslims numbered only 3,156, some of whom were citizens of Turkey.22 A similar picture comes from data for Georgia as a whole. According to official sources, a total of 150,000 individuals left the country for Turkey during the muhajiroba.23 By the beginning of the twentieth century, as many as 200,000 to 250,000 Georgians lived in Turkey.24

Today there are 242 villages in 15 vilayets (provinces) of Turkey with residents of Georgian heritage, 158 of which are populated by Georgians only.25 Georgians live mainly in the Artvin, Rize, Kars, Samsun, and Sinop vilayets, but they are also present in significant numbers in Bursa, Izmit, Istanbul, and Ankara. Most are Sunnis of the Hanafi madzhab (school of Islamic law), although there are a small number of Georgians in Turkey who are Christian (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant).26

At the end of the nineteenth century, Russian officials began to try to win the loyalty of
Georgia’s Muslims, one consequence of which was an end to the policies that had spurred
10 emigration. The Russian state financed the construction of mosques and the opening of madrasas in Ajaria and elsewhere. Some 400 mosques were built in Ajarian villages as a result. Batumi had three mosques, two of which belonged to Turks and one to Georgians. (Interestingly, the trustees of the Georgian mosque were members of the Abashidze feudal family, ancestors of the recently removed strongman of Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze).27
State officials also began to reach out to the Muslim clergy in the hopes it would “operate
in accordance with the interests of the government, and the government in turn could supervise its actions and have constant control over it.”28 As early as 1870, imperial authorities issued regulations specifying the rights and duties of the Islamic clergy, and as time passed, the government made additional efforts to bring the clergy under its control. It created a special administration to oversee the Islamic establishment; formed educational religious centers at the local level; and prohibited study in Muslim countries. In addition, it opened a special school in Tbilisi for the training of the both Sunni and Shiite mullahs, mullahs who presumably would serve the interests of the state. Finally, Muslim khojas (teachers) were appointed by the government and received state salaries—for example, a certain khoja, Limon Efendi Kartsivadze, was given an annual salary of 100 Russian imperial rubles.29

Meanwhile, state efforts in the latter half of the nineteenth century to promote Christianity in the region proved ineffective. Nevertheless, most Ajarian Muslims continued to identify as Georgian. As a result, during the First World War a “Committee for the Liberation of Muslim Georgia” was created in Tbilisi, with Memed Abashidze as its chairman (Abashidze had been the founder and editor of the newspaper Muslim Georgia). The goal of the organization was to “liberate” Muslim Georgia from Turkish rule. For some Ajarians, however, Islamic identity meant loyalty to Turkey. This was true even before the October Revolution, but the establishment of Communist authority in the region, and the threat it posed to traditional religious practices and nationalist sentiments, radicalized pro-Turkish elements in the Ajarian community. A pan-Turkish and pan-Islamist party, Jemiet Islam, was founded in 1921, which advocated Ajarian 11 unification with Turkey. Still others championed Ajarian nationalism, advocating the creation of an independent Ajarian state.30

During the brief period of Georgian independence (1918–1921), a pro-Georgian orientation
prevailed in Ajaria. This was made clear in the final declaration of the special “Congress of
the Ajarian People,” which convened in Batumi during the period of British occupation in the fall of 1918. The declaration asserted that while the people of the Batumi district were Muslim by religion, they were Georgian by virtue of history, origin, language, and culture. It also claimed that territorially and economically the region had always been part of Georgia.31

The establishment of Soviet power and the creation of the Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic (SSR) in February 1921 were followed by the formation of Ajaria as an autonomous republic (ASSR) within the Georgian SSR in June. Interestingly, it was the only autonomous republic in the USSR that was established on a religious rather than an ethno-linguistic basis (most Ajarians at the time spoke Georgian).32 The reasons were political, particularly the complex relationship between the USSR and Turkey in the early 1920s that resulted from the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Even to this day, the treaty plays an important role in influencing relations between Turkey, Russia, and Georgia. For example, while signing a Treaty of Friendship and Good Will with Georgia in 1992, the Turkish president demanded that Georgia provide proof that Tbilisi would abide by the treaty’s conditions.33

At the beginning of the Soviet era there were 158 mosques in Ajaria.34 In the years that
followed, the number declined dramatically thanks to the regime’s harsh campaign against
religion. By 1936, only two registered mosques remained.35 The state also undertook an aggressive campaign of propaganda in favor of atheism. A “Union of Atheists” was created in Ajaria in 1925, and two Soviet newspapers were published in the region in the 1920s and 1930s to promote the official line: The Atheist (Bezbozhni, meaning “godless” in Russian), which came out in Russia, and The Fighting Atheist, which was published in Georgian. Islamic law (Sharia) and the muftiate (the religious affairs administration) were abolished in 1926.36 Soviet authorities also tried to force the Muslim clergy to support Soviet rule in their religious vaiazes (sermons/preach12
ing).

On January 10, 1930, an accommodation of sorts was reached when Khoja Iskander
Artmeladze called on Muslims to obey Soviet authorities and not fall under the influence of antiregime agitators.37 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, pressure on Islam diminished during and after World War II, and Islamic practices in the region survived. Islam remained depoliticized, however, and Islamic practices were in many cases informal, carried out beyond the purview of the officially recognized religious establishment.
Today it appears that most Muslims in Ajaria have a respectful attitude toward Christians
and Christianity. Doubtless this is partly because Ajarians afford their ancestors great respect, and many of those ancestors were Christians. Moreover, many young Ajarians have embraced Christianity, although it is impossible to know just how many. What can be said is that re-Christianization has accelerated, although a significant number of Ajarians still consider themselves Muslims and carry out Islamic rites. The coexistence of the two religions in a single family (particularly cases where younger members of the family are Christians while their elders are Muslims) is now quite common.

Christianity enjoys substantial state support in Ajaria today. In a move of obvious political
significance, the former strongman Aslan Abashidze converted to Christianity despite the fact that, as noted earlier, he is the descendant of a well-known Ajarian Muslim family that not only strengthened Georgian consciousness among the Ajarian Muslims after the region became a part of the Russian Empire in 1878, but also promoted the strengthening of Islam.38

Islam, in contrast, is not supported by local authorities. During an expedition to the
highlands of Ajaria in September 2003, local authorities went to great lengths to prevent
Sanikidize and his colleagues from contacting Muslims, at one point going so far as to demand that they show them a document signed by Abashidze himself giving them permission to proceed with their research. Similarly, the person in charge of Ajaria’s religious affairs claimed that no mosque had been built in region in the last few years, although the research team saw many new mosques in Ajarian villages.
13
At least part of the funding for construction of these new mosques comes from Turkish
citizens of Georgian heritage. Most are built using standard plans and have no value as architectural monuments. But there are also old mosques in the villages. Of special interest are those in the villages of Ghordjomi and Beghleti. The mosque in Ghordjomi was built in the nineteenth century, while the mosque of Beghleti dates from the beginning of the twentieth century. Both are decorated inside and out with ornaments. And in both a vine tree is a major ornament—a traditional symbol of Georgian Christianity. In villages without mosques, small chapels or houses of believers serve as places of worship. There are imams at the mosques of Khulo, Ghordjomi, and Batumi (see below), although none has received a classical religious education.

There is only one mosque in Batumi, whereas there are 14 Christian churches (12 Orthodox, one Armenian Gregorian, and one Catholic). The central hall of the Batumi mosque can accommodate about 1,500 believers. According its mufti, Avtandil (his Islamic name is Mahmud) Kamashidze, about 200 believers visit the mosque every day, a number that goes up to 400 on Fridays. He also claimed that as many as 4,000 attend during religious feasts, most of whom assemble in the mosque’s courtyard. However, Sanikidize visited the Batumi mosque twice, and each time there were only 15–20 believers in the courtyard and central hall, which suggests that the figure of 200 daily worshippers everyday is exaggerated. There also appeared to be few foreign or young worshippers at the mosque.

Nevertheless, unlike its counterpart in Tbilisi, the Batumi mosque is open every day.
During the month of Ramadan women have the right to enter it and pray in the women’s chapel on the second floor. The mosque also offers courses in Koranic studies. While there have been rumors about the construction of a new mosque in Batumi, reportedly with funding from Turkish businessmen, it appears that the idea has been dropped because there are so few worshippers in the city. According to the mufti, the existing mosque is more than adequate to meet current needs. However, a new minaret has been constructed for the Batumi mosque, which has been financed by Turks.
14
Islamic practices in Ajaria today fall into two categories: (1) purely religious rituals such
as daily prayer, the recitation of the Koran, charitable donations (under different forms), sacrifice (qurban), and the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (mevlud or dhyrk, which in different parts of the Muslim world is celebrated in different ways and on different days, and which in Ajaria entails visiting the tombs of relatives and the celebration of important events in the life of a family); and (2) Islamicized Ajarian traditions such as circumcision (sunat), burial ceremonies (janazah), and marriage contracts (niqah, qalim, mahr), including marriage of underage girls.

Many of these rituals take place outside the mosque, in courtyards, fields, or private homes. An important practice among Ajarian Muslims is the religious pledge. In addition, to
ensure that Allah fulfills the desires of believers, they carry out qurban, celebrate mevlud, and read the Koran. Fasting and special collective prayers (taravi) are recited during the holy month of Ramadan. Taravi offered in mosques is generally considered more pious than taravi in private homes, and as a result many believers come to Batumi at the beginning of Ramadan to attend the mosque every evening. The end of fasting is celebrated by Bairam, when in the Batumi mosque as many as 4,000 believers gather (in Tbilisi the figure is only 400 to 500). Another important festival is Kuchuk Bairam (Feast of Sacrifice).39 In addition to ritual sacrifices tied to national traditions, there are Islamic occasions, such as when sacrifice (qurban) is performed in lieu of the hajj. Ritual sacrifice also takes place when disorder strikes a family or when there is a joyous event to celebrate. And as in much of the rest of the Muslim world, a sacrifice is offered at the
beginning of the hajj.

One of the most popular feasts in Ajaria is Khadir geja, which is usually celebrated on the
twenty-seventh day of Ramadan to mark the day that Allah decides the destiny of believers.

Another is Barati geja, which is usually celebrated during the fall and marks the moment when the souls of believers depart to the other world. Ashura, the feast marking the landing of Noah’s ark that is of particular significance to Shiites, is celebrated as well by Sunni Ajarians, although the ritual is different. Finally, the night of Eli Ekenji is celebrated on the fifty-second day after a person’s death when mevlud is read at the tomb.
15
The influence of national traditions on religious practices is the result of numerous
factors—historical, national, religious, and psychological—as well as social environment. Young believers who witness religious traditions in early childhood play a particularly important role in preserving religious traditions. Because younger Ajarians have been converting to Christianity in significant numbers, preserving the Muslim traditions unique to Ajaria is becoming increasingly difficult.

Muslim religious practices in Ajaria are also intermingled with Christian ones. A large
number of “Muslim” toponyms, for example, have Christian roots. As the Georgian art historian Ekvtime Takhaishvili noted at the beginning of the twentieth century: “There is a tradition of going to ziareti in Muslim Georgia that corresponds to the Christian feast of the worship of icons. Ziareti are places for prayer, which in a majority of cases are old churches or places where Christian crosses are erected.”40 Another historian, Dmitri Bakradze, who visited Ajaria during the last years of Turkish domination, similarly observed, “Although Georgian churches were demolished a long time ago, the population considers their ruins as sacred … many Muslim Ajarians pray on their former Christian icons.”41 An example of these syncretic practices is the abundance of vine tree ornaments inside and outside Ajaria’s mosques (wood or stone ornaments
or oil painted images). In the mosque of the village of Drvani, for example, images of grape clusters are carved into the minbar (pulpit) and painted on the walls. Again, this is a Georgian tradition linked to Christianity.42 Indeed, Islam forbids pictures and most inscriptions on tombs—only Islamic formulas, names of the deceased, and dates of births and deaths are allowed, and all inscriptions can be in Arabic. But in Georgia portraits as well as inscriptions written in Georgian, Russia, and Azeri can be found in many Muslim cemeteries.43

A considerable number of young Ajarian Muslims received their religious education
abroad during the last decade. The religious administration of Turkey, Diyanet, is especially active in this regard.44 There are frequent complaints in local newspapers that the government has failed to monitor the quality of the education that young Ajarians are receiving in foreign religious institutions.  16 orientation (the more accurate label is “Salafite”).

ISLAM IN MESKHETIA
Islam came to Meskhetia in the sixteenth century with the arrival of nomadic tribes of
Turkish origin. Thereafter, the establishment of the Ottoman landowner system in the region aided Islamicization. To preserve its power and wealth, the dominant feudal family in the region, the Jaqeli, converted to Islam, and a member of the Jaqeli family almost continuously held the title of Pasha until the abolition of the Akhaltsikhe pashalik in 1829. Other Meskhetian feudal families followed the Jaqeli’s lead.45 Nevertheless, according to the Georgian historian Vakhushti Batonishvili, at the beginning of the eighteenth century most Meskhetian peasants were still Christians, while the nobility was mostly Muslim.46

Like Ajaria, Meskhetia is located in southwestern Georgia. In the eighteenth
century the region of inhabited by Turkic peoples, who had over the centuries migrated to region in large numbers.

After the Russian-Ottoman war of 1828–1829, Armenians began to settle in the region, and they became the largest community in Meskhetia by the end of the nineteenth century. The region was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1829, but a census was conducted in the region only once, in 1897. Unfortunately, the census did not provide a clear picture 17 of religious or political identities.47 According to the 1897 census, the population of Meskhetia (Samtskhe-Javakhetia) consisted of 18,664 Georgians, 67,683 Armenians, and 43,367 “Tatars” and “Turks.”48 “Georgians,” however, included Orthodox, Catholics, and Muslims, so the number of “Georgian” Muslims is impossible to determine.49

50 But there were also Georgian-speaking Muslims who regarded religion as their primary political identity and who accordingly would be counted in the census as Tatars or Turks. Indeed, many Georgian Muslims changed their Georgian family names to Turkish ones because they assumed that “Georgian” was synonymous with “Christian.”51
While the number of Muslims in the region is difficult to assess, what does seem clear is
that state-led efforts to Christianize the Muslim population in Meskhetia were generally unsuccessful.

In 1880, for example, there were only 77 baptisms among Muslim Georgians in
Meskhetia, a figure that did not increase notably in later years.52 After the establishment of Communist rule, Georgian-language secondary schools were replaced by Azeri schools in areas with Georgian-speaking Muslim majorities. In addition, official documents increasingly ignored the linguistic and cultural affiliations of Georgian speaking
Muslims. Georgian-speaking Muslims were referred to as Turks, Muslims, Tatars, or
(eventually) Azeris. People of Turkish origin in Georgia typically referred to themselves, however, as Muslims and would only rarely appropriate the label “Turks,” while Christians tended to refer to them as “Tatars.” In 1937, the Soviet state decided that all people of Turkish origin in the South Caucasus would be categorized officially as “Azeris.” The bilingual (Turkish-Georgian) Muslims of Meskhetia, who were of mixed origin, were also identified as Azeris. There was, thus, a dramatic increase in the number of Azeris registered in Meskhetia in the census of 1939.

Likewise, there was a sudden drop in Azeris in the 1959 census because of the deportation of the so-called “Meskhetian Turks,” many of whom were in fact Georgian-speakers of ethnic Georgian heritage.53
18
The deportation, which took place during World War II, forced all Muslims of Meskhetia
into internal exile, mostly to Central Asia. The number of deportees was on the order of 100,000, although once again it is difficult to establish the exact number. The Meskhetian Turks managed to preserve a high level of religiosity while in internal exile.54 High birth rates also led to rapid population growth.

A second deportation took place in 1989, this time from Central Asia. Currently the redeported live mainly in the Saridabad region of Azerbaijan and in Krasnodar krai in southern Russia. Many hope to return to the homeland of their ancestors in Meskhetia. Most also continue to insist that they are Turks, not ethnic Georgians. They are, therefore, referred to sometimes as “Turks of Meskhetia” rather than “Meskhetian Turks” because “Meskhetian” implies ethnic Georgian to most Georgians. Some scholars prefer an even more precise phrasing: “deported Meskhetians of Turkish orientation” (although some are not, in fact, of Turkish origin).55

Still others distinguish between two groups of deported people—”Turks” and “Georgians.” Finally, the “Meskhetian Turks” themselves distinguish between a pro-Turkish part of the population, which is represented by the movement Vatan, and a pro-Georgian part, which is represented by the movement of Khsna (Salvation). Members of the latter typically consider themselves Georgians.

They are critical of Vatan for being insufficiently aware of the complex ethnopolitical
situation in the region, as well as for what they consider an unrealistic political agenda of
Meskhetian Turkish nationalism. As one Khsna activist explained, what is most important is to return to the homeland of their ancestors, not national orientation.56

The first Muslim Meskhetian returnees arrived in 1969. They were soon forced to leave by
local authorities, however. Between 1982 and 1989, 1,972 Meskhetians returned, but again most left due to fears about personal security, the unsupportive or even hostile attitude of local authorities, isolation from their kin, and economic hardship. Since 1993, the government in Tbilisi has taken measured steps to assist repatriation, and small groups of Meskhetian students have been admitted from CIS countries. In 1994, a Repatriation Service was established under the Ministry of Refugees and Settlement to assist returnees and coordinate efforts for further repatriation.
19
Nevertheless, Tbilisi has continued to drag its feet in creating a comprehensive framework
for promoting repatriation. The primary reason is that repatriation is extremely unpopular
with the Georgian public. When Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe, Tbilisi
promised to make greater efforts to facilitate repatriation—it wanted above all to demonstrate that it was committed to liberal values and “European” norms. There has also been consistent pressure from human rights organizations to recognize the right of the deported to return. Nonetheless, not a single political party or national politician has been willing to incur the political costs of championing repatriation. On the contrary, most have given in to the temptation to win political capital by publicly opposing it. This is especially true of politicians from nearby Samtskhe-Javakheti, for whom a strong anti-repatriation stance is a political necessity.57 It would be unfair, however, to ascribe the resistance to repatriation simply to populism and selfishness.

There are in fact many serious practical reasons why repatriation must be handled with care. The size of the Meskhetian Turk population increased considerably after the
deportation, and it is, therefore, even more difficult for financially strapped Tbilisi to provide for the returnees financially and resolve property claims.58 In addition, Meskhetia is today an ethnically and religiously diverse region, with significant populations of Georgian Orthodox, Georgian Catholics, Armenian Gregorians, Armenian Catholics, Russian Dukhobors, and Ajarian Muslims resident on its territory. The arrival of an additional ethno-religious community would almost certainly lead to increased political tensions.

========================================

GEORGIANS OF FERIDUN, IRAN
In the 1970s, the descendants of Georgians who had been deported to Iran’s Feridun region at the beginning of the seventeenth century began to return to Georgia. Despite having converted to Islam centuries earlier, the Feridun Georgians managed to preserve their traditional language and customs. From 1972–74, eighteen large families returned, but reintegration into Georgian society proved difficult, and as a result many returned to Iran within a few years. Today about 120–130 Feridunis live in Kakheti and Tbilisi.59 While some are still Muslim, most have reconverted to 20 Christianity. In either case, however, the Feridunis are typically not very religious.

It is worth noting, however, that the newly and forcibly "Christianized" often continue to perform Islamic rituals as part of their religious practices. Many, for example, visit Christian Churches, where they light candles, even as they perform namaz (Muslim prayer) and celebrate navruz, the Persian New Year, at home.

In June 2004, the new Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, visited Iran’s Feridun
region. Feridun’s Muslims, who still speak Georgian and adhere to many Georgian traditions, gave Saakashvili a warm welcome, which included waving of the new Georgian national flag with its five crosses.

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 27, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

Muslims face ever increasing ethnic cleansing and forced coversion in Georgia. It is open hunting season on Muslims. In Caucus mountain and in Georgia, more so than any other place. A Georgian inquisition and Ethnic cleansing has been going on in Georgia since it became a republic. The Muslim population of the country is dramatically declining due to forced conversions, involuntarily, nonvoluntary immigration and unvoluntary migration.

The dog days of August suddenly became the guns of August. In Georgia, the United States and its NATO allies are learning you don't get into a resurgent Russia's space -- let alone its face -- with impunity. Russia is back, just as the United States would be back had it lost the Cold War 20 years ago and watched Russia trying to extend its Warsaw Pact security blanket to the Bahamas and Puerto Rico. It was a case of elementary geopolitics, more than it was a matter of democracy vs. authoritarianism. Middle Eastern Times

SUMMARY

Georgia came under Roman control from 65 BC. The people were converted to Christianity in 330 AD. It was conquered by the Sassanian empire under Khosrow (531-579); then in 654 by the Arabs who created the Emirate of Tbilisi. The country became independent again in the 9th century. It reached its greatest power under Queen Tamara (1184-1213) who ruled a Pan-Caucasian empire. The Mongols came in 1220 and destroyed many of the villages and people. In 1510 the Ottoman Turks conquered the western part and the Iranian Shahs the eastern part. The whole country was under Muslim overlordship (either Ottoman or Iranian) until the 18th century. The king agreed to a treaty with Catherine the Great in 1783 to be protected, as an Orthodox country, by Russia from the Muslim powers. In 1801 the Georgian lands were absorbed into the Russian empire after being fought over by Iranians again. The Russians then conquered other parts of Georgia from the Turks in campaigns ending in 1878. Until 1991 it was wholly under Russian control as a Republic of the Soviet Union. During the Russian revolution there was an independent state in 1918, then occupied by the British 1919-20 as part of the anti-Bolshevik intervention force. In 1920 a Communist regime was set up and the country re-absorbed into the USSR. Stalin (Josip Vissarionavich Djugashvili) was a Georgian. So was Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's chief of the Political Police. It was Stalin who incorporated Avkasia and South Ossetia into the Soviet Republic of Georgia.

In 1990 a peaceful demonstration in favor of independence was attacked by the Soviet army and several civilians were killed by soldiers wielding spades and others poisoned by gas. This increased the desire for complete independence and a nationalist coalition won the election.

 

Anatolian tribes from Turkey moved into the eastern regions about a century later, fusing with people already there and forming the kingdom of Iveria. Between 550 BC and 300 BC, the area was tossed from one dominant empire to the next, being variously connected with the Persian Achaemenians, the Macedonians and the Seleucids. The Romans defeated the Seleucids in 189 BC and allowed the locals to set up independent Armenian states. These were united about a century later, forming the strongest power in the Roman east, holding sway from the Caspian Sea to central Turkey, and taking in a great deal of modern Georgia.

In around 400 AD, western Armenia, including western Georgia, was swallowed up by the mighty Byzantine Empire. The eastern area of Iveria fell under Persian control until Muslim Arabs set up shop in the mid-7th century, establishing an emirate in Tbilisi. To-ing and fro-ing between the Arabs and the Byzantines ended when the Seljuk Turks rode in and seized power over most of Armenia in the 1060s, causing many to flee to predominantly Christian Georgia. By this stage most of what is now Georgia was united under the name Iveria. The period following the recovery of Tbilisi from the Arabs in 1122 was a kind of golden age for Georgia, with power extending from western Azerbaijan to eastern Turkey.

Stability was short-lived, however, and for the next 800 years the region was roiled by land grabs and power plays. The Mongols, Persian Safavids and Ottoman Turks vied for supremacy, and by the 18th century, the Ottomans were on top. Enter Russia. Catherine the Great's troops moved into the region to wrest control of the territories from the Turks. In 1795 the Persian eunuch Agha Mohammed Khan Qajar sacked Tbilisi before the Russians annexed the Georgian princedoms, taking total control forcibly from the Turks by the 1870s. As the technology and economy developed, so did nationalism. The Georgian social nationalist movements First Group, Second Group and - you guessed it - Third Group, each more radical than the last, sprang up. Third Group counted Iosif Dzhugshvili as one of its members. He later changed his name to Man of Steel, which, in Georgian, is Stalin.

4) 5)

Map of Georgia, circa 830-1020.

DETAILS

The Arabs first appeared in Georgia, namely in Kartli (Caucasian Iberia of the Classic authors), in 645. It was not, however, until 735, when they succeeded in establishing their firm control over a large portion of the country. In that year, Marwan II took hold of Tbilisi and much of the neighbouring lands and installed there an Arab emir, who was to be confirmed by the Caliph of Baghdad or, occasionally, by the Wali of Armīniya.

During the Arab period, Tbilisi (al-Tefelis) grew into a center of trade between the Islamic world and northern Europe. Beyond that, it functioned as a key Arab outpost and a buffer province facing the Byzantine and Khazar dominions. Over time, Tbilisi became largely Muslim, but the Islamic influences were strictly confined to the city itself, while the environs remained largely Christian.

The Emirs of Tbilisi ruled over the parts of today’s eastern Georgia from their base in the city of Tbilisi, from 736 to 1080 (nominally to 1122). Established by the Arabs during their invasions of Georgian lands, the emirate was an important outpost of the Muslim rule in the Caucasus until recaptured by the Georgians under King David IV in 1122. Since then, the city has been the capital of Georgia to this day Emirate of Tiblisi

The Arabs first appeared in Georgia, namely in Kartli (Caucasian Iberia of the Classic authors), in 645. It was not, however, until 735, when they succeeded in establishing their firm control over a large portion of the country. In that year, Marwan II took hold of Tbilisi and much of the neighbouring lands and installed there an Arab emir, who was to be confirmed by the Caliph of Baghdad or, occasionally, by the Wali of Armīniya. During the Arab period, Tbilisi (al-Tefelis) grew into a center of trade between the Islamic world and northern Europe. Beyond that, it functioned as a key Arab outpost and a buffer province facing the Byzantine and Khazar dominions. Over time, Tbilisi became largely Muslim, but the Islamic influences were strictly confined to the city itself, while the environs remained largely Christian. Tbilisi was a large city with a strong double wall pierced by three gates. It lay on both banks of the Kura River, and the two parts were connected by a bridge of boats. The contemporary geographers especially mention its thermal springs, which supplied the baths with constant hot waters. On the river were water-mills. The houses were primarily built, to the surprise of contemporary Arab travelers, of pine wood. In the first half of the 9th century, Tbilisi is said to have been the second largest, after Derbend, city in the Caucasus, with its at least 50.000 inhabitants and thriving commerce.

As the Caliphate weakened after the destruction of Baghdad in 813, the Abbasid power was much troubled by the secessionist tendencies among peripheral rulers, those of Tbilisi not excluded. At the same time, the emirate became a target of the resurgent Georgian Bagratids who liberated several Georgian lands from the Arab grasp. The Emirate of Tbilisi grew in relative strength under Is’hak bin Ismail (833-853), who was powerful enough to quell the energies of the Georgian princes and to contend the Abbasid authority in the region. He withheld his annual payment of tribute to Baghdad, and declared his independence from the Caliph. To suppress the rebellion, Caliph al-Mutawakkil dispatched, in 853, a punitive expedition led by Bugha al-Kabir al-Sharabi (also known as Bugha the Turk) who burned Tbilisi to the ground and had Is’hak decapitated, terminating the city’s chances to become the center of an independent Islamic state in the Caucasus. The Abbasids chose not to rebuild the city extensively, and as a result the Muslim prestige and authority in the region began to wane. Beginning in the 1020s, the Georgian kings pursued contradictive but generally expansionist policy against the emirs of Tbilisi, this latter city coming sporadically under Georgian control. The territories of the emirate shrank to Tbilisi and its immediate environs. However, the Seljuk invasions of the 1070s-1080s thwarted the Georgian advances and deferred the Bagratid plans for nearly a half of a century.

The last line of emirs of Tbilisi went back, presumably, to circa 1080, and the city’s government was run thereafter by the merchant oligarchy known to Georgian annals as tbileli berebi, that is, the elders of Tbilisi. David IV’s victories over the Seljuk Turks inflicted a final blow to Islamic Tbilisi, and a Georgian army triumphantly entered the city in 1122, ending the four hundred years of a foreign domination.

Rulers

Shuabid emirs of Tbilisi

• Ismail b. Shuab (the first known emir, r. until 813)
• Mohammed b. Atab (813-829)
• Ali b. Shuab (829-833)
• Is’hak b. Ismail b. Shuab (833-853)

Shaybanid emirs of Tbilisi

• Mohammed b. Khalil (853-870)
• Isa b. ash-Sheikh ash-Shayban (870-876)
• Ibrahim (876-878)
• Gabuloc (878-880)

Jaffarid emirs of Tbilisi

• Jaffar I b. Ali (880-914)
• Mansur b. Jaffar (914-952)
• Jaffar II b. Mansur (952-981)
• Ali b. Jaffar (981-1032)
• Jaffar III b. Ali (1032-1046)
• Mansur b. Jaffar (1046-1054)
• Abu’l-Haija b. Jaffar (1054-1062) (the last known emir)

References

• Allen, WED (1932), A History of the Georgian People, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co,
• Minorsky, V., Tiflis in Encyclopaedia of Islam
• Suny RG (1994), The Making of the Georgian Nation (2nd Edition), Bloomington and Indianapolis, ISBN 0-253-35579-6

THE FLAGS
 

Flag of Georgia, 1918-1921 (ratio 1:2) Following World War I, an independent Georgian Democratic Republic was proclaimed on May 26, 1918. The national flag, designed by Jakob Nikoladze, had been first hoisted on March 25, 1917, and it continued to be displayed until Soviet forces crushed Georgian independence in 1921. The flag was cherry red with a canton of black and white stripes. Cherry red was (and still is) considered the national colour; black stood for the tragedies of the past, white for hopes for the future. Under the Soviet regime, various flags were used before the adoption of a distinctive Georgian flag on April 11, 1951. Its background was red, and its canton was blue with red rays surrounding a red hammer, sickle, and star; from the canton a blue horizontal stripe extended to the end of the flag. The 1918–21 flag was readopted on November 14, 1990, and independence was again proclaimed on April 9, 1991.

Flag of Georgia, 1990-2004 (ratio 5:8)

Reds' Rise

At the start of the 19th century, Georgia's rulers were most concerned about their Iranian neighbors, and they turned to Russia for help. Russia's rulers responded by helping themselves to Georgia, annexing their smaller neighbor piece by piece. Eventually, Georgia's royals were deported, and the Georgian people underwent a process of "Russification" designed to erase their national identity.

Still, Georgian patriots dreamed of national independence. When Russia was embroiled in revolution in 1917, the Georgians seized the opportunity. After trying to align with their "Transcaucasian" neighbors (Armenia and Azerbaijan), they founded the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918. Three years after that, the Red Army rolled in and made Georgia join the Soviet Union.

Flag of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1951-1990

Adopted January 25, 2004 The central element of the flag is St. George's cross (still used as the national flag of England), who is the patron saint of Georgia. According to the Georgian scholar Giorgi Gabeskiria, the four extra crosses were probably added during the reign of George V of Georgia (also known as "the Brilliant" or "the Splendid"), who drove out the Mongols. Around that time, the new design was adopted as a variant of the Jerusalem cross, a symbol used by crusaders in the Holy Land, which likewise used a large central cross with four smaller "crosslets" in the four quadrants. The crosses are said to have represented the five Holy Wounds of Christ.

kartli

tablisi

 

.

Tbilisi as the capital of a unified Georgian state

In 1122, after heavy fighting with the Seljuks that involved at least 60,000 Georgians and up to 300,000 Turks, the troops of the King of Georgia David the Builder entered Tbilisi. After the battles for Tbilisi concluded, David moved his residence from Kutaisi (Western Georgia) to Tbilisi, making it the capital of a unified Georgian State. From 12-13th centuries, Tbilisi became a dominant regional power with a thriving economy (with well-developed trade and skilled labour) and a well-established social system/structure. By the end of the 12th century (A.D.), the population of Tbilisi had reached 80,000. The city also became an important literary and a cultural center not only for Georgia but for the larger civilized world as well. During Queen Tamar's reign, Shota Rustaveli worked in Tbilisi while writing his legendary epic poem, The Knight in the Panther's Skin. This period is widely known as "Georgia's Golden Age" or the Georgian Renaissance.^{[citation needed]}

Mongol domination and the following period of instability
Tbilisi, ca. 1890-1900Tbilisi's "Golden Age" did not last for more than a century. In 1236 A.D., after suffering crushing defeats to the Mongols, Georgia came under Mongol domination. The nation itself maintained a form of semi-independence and did not lose its statehood, but Tbilisi was strongly influenced by the Mongols for the next century both politically and culturally. In the 1320s, the Mongols were forcefully expelled from Georgia and Tbilisi became the capital of an independent Georgian state once again. An outbreak of the plague struck the city in 1366.

From the late 14th until the end of the 18th century, Tbilisi came under the rule of various foreign invaders once again and on several occasions was completely burnt to the ground. In 1386, Tbilisi was invaded by the armies of Tamerlane (Timur). In 1444, the city was invaded and destroyed by Jahan Shah (the Shah of the town of Tabriz in Persia). From 1477 to 1478 the city was held by the Ak Koyunlu tribesmen of Uzun Hassan. In 1522 A.D., Tbilisi came under Persian control but was later freed in 1524 by King David X of Georgia. During this period, many parts of Tbilisi were reconstructed and rebuilt. From the 17-18th centuries, Tbilisi once again became the object of rivalry only this time between the Ottoman Turks and Persia. King Erekle of Georgia tried on several occasions, successfully, to free Tbilisi from Persian rule but in the end Tbilisi was burnt to the ground in 1795 by Shah Agha-Mohammad Khan. At this point, sensing that Georgia could not hold up against Persia alone, Erekle sought the help of Russia.

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

History

Archaeological findings make it possible to trace the origins of human society on the territory of modern Georgia back to the early Paleolithic and Neolithic periods. A number of Neolithic sites have been excavated in the Kolkhida Lowland, in the Khrami River valley in central Georgia, and in South Ossetia; they were occupied by settled tribes engaged in cattle raising and agriculture. The cultivation of grain in Georgia during the Neolithic Period is attested by finds of saddle querns and flint sickles; the earth was tilled with stone mattocks. The Caucasus was regarded in ancient times as the primeval home of metallurgy. The start of the 3rd millennium bc witnessed the beginning of Georgia’s Bronze Age. Remarkable finds in Trialeti show that central Georgia was inhabited during the 2nd millennium bc by cattle-raising tribes whose chieftains were men of wealth and power. Their burial mounds have yielded finely wrought vessels in gold and silver; a few are engraved with ritual scenes suggesting Asiatic cult influence.

History » Origins of the people of the Islamic Emirate of Georgia

Early in the 1st millennium bc, the ancestors of the Georgian nation emerge in the annals of Assyria and, later, of Urartu. Among these were the Diauhi (Diaeni) nation, ancestors of the Taokhoi, who later domiciled in the southwestern Georgian province of Tao, and the Kulkha, forerunners of the Colchians, who held sway over large territories at the eastern end of the Black Sea. The fabled wealth of Colchis became known quite early to the Greeks and found symbolic expression in the legend of Medea and the Golden Fleece.

Following the influx of tribes driven from the direction of Anatolia by the Cimmerian invasion of the 7th century bc and their fusion with the aboriginal population of the Kura River valley, the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era witnessed the growth of the important kingdom of Iberia, the region that now comprises modern Kartli and Kakheti, along with Samtskhe and adjoining regions of southwestern Georgia. Colchis was colonized by Greek settlers from Miletus and subsequently fell under the sway of Mithradates VI Eupator, king of Pontus. The campaigns of the Roman general Pompey the Great led in 66 bc to the establishment of Roman hegemony over Iberia and to direct Roman rule over Colchis and the rest of Georgia’s Black Sea littoral. (See Roman Republic and Empire.)

History » Medieval Georgia

Georgia embraced Christianity about the year 330; its conversion is attributed to a holy captive woman, St. Nino. During the next three centuries, Georgia was involved in the conflict between Rome—and its successor state, the Byzantine Empire—and the Persian Sāsānian dynasty. Lazica on the Black Sea (incorporating the ancient Colchis) became closely bound to Byzantium. Iberia passed under Persian control, though toward the end of the 5th century a hero arose in the person of King Vakhtang Gorgaslani (Gorgasal), a ruler of legendary valour who for a time reasserted Georgia’s national sovereignty.

MUSLIM GEORGIA: The Sāsānian monarch Khosrow I (reigned 531–579) abolished the Iberian monarchy, however. For the next three centuries, local authority was exercised by the magnates of each province, vassals successively of Persia (Iran), of Byzantium, and, after ad 654, of the Arab caliphs, who established an emirate in Tbilisi. (See Iran, ancient.)

Toward the end of the 9th century, Ashot I (the Great), of the Bagratid dynasty, settled at Artanuji in Tao (southwestern Georgia), receiving from the Byzantine emperor the title of kuropalates (“guardian of the palace”). In due course, Ashot profited from the weakness of the Byzantine emperors and the Arab caliphs and set himself up as hereditary prince in Iberia. King Bagrat III (reigned 975–1014) later united all the principalities of eastern and western Georgia into one state. Tbilisi, however, was not recovered from the Muslims until 1122, when it fell to King David II (Aghmashenebeli, “the Builder”; reigned 1089–1125).

The zenith of Georgia’s power and prestige was reached during the reign (1184–1213) of Queen Tamar, whose realm stretched from Azerbaijan to the borders of Cherkessia (now in southern Russia) and from Erzurum (in modern Turkey) to Ganja (modern Gäncä, Azerbaijan), forming a pan-Caucasian empire, with Shirvan and Trabzon as vassals and allies.

The invasions of Transcaucasia by the Mongols from 1220 onward, however, brought Georgia’s golden age to an end. Eastern Georgia was reduced to vassalage under the Mongol Il-Khanid dynasty of the line of Hülegü, while Imereti, as the land to the west of the Suram range was called, remained independent under a separate line of Bagratid rulers. There was a partial resurgence during the reign (1314–46) of King Giorgi V of Georgia, known as “the Brilliant,” but the onslaughts of the Turkic conqueror Timur between 1386 and 1403 dealt blows to Georgia’s economic and cultural life from which the kingdom never recovered. The last king of united Georgia was Alexander I (1412–43), under whose sons the realm was divided into squabbling princedoms.

History » ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF GEORGIA: Turkish and Persian domination

The fall of Constantinople (modern Istanbul, Turkey) to the Ottoman Empire in 1453 isolated Georgia from western Christendom. In 1510 the Ottomans invaded Imereti and sacked the capital, Kʿutʿaisi. Soon afterward, Shah Ismāʿīl I of Iran (Persia) invaded Kartli. Ivan IV (the Terrible) and other Muscovite tsars showed interest in the little Christian kingdoms of Georgia, but the Russians were powerless to stop the Muslim powers—Ṣavafid Iran and the Ottoman Empire, both near their zenith—from partitioning the country and oppressing its inhabitants. In 1578 the Ottomans overran the whole of Transcaucasia and seized Tbilisi, but they were subsequently driven out by Iran’s Shah ʿAbbās I (reigned 1587–1629), who deported many thousands of the Christian population to distant regions of Iran. There was a period of respite under the viceroys of the house of Mukhran, who governed at Tbilisi under the aegis of the shahs from 1658 until 1723. The most notable Mukhranian ruler was Vakhtang VI, regent of Kartli from 1703 to 1711 and then king, with intervals, until 1723. Vakhtang was an eminent lawgiver and introduced the printing press to Georgia; he had the Georgian annals edited by a commission of scholars. The collapse of the Ṣafavid dynasty in 1722, however, led to a fresh Ottoman invasion of Georgia. The Ottomans were expelled by the Persian conqueror Nādir Shah, who gave Kartli to Tʿeimuraz II (1744–62), one of the Kakhian line of the Bagratids. When Tʿeimuraz died, his son Erekle II reunited the kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti and made a brave attempt at erecting a Caucasian multinational state based on Georgia. Imereti under King Solomon I (1752–84) succeeded in finally throwing off the domination of the declining Ottoman Empire.

Raids by Lezgian mountaineers from Dagestan, economic stringency, and other difficulties impelled Erekle to adopt a pro-Russian orientation. On July 24, 1783, he concluded with Catherine II (the Great) the Treaty of Georgievsk, whereby Russia guaranteed Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity in return for Erekle’s acceptance of Russian suzerainty. Yet Georgia alone faced the Persian Āghā Moḥammad Khan, first of the Qājār dynasty. Tbilisi was sacked in 1795, and Erekle died in 1798. His invalid son Giorgi XII sought to hand over the kingdom unconditionally into the care of the Russian emperor Paul, but both rulers died before this could be implemented. In 1801 Alexander I reaffirmed Paul’s decision to incorporate Kartli and Kakheti into the Russian Empire. Despite the treaty of 1783, the Bagratid line was deposed and replaced by Russian military governors who deported the surviving members of the royal house and provoked several popular uprisings. Imereti was annexed in 1810, followed by Guria, Mingrelia, Svaneti, and Abkhazia in 1829, 1857, 1858, and 1864, respectively. The Black Sea ports of Potʿi and Batʿumi and areas of southwestern Georgia under Ottoman rule were taken by Russia in successive wars by 1877–78.

History » National revival

By waging war on the Lezgian clansmen of Dagestan and on Iran and the Ottomans, the Russians ensured the corporate survival of the Georgian nation. Under Prince Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov, who served with distinction as viceroy (1845–54), commerce and trade flourished. Following the liberation of the Russian serfs in 1861, the Georgian peasants also received freedom from 1864 onward, though on terms regarded as burdensome. The decay of patriarchy was accelerated by the spread of education and European influences. A railway linked Tbilisi with Potʿi from 1872, and mines, factories, and plantations were developed by Russian, Armenian, and Western entrepreneurs. Peasant discontent, the growth of an urban working class, and the deliberate policy of Russification and forced assimilation of minorities practiced by Emperor Alexander III (1881–94) fostered radical agitation among the workers and nationalism among the intelligentsia. The tsarist system permitted no organized political activity, but social issues were debated in journals, works of fiction, and local assemblies.

The leader of the national revival in Georgia was Prince Ilia Chavchavadze, leader of a literary and social movement dubbed the Pirveli Dasi, or First Group. The Meore Dasi, or Second Group, led by Giorgi Tseretʿeli, was more liberal in its convictions, but it paled before the Mesame Dasi, or Third Group, an illegal Social Democratic party founded in 1893. The Third Group professed Marxist doctrines, and from 1898 it included among its members Joseph Dzhugashvili, who later took the byname Joseph Stalin. When the Mensheviks—a branch of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party—gained control of the group, Stalin left Georgia.

The 1905 Revolution in Russia led to widespread disturbances and guerrilla fighting in Georgia, later suppressed by Russian government Cossack troops with indiscriminate brutality. After the Russian Revolution of February 1917 the Transcaucasian region—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—was ruled from Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) and known as the Ozakom. The Bolshevik coup later that year forced the predominantly Menshevik politicians of Transcaucasia to reluctantly secede from Russia and form the Transcaucasian Commissariat. The local nationalisms, combined with the pressure brought on by an Ottoman advance from the west during World War I (1914–18), brought about the breakdown of the Transcaucasian federation. On May 26, 1918, Georgia set up an independent state and placed itself under the protection of Germany, the senior partner of the Central Powers, but the victory of the Allies at the end of 1918 led to occupation of Georgia by the British. The Georgians viewed Anton Ivanovich Denikin’s counterrevolutionary White Russians, who enjoyed British support, as more dangerous than the Bolsheviks. They refused to cooperate in the effort to restore the tsarist imperial order, and British forces evacuated Batʿumi in July 1920.

Georgia’s independence was recognized de facto by the Allies in January 1920, and the Russo-Georgian treaty of May 1920 briefly resulted in Soviet-Georgian cooperation.

History » Incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

Refused entry into the League of Nations, Georgia gained de jure recognition from the Allies in January 1921. Within a month the Red Army—without Lenin’s approval but under the orders of two Georgian Bolsheviks, Stalin and Grigory Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze—entered Georgia and installed a Soviet regime.

After Georgia was established as a Soviet republic, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze incorporated it into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The still-popular Georgian Social Democrats organized a rebellion in 1924, but it was brutally suppressed by Stalin.

During Stalin’s despotic rule (1928–53), Georgia suffered from repression of all expressions of nationalism, the forced collectivization of peasant agriculture, and the purging of those communists who had led the Soviet republic in its first decade. Stalin installed his

The land Relief, drainage, and soils

With the notable exception of the fertile plain of the Kolkhida Lowland—ancient Colchis, where the legendary Argonauts sought the Golden Fleece—the Georgian terrain is largely mountainous, and more than a third is covered by forest or brushwood. There is a remarkable variety of landscape, ranging from the subtropical Black Sea shores to the ice and snow of the crest line of the Caucasus. Such contrasts are made more noteworthy by the country’s relatively small area.

The rugged Georgia terrain may be divided into three bands, all running from east to west.

To the north lies the wall of the Greater Caucasus range, consisting of a series of parallel and transverse mountain belts rising eastward and often separated by deep, wild gorges. Spectacular crest-line peaks include those of Mount Shkhara, which at 16,627 feet (5,068 metres) is the highest point in Georgia, and Mounts Rustaveli, Tetnuld, and Ushba, all of which are above 15,000 feet. The cone of the extinct Mkinvari (Kazbek) volcano dominates the northernmost Bokovoy range from a height of 16,512 feet. A number of important spurs extend in a southward direction from the central range, including those of the Lomis and Kartli (Kartalinian) ranges at right angles to the general Caucasian trend. From the ice-clad flanks of these desolately beautiful high regions flow many streams and rivers.

The southern slopes of the Greater Caucasus merge into a second band, consisting of central lowlands formed on a great structural depression. The Kolkhida Lowland, near the shores of the Black Sea, is covered by a thick layer of river-borne deposits accumulated over thousands of years. Rushing down from the Greater Caucasus, the major rivers of western Georgia, the Inguri, Rioni, and Kodori, flow over a broad area to the sea. The Kolkhida Lowland was formerly an almost continually stagnant swamp. In a great development program, drainage canals and embankments along the rivers were constructed and afforestation plans introduced; the region has become of prime importance through the cultivation of subtropical and other commercial crops.

To the east the structural trough is crossed by the Meskhet and Likh ranges, linking the Greater and Lesser Caucasus and marking the watershed between the basins of the Black and Caspian seas. In central Georgia, between the cities of Khashuri and Mtsʿkhetʿa (the ancient capital), lies the inner high plateau known as the Kartli (Kartalinian) Plain. Surrounded by mountains to the north, south, east, and west and covered for the most part by deposits of the loess type, this plateau extends along the Kura (Mtkvari) River and its tributaries.

The southern band of Georgian territory is marked by the ranges and plateaus of the Lesser Caucasus, which rise beyond a narrow, swampy coastal plain to reach 10,830 feet in the peak of Didi-Abuli.

A variety of soils are found in Georgia, ranging from gray-brown and saline semidesert types to richer red earths and podzols. Artificial improvements add to the diversity.

The land » Climate

The Caucasian barrier protects Georgia from cold air intrusions from the north, while the country is open to the constant influence of warm, moist air from the Black Sea. Western Georgia has a humid subtropical, maritime climate, while eastern Georgia has a range of climate varying from moderately humid to a dry subtropical type.

There also are marked elevation zones. The Kolkhida Lowland, for example, has a subtropical character up to about 1,600 to 2,000 feet, with a zone of moist, moderately warm climate lying just above; still higher is a belt of cold, wet winters and cool summers. Above about 6,600 to 7,200 feet there is an alpine climatic zone, lacking any true summer; above 11,200 to 11,500 feet snow and ice are present year-round. In eastern Georgia, farther inland, temperatures are lower than in the western portions at the same altitude.

Western Georgia has heavy rainfall throughout the year, totaling 40 to 100 inches (1,000 to 2,500 millimetres) and reaching a maximum in autumn and winter. Southern Kolkhida receives the most rain, and humidity decreases to the north and east. Winter in this region is mild and warm; in regions below about 2,000 to 2,300 feet, the mean January temperature never falls below 32° F (0° C), and relatively warm, sunny winter weather persists in the coastal regions, where temperatures average about 41° F (5° C). Summer temperatures average about 71° F (22° C).

In eastern Georgia, precipitation decreases with distance from the sea, reaching 16 to 28 inches in the plains and foothills but increasing to double this amount in the mountains. The southeastern regions are the driest areas, and winter is the driest season; the rainfall maximum occurs at the end of spring. The highest lowland temperatures occur in July (about 77° F [25° C]), while average January temperatures over most of the region range from 32° to 37° F (0° to 3° C).

The land » Plant and animal life

Georgia’s location and its diverse terrain have given rise to a remarkable variety of landscapes. The luxuriant vegetation of the moist, subtropical Black Sea shores is relatively close to the eternal snows of the mountain peaks. Deep gorges and swift rivers give way to dry steppes, and the green of alpine meadows alternates with the darker hues of forested valleys.

More than a third of the country is covered by forests and brush. In the west a relatively constant climate over a long time span has preserved many relict and rare items, including the Pitsunda pines (Pinus pithyusa). The forests include oak, chestnut, beech, and alder, as well as Caucasian fir, ash, linden, and apple and pear trees. The western underbrush is dominated by evergreens (including rhododendrons and holly) and such deciduous shrubs as Caucasian bilberry and nut trees. Liana strands entwine some of the western forests. Citrus groves are found throughout the republic, and long rows of eucalyptus trees line the country roads.

Eastern Georgia has fewer forests, and the steppes are dotted with thickets of prickly underbrush, as well as a blanket of feather and beard grass. Herbaceous subalpine and alpine vegetation occurs extensively in the highest regions. Animal life is very diverse. Goats and Caucasian antelope inhabit the high mountains; rodents live in the high meadows; and a rich birdlife includes the mountain turkey, the Caucasian black grouse, and the mountain and bearded eagles. The clear rivers and mountain lakes are full of trout.

Forest regions are characterized by wild boars, roe and Caucasian deer, brown bears, lynx, wolves, foxes, jackals, hares, and squirrels. Birds range from the thrush to the black vulture and hawk. Some of these animals and birds also frequent the lowland regions, which are the home of the introduced raccoon, mink, and nutria. The lowland rivers and the Black Sea itself are rich in fish.

The economy » Transportation

Georgia has a dense transportation system. Most freight is carried by truck, but railways are important. Tʿbilisi is connected by rail with both Sokhumi and Batʿumi on the Black Sea and Baku on the Caspian.

An oil pipeline connects Batʿumi with Baku, Azerbaijan; two natural gas pipelines run from Baku to Tʿbilisi and then turn north to Russia. The seaports of Batʿumi, Potʿi, and Sokhumi are of major economic importance for the whole of Transcaucasia. The country’s international airport is at Tʿbilisi.

Administration and social conditions » Government

In 1992 Georgia—which had been operating under a Soviet-era constitution from 1978—reinstated its 1921 pre-Soviet constitution. A constitutional commission was formed in 1992 to draft a new constitution, and after a protracted dispute over the extent of the authority to be accorded the executive a new document was adopted in 1995.

The head of state is the president, who is given extensive authority. A prime minister and cabinet are appointed by the president. The legislature is a 235-member Supreme Council. The judicial system includes district and city courts and a Supreme Court.

The Communist Party of Georgia, controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was until the 1980s the only political party. With the increase in nationalist sentiment and the reforms of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, many diverse political groups emerged. Major political organizations now include the Citizens’ Union, an alliance formed by the Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze; the reformist National Democratic Party; the Georgian Popular Front, formed in 1989 to promote Georgian independence; and the Georgian Social Democratic Party, which was established in 1893 but dissolved after the Soviet takeover.

Georgia became a member of the United Nations in 1992 and joined the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993.

Administration and social conditions » Armed forces and security

In the early years of independence Georgia’s armed forces were divided, but they were gradually becoming unified by the mid-1990s. The primary state military organization is the National Guard; paramilitary groups also are present. A two-year period of military service is compulsory for adult men, though draft evasion is widespread. Substantial numbers of Russian troops remain on Georgian territory.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs oversees the regular police force. Crime rates in Georgia increased after independence because of the social dislocations resulting from the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a lack of civil authority in parts of the country, and regional instability caused by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Administration and social conditions » Education

The level of education is relatively high. Tʿbilisi University was founded in 1918; the Academy of Sciences (founded 1941) is made up of several scientific institutions, which conduct research throughout the republic. Georgia has an extensive library system.

Administration and social conditions » Health and welfare

Payments from public funds provide free education, medical services, pension grants, and stipend payments and free or reduced-cost accommodation in rest homes and sanatoriums, as well as holiday pay and the maintenance of kindergartens and day nurseries. Georgia ranks high in the level of medical services, and relative to other former Soviet republics its population has low incidences of tuberculosis and cancer. The republic is famed as a health centre, a reputation stemming from the numerous therapeutic mineral springs, the sunny climate of the Black Sea coast, the pure air of the mountain regions, and a wide range of resorts. The Tsqaltubo baths, with warm radon water treatment for arthritis sufferers, are especially noted.

Cultural life

Georgia is a land of ancient culture, with a literary tradition that dates to the 5th century ad. Kolkhida (Colchis) early housed a school of higher rhetoric in which Greeks as well as Georgians studied. By the 12th century, academies in Ikalto and Gelati, the first medieval higher-education centres, disseminated a wide range of knowledge. The national genius was demonstrated most clearly in Vepkhis-tqarsani (The Knight in the Panther’s Skin), the epic masterpiece of the 12th-century poet Shota Rustaveli. Major figures in later Georgian literary history include a famed 18th-century writer, Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani, and the novelist, poet, and dramatist Ilia Chavchavadze. The 19th-century playwright Giorgi Eristavi is regarded as the founder of the modern Georgian theatre. Among other prominent prerevolutionary authors were the lyric poet Akaki Tsereteli; Alexander Qazbegi, novelist of the Caucasus; and the nature poet Vazha Pshavela. The novelist Mikhail Javakhishvili and the poet Titsian Tabidze were executed during the Stalin era, and the poet Paolo Iashvili was censured by the government and committed suicide. Giorgi Leonidze and Galaktion Tabidze were well-known poets, and Konstantin Gamsakhurdia was celebrated for his historical novels.

The Abkhazian literary tradition dates back only to the late 19th century. Notable writers include the poet, novelist, and scholar Dmitri Gulia, the novelist and playwright Samson Chanba, the poet Bagrat Shinkuba, and Fazil Iskander, a popular satirist who writes in Russian.

Important individuals in other arts include the painters Niko Pirosmani (Pirosmanashvili), Irakli Toidze, Lado Gudiashvili, Elena Akhvlediani, and Sergo Kobuladze; the composers Zakaria Paliashvili and Meliton Balanchivadze (father of the choreographer George Balanchine); and the founder of Georgian ballet, Vakhtang Chabukiani. Georgian theatre, in which outstanding directors of the Soviet period were Kote Mardzhanishvili, Sandro Akhmeteli, and Robert Sturm, has had a marked influence in Europe and elsewhere. The Georgian film Repentance, an allegory about the repressions of the Stalin era, was directed by Tenghiz Abuladze. It won the Special Jury Prize at the 1987 Cannes Film Festival and was widely praised for its political courage.

The ancient culture of the republic is reflected in the large number of architectural monuments, including many monasteries and churches; indeed, Georgian architecture (with Armenian) played a considerable role in the development of the Byzantine style.

Georgia has a long tradition of fine metalwork. Bronze, gold, and silver objects of a high technical and aesthetic standard have been recovered from tombs of the 1st and 2nd millennia bc. Between the 10th and 13th centuries ad, Georgian goldsmiths produced masterpieces of cloisonné enamel and repoussé work, notably icons, crosses, and jewelry.

A number of newspapers and periodicals are published, most of them in Georgian. Radio programs are broadcast in Georgian and in several minority languages, and television programs are broadcast in Georgian and Russian.

Mikhail Leonidovich DjibladzeG. Melvyn Howe

پاکستاان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

ISLAM IN ABKHAZIA-The Muslims survived the Muhajiroba (the Georgian inquisition): Prior to the mid-eighteenth century,Christianity co-existed in Abkhazia with Islam and local pagan beliefs. With the establishment of Ottoman rule, however, the Georgians attempted to weaken Muslim position in the region, and they accordingly set about demolishing Abkhazia’s mosques and.60 Islam became more widespread as a result, at least until the muhajiroba of the 1860s when Muslims were driven out of Abkhazia into Turkey by Russian imperial authorities.

61
Despite the muhajiroba, observers at the time observed few signs of tension between the
religious communities in Abkhazia. Christian missionaries reported that most Muslim Abkhaz
practiced Islamic rites and observed Islamic celebrations, including fasting during the month of Ramadan and the celebration of the qurban. They would also invite mullahs to preside over burial ceremonies. But most embraced various Christian traditions as well, including the celebration of Christmas and Easter and commemoration of the holy days of the Virgin Mary and Saint George.

According to reports by the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the
Caucasus, efforts to propagate Islam in Abkhazia increased in the late nineteenth century.62 At the time, however, many Muslims were also converting to Christianity. According to data gath21 ered by the Society, between 1866 and 1902 a total of 21,336 Muslim Abkhaz became Christian.

Moreover, the missionaries complained that marriages between Christians and Muslims were common, even more so in Abkhazia than in other parts of the Caucasus. As a result, they argued that the most salient cleavage for the Abkhaz was social status, not religion.63 There was also little evidence during the Soviet period of religiosity among the Abkhaz.

As Nestor Lakoba, the Communist Party first secretary of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia in the 1920s and 1930s, remarked, “Religion for the Abkhazian is meaningless. The Abkhaz by his nature and historically is an atheist and nonbeliever.”64
The ongoing struggle over sovereignty between the Abkhaz and Tbilisi make it impossible
to study the religious situation in the region today. In the last few years, ties to Muslim
communities in the North Caucasus, as well as the return of the descendants of the muhajirs from Turkey, appear to have led to a modest increase in the role of Islam among the Abkhaz.

 

THE MUSLIM AZERIS OF GEORGIA
Azeris constitute the largest Muslim community in Georgia. According to the census of 1989, there were 303,600 Azeris in the republic, or some 5.7 percent of the total population.65 The number appears to have declined significantly in the period since, however. An estimate from 2003 concluded that there might be fewer than 280,000 Azeris in Georgia today, in large part because of emigration. They are concentrated in the region of Lower Kartli, where approximately 244,000 reside (including some 18,000 in Tbilisi), as well as in the eastern region of Kakhetia, which has some 33,600 Azeri residents. The remainder are scattered around other parts of the country.
The first “Azeris” (in fact, Turkic-speaking Muslims) to arrive in Georgia were nomadic
22

Turkish tribes (eli) that began settling in the region in the eleventh century. A second wave came in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when another group of nomadic Turks (Iuruqs) established themselves in southern Georgia. At the same time, so-called Qizilbash tribes moved into the eastern part of the country.66 During the early modern period, these nomads became settled and underwent a process of adaptation to state service. By the nineteenth century, most were peasants living in villages, but some had become merchants and craftsmen in urban areas.

The Muslim population of Tbilisi in the nineteenth century was substantial. According to
the census of 1897, there were 189,024 Muslims in the province of Tbilisi.67 The community was also ethnically quite diverse, consisting of Persians, Turkic speakers (referred to later as Azeris), Dagestanis, and Volga Tatars, among others. Of these, the most numerous were Persians, followed by Azeris. Both were Shiites, whereas the other Muslims in Tbilisi were Sunnis. Relations between the two communities were tense.68 They had different mosques and different places in the Muslim cemetery, and they avoided contact with each other.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Russian imperial authorities tried to win the confidence of Georgia’s Muslims, including the “Tatars,” which led them to cultivate relations with the Muslim clergy in particular. An Islamic seminary for the preparation of mullahs was opened in Tbilisi with state support.69 By the time Soviet authority was established in Georgia, there were 59 mosques serving Georgia’s Azeri community, with some 500 mullahs conducting religious services in one district alone (Borchalo district, populated mostly by Azeris). By then, muridism70 had become widespread among Georgia’s Azeris, due to the influence of North Caucasian Islam. There were also numerous madrasas serving the Azeri community, although these provided only a rudimentary education—at the beginning of the Soviet era, 96.3 percent of Azeris in Georgia were illiterate.71

High birthrates led to a rapid increase in the size of the Azeri population in Georgia
throughout the Soviet period—between 1959 and 1989, for example, Georgia’s Azeri population doubled. The population has since diminished, however, mostly due to emigration. Non-official estimates are that as many as 50,000 Azeris have left, permanently or temporarily, due to eco23 nomic difficulties and social conditions. Nevertheless, Azeri birthrates are still high. Districts with large Azeri populations—Gardabani, Bolnisi, Dmanisi, Akhalkalaki, and Bogdanovka—have the highest birthrates in the country, and Azeri villagers there have particularly large families.

Marriages between Azeris and other nationalities are extremely rare.72
In the late Gorbachev and early post-Soviet periods, Georgia’s Azeris became politically
active. An Azeri organization, Kairat, was established, which demanded greater autonomy for Azeri-majority regions. It soon lost its mobilizing potential, however, and today there is little evidence of Azeri nationalist or separatist sentiments. In general, Azeris show what might be called “indirect loyalty” to the Georgian state—that is, their attitude toward the national state depends mostly on the relationship between their “national homeland” (Azerbaijan) and their country of residence (Georgia).73

In Tbilisi, the 18,000-member Azeri community is split almost evenly between Shiites
and Sunnis. Unlike during the nineteenth century, however, today relations between the two communities are good, as suggested by the fact that there is a single Friday mosque serving both.

Until the early 1950s, the Tbilisi mosque served Sunnis only, but the city’s only Shiite mosque (known as the Blue Mosque), which dated from the 16th century, was destroyed by the Communists in 1951. As a result, Sunnis and Shiites were forced to share the same mosque, and the arrangement appears to have strengthened ties between the two communities. 74

There are mosques in other cities of eastern Georgia as well, including Mskhaldidi,
Dmanisi, Bolnisi, and Marneuli. The Marneuli mosque, which opened a few years ago, is now the biggest in Georgia. In Mskhaldidi, a mosque built in 1985 was soon closed and transformed into a warehouse, but it was reestablished in early 1990 and has been open for worship ever since.75 There are also informal mosques in almost every Azeri village, even small ones, often in ordinary houses where prayers may be led by local believers.

These so-called wandering mullahs perform religious rituals (in mosques as well as private homes), write magic formulas, prepare talismans, and so on (all of which is forbidden by orthodox Islam).
24
Many Azeri villages are also home to holy shrines and pilgrimage sites, and the worship
of saints (or holy persons) is widespread. One such place of pilgrimage is the tomb of the Sufi “saint” Isa Efendi, a native of Dagestan who died in the 1930s. The site, which is located in the village of Kabal, is visited not only by Sunni Azeris, but also Muslim Kists from Pankisi (see below) and by Shiite Azeris.

There is a particularly interesting intermixing of Sunni and Shiite practices and religious
consciousness among Azeris in the Lagodekhi region of eastern Georgia. Azeri villages in the region, which include Kabal, Karadzhala, Gandzhala, and Uzuntala, have around 10,000 inhabitants.

While the population of Kabal is Sunni, the others have Shiite majorities. The latter consider it their duty to perform religious ceremonies according to the Shafi’i madzhab (school of law): praying five times a day, the celebration of Qurban Bairam, the mevlud, performing the zikr (the Sufi ecstatic dance), and funeral ceremonies.76 Sufi muridism is also prevalent. The Sunni villagers of Kabal, as well as some Kists (Azeris in the region have frequent contact with PankisiKists as well as with Azeris across the border in Azerbaijan), are followers of the Sufi saint Isa Efendi, and they make frequent pilgrimages to his tomb, particularly when giving a vow of some sort or when praying for the recovery of the sick. While at the shrine, believers pray, make charitable contributions, and ask the sacred soul of Isa Efendi for help. In the Shiite majority villages of Karadzhala, Gandzhala, and Uzuntala, believers practice many of the standard rituals of Shiism, including the celebration of Ashura. But they also perform the zikr and make pilgrimages
to the Sufi Isa Efendi’s tomb. Only in villages where there are no Sunnis is it rare to see
Shiites engaging Sunni rituals.

In general, however, the religiosity of the Georgia’s Azeris is modest—few strictly follow
all Islamic rituals. Attending a mosque and having a mullah lead prayer is connected mostly with burial rites. For many Azeris, it is imperative that burials be performed according to religious strictures, which often include performance of the zikr. In part, low religiosity can be explained by the demands of prayer rituals. Many consider themselves believers, but they lack the time to pray regularly and dutifully. In 1990, field research in Azeri villages indicated that only thirteen
25
percent of men and nine percent of women prayed five times a day.77 Observing Ramadan is more common—about twenty percent of Azeris fast during the month. And virtually all celebrate Bairam, with many using the occasion to visit the tombs of relatives. Some participate also participate regularly in collective prayers, including in houses where a mullah is invited to read from the Koran. Most practice the ritual of sacrifice (qurban).78
Islam has considerable influence over the national consciousness of Georgia’s Azeris,
many of whom equate religion with nationality. Thus one-third of those questioned in the 1990 field research considered Islam to be their nationality (“my nationality is Muslim”).79 Similarly, for many the Koran is part of their national culture, and reverence of the Koran and memorization of its chapters (sura) is an expression of faith to national tradition.

GEORGIA’S AVARS
Avars are native to Dagestan, where most continue to live today, but there is also a small population in eastern Georgia in the Kvareli district. An initial migration of Avars into Georgia took place in the second half of the nineteenth century, while a second occurred in the late 1950s.

Most live in villages, and they maintain close contact with Avar villagers in Dagestan as well as with Avars in the Belakani and Zakatali districts of Azerbaijan.80 Secondary schools in Avar villages in Georgia teach mostly in Russian, and as a result, most Avars do not speak or read
Georgian.

Avars are Sunnis of the Shafi’i madzhab. They practice the zikr and mevlud; make frequent pilgrimages to holy sites (most sites are in Dagestan); observe nikah (mahar in Avar, or receipt of an official document of marriage signed by a mullah); and perform qurban. Avars also have a particularly powerful cult of saints. Religiosity is quite high among older Avars—some seventy to eighty percent, by our estimation, pray five times a day and fast for the full thirty days of Ramadan.

Avar villages typically contain unregistered mosques as well as cemetery chapels. In
recent years, Avar mullahs have become more politically active in Avar communities. However, 26 as is typical of Northern Caucasus muridism, non-clerical elders are typically the most authoritative figures in village life, in particular in their role as adjudicators of private disputes.

THE MUSLIM KISTS OF PANKISI
Georgia’s Kists (or Vainakhs) live mostly in and around the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia’s northeast. According to official data, there are 12,000 in Georgia currently, although non-official figures put the number at no more than 8,000. Of these, some 6,000 live in Pankisi. Unemployment and difficult economic conditions induced many younger Kists to immigrate to Russia during the 1970s and 1980s, but in the past decade the number of residents in the region has at least doubled due to an influx of refugees from Chechnya. Currently there are six Kist villages in Pankisi: Duisi, Dzibakhevi, Jokolo, Shua Khalatsani, Omalo, and Birkiani (the latter was at one time populated by Christian Georgians known as Tush). The first village to be settled was Duisi, which was originally named Pankisi (Pengiz in the Vainakh language), from which the region took its name. As is the case with Chechens and Ingush to the north, clans (teipy) are an important line of cleavage and identity for Kists. Nevertheless, the Pankisi Kists are currently divided loosely into two communities, which correspond with membership in one of two Sufi brotherhoods.
Each community is present in each village, and each community is led by a separate
elder. There is no evidence of tension between the two communities.

The Kists are descendants of Chechens and Ingush (who call themselves collectively
“Vainakhs”) who migrated to the region from the north beginning in the 1830s.81 One reason for the migration was economic hardship; another was a desire to escape the consequences of blood feuds. In addition, the leader of the highlanders in the North Caucasus War, Imam Shamil, strictly enforced Islamic law in areas under his control, which some Chechens and Ingush found oppressive. As a result, they fled to the south. Finally, some arrived from the neighboring Georgian district of Tianeti, where they had settled in the early nineteenth century.82 They moved to 27 Pankisi because of a decision by tsarist authorities to concentrate all of Georgia’s Kists in a single area. Villages formed quickly, and new village settlements were established as late as
1860. Other families moved into the area thereafter, but not in large enough numbers to justify new settlements.

After arriving in Georgia, most Kists quickly began acculturating, as suggested by the
fact that many have added Georgian endings to their family names (e.g., “shvili,” which means “son of” or “daughter of” in Georgian). Examples include Qavtarashvili (of Qavtar), Musashvili (of Musa), and Bakhashvili (of Bakha).83

Most of the original migrants were pagan, although there were also Christian elements in
their practices. Since the early Middle Ages, Georgian Christian missionaries had been disseminating both Christianity and Georgian culture among the Vainakhs, and Christian faith helps explain the close ties between Vainakhs and Georgians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

84 Moreover, during the reign of Catherine the Great, Russian imperial authorities began
promoting the Christianization of the highlanders in the North Caucasus, using both financial incentives and political privileges to encourage conversion.85
Once in Georgia, the Kists were again pressured by state authorities to embrace Christianity —indeed to the point of coerced conversion in some instances. As a result, by 1866 most the villagers of Jokolo and Omalo had been Christianized. According to data from the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the Caucasus, between 1864 and 1910 there were numerous baptisms of Kists.86 As a result, Islamic faith was less prevalent in Pankisi than among Chechens and Ingush in the North Caucasus.
Nevertheless, in 1902 local Muslims began to construct a mosque in the village of Duisi,
using their own money to finance the project. The Russian imperial government refused, however, to register the mosque because of concerns about the political implications if recently converted Christian Kists returned to Islam. The mosque was closed after the October Revolution, and it would not be reopened until 1960. Still, Islamic faith strengthened among the Kists in the Soviet period, in part because of the successful proselytizing of “wandering” mullahs.
28
Thus, while considerable numbers of Kists became Christian over the years, most of
those who did later reconverted to Islam. Even so, until around 1970 a considerable number of villagers in Jokolo, Omalo, and Birkiani were Christian. A Christian chapel was built in Omalo in the 1960s.87 In the 1970s, many Christians in Jokolo and Omalo were Islamicized. Only Birkiani has a majority Christian population today. There is also a small community of Kists in Kakheti (a region of Georgia bordering on the Gorge), mainly in the city of Telavi.

They consider themselves Georgian and Orthodox Christian.88 Like Chechens and Ingush, the religious practices of Kists are very eclectic. As one authority has observed: “The Ingush were Christians in the past. After the weakening of Christianity in the region, they revived their pagan religion and later adopted Islam, then once again Christianity, and at the end, Islam again, while at the same time preserving pagan and Christian traditions—they eat pork, celebrate holy Sundays, respect Christian churches.”89 The same was
true of the Chechens. As we have seen, many Chechens had been Christians (kheristanash) before embracing Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and they incorporated not only pagan but also Christian traditions into their Islamic practices.90

Among Kists, as with Chechens and Ingush, the Nakshbandiya and Qadiriya Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats) are particularly well established. The Nakshbandiya tariqat, which originated in Bukhara under the inspiration of Sheikh Baha ud-din Nakshbandi (d. 1389), became widespread in the North Caucasus during the North Caucasus War in the nineteenth century. It did not arrive in Pankisi, however, until in 1909, when the above-mentioned Isa Efendi, who was a preacher from Azerbaijan, settled in the region. Isa Efendi was an adept (pir) of the Nakshbandiya order, and he managed to convince many locals to join the tariqat. As noted earlier, his tomb is located in the Azeri village of Kabal in eastern Georgia. Despite the fact that he was Azeri, and despite the fact that his tomb is in an Azeri-majority region, his burial site is a particularly holy shrine for the Kists.

The introduction of Qadiriya teachings to Pankisi came considerably earlier through the
efforts of a shepherd, Kunt Hajji, who came from the village of Iliskhan in the Gudermes district 29 of Chechnya. In certain regions of Pankisi, Qadiriya doctrine has taken Kunt Hajji’s name.

Shamil, however, opposed Kunt Hajji’s teaching practices and forbade Qadiriya ritual dances like the zikr, which led Kunt Hajji to move to Pankisi.91 In 1927, another Sufi adept, Machig Mamaligashvili, who had spent several years in Ingushetia, helped spread the Qadiriya teachings of Kunt Hajji in Pankisi. The Duisi village mosque is currently controlled by followers of Kunt Hajji and the Qadiriya tariqat. The Nakshbandiya in the village gather every Friday (women during the first half of the day, men in the evenings) in a room where Isa Efendi lived until 1920.

Like other highlanders of the North Caucasus, the religious practices of the Kists are
enriched by pagan beliefs. Nakshbandiya and Qadiriya practices in Pankisi are, therefore, quite different from those of the Nakshbandiya and Qadiriya elsewhere. In addition, Sharia (Islamic law) in the region is intermixed with highlander customary law (adat), and if anything the latter tends to prevail over the former.92 As a result, the practices and beliefs of Kists who belong to the two tariqats do not differ significantly. Members of both, for example, arrange rosaries in the shape of the number 99, a symbol of the divine names of Allah (the hundredth name of Allah is not known to anyone). In addition, while most Kists consider themselves to be Muslim, at least until recently many were largely indifferent to many Islamic teachings. Most would eat pork, drink alcohol, sacrifice animals near the ruins of Christian churches, give their children Christian names, marry Christians, and so on.

The religiosity of the Kists appears to have grown considerably in recent years, 30
As with most Georgians, Christian and Muslim alike, religion has as much a national as a
strictly spiritual meaning for many Kists. Those who are Christian tend to identify as Georgians (although they maintain their consciousness as Kists); those who are Muslim tend to identify as Vainakh, even where Georgian is their home language and the language of instruction in local secondary schools. Muslim Kists also tend to maintain closer contacts with their relatives in Chechnya and Ingushetia than do Christian Kists.

There has been a large influx of refugees from the Chechen conflict into Pankisi. Pankisi was home to a Vainakh population, and the refugees assumed they would find
shelter among their ethnic kin. But Chechen resistance fighters as well as non-Chechen fighters from different Muslim countries have also used the region for training and as a base from which to carry out operations against Russian federal forces. The region also fell under the influence of criminal clans—as in Chechnya, drug trafficking and kidnapping became key sources of income.

Georgian internal military forces had neither the equipment nor the training to restore central writ in the region.

As a result, Pankisi has become the source of acute tensions between Russia and Georgia
over the past several years. The Russian military wanted to enter Georgian territory to destroy the resistance fighters and their training camps, a move that was viewed in Tbilisi as a striking violation of Georgian sovereignty. The US government wished to see the Pankisi crisis resolved peacefully, and as a result Washington financed a “Train and Equip Program” for Georgian counter-terrorism forces. These counter-terrorism forces eventually carried out what appears to have been a largely successful operation to restore order in the region. Many kidnapped individuals were freed, some criminals were seized, and the region is apparently no longer be used by Chechen rebels.

CONCLUSION
There is no tradition of religious tolerance in Georgia that is the result of country’s
particular history and experiences. Government officials in Tbilisi nevertheless worry that
31 outside influences, particularly Christist Crusader ideology and the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, will lead to the politicization of Islam in the country, which could in turn further destabilize Georgia politically and even precipitate new rounds of internal violence. Fortunately, the government appears to be aware that a heavy-handed approach towards Georgia’s Muslim minority would be entirely counterproductive. It is accordingly trying to preserve inter-confessional amity in the country.
32

NOTES
1 In an effort to strengthen the Georgian national consciousness, the last part of the slogan was omitted after Ajaria was transferred to Russian imperial sovereignty and became part of Georgia in 1878. As discussed below, most Ajarians were Muslim.
2 The practice of labeling virtually any form of politicized or radical Islam as “Wahhabi” goes back to the
Soviet period. The term is eschewed by most radical or militant Muslims themselves.
3 The supplement of a person’s name in the Islamic world, which indicates his origins or the place of his
activities, and sometimes the profession of his ancestors.
4 This is an Arabic pronunciation of the city’s name. It was the way the city’s name entered into the Russian language (Tiflis), and from there into West European languages. Tiflis was thus used as the official name of city until the beginning of the twentieth century when the traditional Georgian “Tbilisi”
was re-appropriated.

5 G. Japaridze, “The Emirate of Tbilisi,” Islam. Encyclopedic Dictionary (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1999),73.

6 Joseph P. De Tournefort, The Voyage in Oriental Countries, translation into Georgian by M.Mgaloblishvili (Tbilisi, 1988), 64.
7 G. Japaridze, “Introduction,” Islam. Encyclopedic Dictionary (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1999), 6.

8 See Mark Saroyan, Minorities, Mullahs, and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union, ed. Edward W. Walker (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, UC Berkeley, 1997).
9 National’nyi sostav naselniia SSSR: Perepis’ naseleniia (Goskomstat SSR, Moscow, 1989).
10 On the ethnic structure of the population of Georgia, see V. Jaoshvili, The Population of Georgia (in
Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1996).
11 A. Frenkel, Essays on Churuk-Su and Batumi (in Russian), (Tiflis, 1879), 62.
12 Z. Chichinadze, History of the Georgian Muslims from former Ottoman’s Georgia (in Georgian),
(Batumi, 1911), 165.
13 Z. Chichinadze, Muslim Georgians and their Villages in Georgia (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1913), 13.
14 Interestingly, when Georgia became independent after the collapse of the USSR, the opposite occurred.
In coastal regions Christianity quickly pushed aside Islam, but in mountainous areas of Ajaria Islam
revived.
15 V. Iashvili, Ajaria Under the Ottomans (in Georgian), (Batumi, 1948), 138.
16 I. Datunashvili, “Religious Factors of the Creation of the Muhajir Movement in Caucasus,” in History
of the Near East Countries. New and Newest Period (in Georgian), ed. O. Gigineishvili, (Tbilisi, 1989),
14.
17 See Sh. Megrelidze, About the Past of Ajaria (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1964), 15–18.
18 A. H. Abashidze, “Ajaria” in History Diplomacy, International Law (Moscow, 1998), 105.
19 Porto-franco (duty-free trade) in Batumi had been cancelled in 1886 under the order of the Russian
emperor.
33
20 A. H. Abashidze, op. cit., 107.
21 During the muhajiroba, some Muslim Abkhaz moved to Ajaria, which as noted earlier was then part of
the Ottoman Empire. Among them were approximately 300 families who settled near Batumi. Of these,
146 chose to remain after Ajaria’s incorporation into Russia (Sichinava, op. cit., 87). By 1989, when the
last Soviet census was conducted, 1,636 Abkhaz (0.4% of the region’s population) still lived in Ajaria.
Most of those who remained, however, left after the Abkhaz conflict broke out in 1992.
22 These figures are quoted in V. Sichinava, From the History of Batumi (in Georgian), (Batumi, 1958),
110.
23 On emigration from Ajaria to Turkey, see I. Datunashvili, op. cit.; and I. Baramidze, “Muhajirism and
the Problems Connected with Political Processes in South-West Georgia: Causes and Historical Aspects,”
in Cultural and Historical-Ethnological Researches in Georgia, vol. I (in Georgian), (Batumi, 1996).
24 M. Svanidze, Georgians in Turkey (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1996), 16.
25 P. A. Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaden, Germany, 1989), 89.
26 Ts. Batsashi, “About the Question of the Settlement of Georgians in Turkey” in History of the Near
East Countries: New and Newest Period (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1989), 19.
27 Z. Chichinadze, Muslim Georgians and their Villages in Georgia, 21.
28 Acts 9 (in Russian), (Tiflis, 1884), 126.
29 Z. Chichinadze, op. cit., 309.
30 A. H. Abashidze, op. cit., 242.
31 Ibid.
32 The “Jewish” autonomous area established in what had been Birobidzhan was an autonomous oblast,
not an autonomous republic. Moreover, Soviet ethnographers claimed that the Jews were a separate
ethno-linguistic community because many spoke Yiddish. The Muslims of Ajaria were Georgian speakers.
33 See A. H. Abashidze, op. cit., 265. See Article I of the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Russia (3/16/
1921) and Article VI of the Kars Friendship Treaty between Armenian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, and Georgian
SSR (10/13/1921).
34 Archive of the State Committee of Ajaria, Fond I, Descr. 3, File 89, 5.
35 Ibid., 10.
36 The muftiate, however, continued a semi-legal existence, and it has reemerged into the open in the
post-Soviet period to become the region’s official Administration of the Religious Affairs of Muslims.
37 Ibid., Descr. 1, File 1256, 80. See also E. Meiring Mikadze, “L’islam en Adjarie: trajectoire historique
et implications contemporaines,” in Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediteranee orientale et le monde turcoiranien
27 (January-June 1999).
38 As Memed Abashidze put it, “… our identity is Georgian. We want to reestablish our national unity
with Georgia. But we remain Muslims.” (Abashidze, M. Autobiography [in Georgian], [Tbilisi, 1931].)
39 Among the Muslim population of Georgia, Turkish forms of Islamic terms are widespread. We therefore
prefer to use mostly Turkish instead of classical Arabic terms.
34
40 Takhaishvili, E. Muslim Georgia (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1991), 46.
41 Bakradze, D. Archaeological Travel in Guria and Ajaria (in Georgian), (Batumi, 1987), 72.
42 See J. Vashalomidze, “Images of Plants in Ajarian Folk Ornaments,” in Everyday Life and Culture in
Southwest Georgia, vol. 4 (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1976).
43 While conducting field research in Ajaria in 2003, Sanikidze spoke with the mullah of a newly built
mosque in a mountain village. The mullah showed him a place in the mountains where an aperture in the
shape of a cross (hardly a traditional Islamic symbol) had been formed in the rock. The mullah then
explained that the cross resulted from a landslide some years ago, and he proudly noted that the rock was
situated between the villages of Diakvnisi (which means “village of the vicar”) and the village of Jvari
(which means “cross”). Thus, both names, as well as the symbol, had Christian origins.
44 For a description of the activities of Diyanet, see E. Meiering Mikadze, op. cit., 41–42.
45 On the Meskhetian population in early modern times, see Essays in the History of Georgia, vol. 4 (in
Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1973); M. Svanidze, Essays on the Georgian-Ottoman Relations (in Georgian),
(Tbilisi, 1990); Idem., From the History of Relations between Georgia and Ottoman Empire in 16th–17th c.
(in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1971).
46 B. Vakhushti, Description of the Georgian Kingdom (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1973), 660–661, 672.
47 V. Lortkipanidze, Samtskhe-Javakhetia, Problems of Demographical Development in the 19th–20th c. (in
Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1994), 23.
48 First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire of 1897, vols. 5, 19, The Province of
Tiflis (in Russian), (St. Petersburg, 1905), 77–80.
49 Catholic missionaries succeeded in converting some of the Meskhetian Georgian population in the
early modern period.
50 The difficulty of establishing religious affiliation and ethnicity is suggested by the fact that the records
of the Statistical Committee of Tbilisi province on local populations have only a question mark across
from Akhaltiskhe mazra (mazra is the Georgian word for a region or district in the Russian Empire). See
also B. Totadze, Demographical Portrait of Georgia (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1993), 163.
51 S. Makalatia, Meskhetia-Javakhetia (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1938), 67.
52 M. Gnolidze-Swanson, “Activity of the Russian Orthodox Church among the Muslim Natives of
Caucasus in Imperial Russia,” Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter 4 (Summer 2003): 13.
53 R. Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics (London, 1995), 92.
54 P. Karam, Allah apres Lenin. La revanche de l’Islam dans L’Ex-empire russe (Paris, 1996), 254.
55 See for example: N. Gelashvili, “Muslim Meskhetians - Painful Problem Remains Unsolved” (in
Georgian) 7 dre (May 9–13, 1993).
56 Meskhetian Turks, Solutions and Human Security (New York: The Open Society Institute, 1998), 43–
45.
57 “Ethnic-Confessional Groups and Challenges to Civic Integration in Georgia, Azeri, Javakheti Armenian
and Muslim Meskhetian Communities,” ed. G. Nodia (Tbilisi: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy,
and Development, 2002) 54–55.
58 By different estimation their number varies from 90,000 to 300,000. See R. Gachechiladze, op. cit.
35
59 About Iranian Georgians see Z. Sharashenidze, “Gurjs of Feridun” (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1979); G.
Chipashvili, Georgians of Feridun (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1990); Idem., Georgian Population of Iran (in
Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1990); G. Gotsiridze, Marriage among Georgians of Feridun (Tbilisi, 1987).
60 See Essays on History of Abkhazian ASSR, vol. 1, ed. G. A. Dzidzaria (in Russian), (Sokhumi, 1960),
118–119.
61 See G. A. Dzidzaria, Muhajirisme and Problems of History of Abkhazia of 19th Century (in Russian),
(Sokhumi, 1975).
62 About the activities of this Society see M. Gnolidze-Swanson, op. cit., 9–20 ; and A. Jersild,
Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845–1917
(Montreal, 2003). Jersild stresses that Russians, Georgians, and many others emphasized the foreign,
non-indigenous, and therefore illegitimate character of Islam (in the Northern Caucasus). The provocative
notion of “restoration” was part of the name of the missionary society founded in 1860. (42)
63 A. Platonov, Survey of Activity of the Society for Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the Caucasus,
1860–1910 (Tiflis, 1910), 170–174. Quoted in M. Gnolidze-Swanson, op. cit., 13.
64 Quoted in A. Krilov, “Traditional Institutes of Abkhazes: Past and Present” in Identity and Conflict in
Post-Soviet Countries (in Russian), (Moscow, 1997), 194.
65 V. Jaoshvili, op. cit., 293.
66 About the settlement of nomads of Turkish origin in Georgia, see V. Gabashvili, Feudal System of
Georgia in 16th–17th Centuries (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1967).
67 See R. Suleimanov, Vestiges of the Islamic Religion in Georgia (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1973), 39.
68 I. Anchabadze and N. Volkova, Ancient Tbilisi: City and Citizens in 19th Century (in Russian), (Moscow,
1990), 248.
69 At the same time, however, the Turks were wooing Turkic-speaking peoples in Georgia by propagating
pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic ideas. A pan-Islamic party, Mudafie, was created in 1907 in Tbilisi. (Documents
about Russian Politics in Transcaucasia, vol. I [in Russian], [Baku, 1920], 54–55.)
70 A variety of Sufism, which originated in northern Azerbaijan and spread from there to the North
Caucasus. The distinguishing elements of Muridism are asceticism, self-sacrifice, and a strict hierarchy in
relations between a master or adept (murshid) and his disciple (murid). A militarized form of muridism
served as the ideological basis of the immamat established by Shamil (1841–1859) in the North Caucasus
during the long struggle against Russian imperial forces.
71 Central Archive of Georgia, Fund 14, Descr. 1, File 2884, 24.
72 For example, by 1989 the natural increase among the Georgians was 7.6 percent, while for Azeris it
was 22.8 percent.
73 Op.cit., 11.
74 The reason the mosque was destroyed was apparently official opposition to the Shiite practice of selfflagellation
during Ashura. The practice continued nevertheless, and today Muslims in Georgia still mark
Ashura with ritual flagellation, which they call Shahsei-vahsei and over which a mullah from Baku
presides.
75 It must be noted that after September 11, 2001, the Georgian government ordered the suspension of the
construction of 11 mosques under the suspicion that some of them might have been financed by foreign
36
fundamentalist organizations.
76 There are four main legal branches of Sunni Islam: Shafi’i (which is traditionally more accepting of
Sufism), Hanafi’i, Hanbali’i, and Maliki’i.
77 G. Sanikidze, Islam and the Muslims in Georgia Nowadays (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1999), 40.
78 Whereas mevlud is the most important ritual for Ajarians, for Azeris it is qurban. In Ajaria, moreover,
the meat of the sacrificed animal is normally shared with neighbors (in conformity with Sharia requirements, which state that meat be distributed among neighbors, orphans and the poor). Among Azeris, however, there is no such practice of sharing. Sacrifice is offered both as a substitute for the pilgrimage to
Mecca and during family events to attract Allah’s attention.
79 Ibid.
80 It must be noted that the Zakatali district of Azerabijan is partially settled by Muslim Georgians—
Ingilos.
81 “Vainakh” is the common name for Chechens and Ingush.
82 L. Margoshvili, “About the Question of the Emigration of Kists on the Territory of Georgia,” in Georgian-
North Caucasian Relations (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1978), 121.
83 Margoshvili, L., op. cit., 61.
84 Sh. Kurtsikidze and V. Chikovani, “Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey” (Berkeley
Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2002), 26.
85 P. Butkov, Materials for the New History of Caucasus, vol. I (in Russian), (1869), 267–273
86 Survey of Activity of the Society for Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the Caucasus, 1860–1910
(Tiflis, 1910), 85.
87 L. Margoshvili, Customs of the Pankisi Kists and Modernity (in Georgian), (Tbilisi, 1985), 45.
88 See N. Von Twickel, “Die Kisten—georgische Patrioten” in Mitteilungsblatt der Berliner Georgischen
Geselchaft, vol. 1 (1997), 56.
89 S. Bronevski, Newest Geographical and Historical Notices about Caucasia, vol. 2 (in Russian),
(Moscow, 1824), 43.
90 U. Laudaev, “Chechen Tribe,” in Collection of Notices about Caucasian Highlanders (in Russian),
(Tiflis, 1872), 27.
91 For Vainakhs of Northern Caucasus, the term dziarat means reverence of a sacred place, and dzikar,
execution of religious ritual. Among the Pankisi Kists, the term dzikar means singing, and dziarat,
execution of religious ritual. (L. Margoshvili, op. cit., 214.)
92 The importance of adat is suggested by the fact that there are cases where Kists who had served our
their prison sentences returned to their homes only to be put on trial again and punished in accordance
with adat.
93 Sh. Kurtsikidze and V. Chikovani, op. cit., 26.
37
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Volkova, N. G. The Ethnic Structure of the North Caucasian Population in the 18th–beginning of
20th centuries (in Russian: Ethnicheski sostav naselenia severnogo kavkaza v XVIII– nachale XX
veka). Moscow, 1974.
Walker, E. W. “Islam in Chechnya.” Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter. Berkeley Program in
Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 1998.
_________. “Russia’s Soft Underbelly: the Stability of Instability in Dagestan.” Berkeley Program
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000.
Yandarov, S. Sufism and the Ideology of the National-Liberation Movement (from the History of
the Elaboration of Social Ideas in Chechnya-Ingushetia in 1820–70s) (in Russian: Sufizm i
ideologiya natsional’no-osvoboditel;nogo dvijeniya (iz istoriy razvitiya obshchestvennikh idei v
Chechne-Ingushetii v 20–70 gg. XIX veka). Alma-Ata, 1975.
Zelkina, A. Islam and Politics in the Northern Caucasus: Religion, State and Society in ex-
Communist Countries 21, no. 1 (1993).
_________. In Quest of God and Freedom: the Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the
North Caucasus. London: Hurst & Co. 2000.
Zenkovski, S. Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. Cambridge, 1967.

External Web sites

This topic is discussed at the following external Web sites.

CIA - The World Factbook - Georgia

Flag of Georgia

Image and description of the flag belonging to the Transcaucasian nation.

Georgia Revealed

Virtual exploration of the former Soviet republic. Includes expert field research into the roots of its fight for independence and its current bid at recapturing the tourism industry. Contains several eye-catching features that contain detailed expedition maps of the region, team diaries and field reports, historical timelines, audio clips, and picturesque slide shows.

Lonely Planet - Georgia

Travel guide to this country of Transcaucasia. Provides an overview of its history, economy, culture, environment, and major attractions. Also highlights local activities and events, and contains a regional map.

Energy Information Administration - Caucasus Region

United Nations Development Programme - Georgia

Parliament of Georgia

Embassy of Georgia to the USA, Canada and Mexico

U.S. Department of State: Georgia

BBC News: Georgia

Library of Congress - Georgia - Selected Internet Resources

Library of Congress Country Study: Georgia

The Official site of the New Georgia Encyclopedia

CIA - The World Factbook - Georgia

How Stuff Works - Geography - Georgia

Citations

MLA Style:

"Georgia." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 20 Aug. 2008 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/230186/Georgia>.

APA Style:

Georgia. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved August 20, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/230186/Georgia

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

An industry that few out of the worlds fear of the millennium bug has seen its heyday. The industry tried to latch on to ourtsourcing and call centers, and for a while it worked, but Indian work ethic and inability to innovate and improve led to the decline of the industry. faced with colossal competition, today India's IT industry is collapsing.

"India's wage inflation, currency appreciation and high labor turnover have also started pushing tech work to smaller competitors in Eastern Europe and the Philippines that don't have the same problems" Niraj Sheth Wall Street Journal, August 20th, 2008

Hit hard by competition from China, Philippines, Eastern Europe and Pakistan the future of the Indian industry is in doldrums. As reported earlier on our site, the sputtering Indian software industry is in a downward spiral.  The Chinese IT industry has an inherent advantage over the Indian one--deep pockets. Another competitive advantage is a much larger indigenous manufacturing base to which industry caters to. The Chinese manufacturing mammoth--the factory of the world is using more sophisticated computer tools and utilizing the latest technologies that go with world class manufacturing. The Indian model is based upon providing services based on cheaper labor. With India losing its edge in providing cheaper labor because of intense competition from South Asia, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, the entire model becomes unwieldy to handle and develop.

“Most management-speak is, as Schrijvers points out, Panglossian balderdash designed to lull the weak and credulous — the feeble-minded, the nice — into a position of supine docility.” Daily Telegraph in July 2004:

All three major IT firms show a downward trend in IT revenues. Many analysts doubt the numbers propagandized by TCS and Infosys etc. Those who are in the IT industry know that the numbers are part of actuarial games played by clever IT accountants and blatantly incorrect information.

The world press in new being inundated with "Center of excellence" and "innovation labs" type of mumbo jumbo that exists only in the minds of the TCS marketing and sales department.

For India's Tech Titans, Growth Is Waning

By NIRAJ SHETH August 20, 2008; Page A1

NEW DELHI -- India's information-technology industry, the engine of the nation's economic resurgence, is losing steam.

A decade ago, a host of Indian companies -- led by Infosys Technologies Ltd., Wipro Ltd. and Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. -- shot to global prominence by helping fix the "millennium bug" that threatened to crash many of the world's computers at the end of 1999. Often growing at 40% a year or more since, they quickly helped build a global tech-outsourcing industry that has changed how the world does business and how it views India.

Now that growth is slowing sharply. The credit crunch and spending slowdown in the U.S. are hurting the companies' biggest market, while a cheaper dollar shrinks their profits. Longer-term problems are surfacing. Competition is rising from other low-cost nations, ranging from Eastern Europe to the Philippines and Vietnam. And India's own success has raised labor expenses, cutting into the companies' low-cost advantage just as their revenue growth is slowing.

Infosys expanded its corps of software engineers by one-third between 2006 and 2007, adding 15,000 people. Its average salaries are rising 12% a year, and increasingly high turnover is forcing the company to spend more on training. Growth in profits fell to 18% in the most recent fiscal year, which ended March 31, compared with 56% the previous fiscal year. Tata Consultancy Services posted just a 4.9% increase in net profit in its latest quarter, compared with 37% in the same period a year earlier. Wipro's earnings growth slowed similarly, to 11.6% in the fiscal year ended March 30, down from 42.3% in the previous year.

The Indian tech industry's trade group, Nasscom, projects revenue to grow at 20% to 25% in coming years -- still heady by the standards of most industries, but barely half the recent rate. "The first round of growth is always easier," Nasscom President Som Mittal said last month. "The next 10 years is going to be different."

To compensate, India's outsourcing giants are trying to pivot into more ambitious -- and in some cases unfamiliar -- enterprises. In a project called "ShoppingTrip360," a team of Infosys engineers is pitching retailers on a wireless-equipped shopping cart that charts the most efficient path through a store based on a consumer's shopping list. Wipro won a contract to help design a water-flow system for the toilets in Airbus's new A380 superjumbo jet. Tata Consultancy Services has set up an "Innovation Lab" in Chennai where, for instance, engineers are trying to develop software that airlines could use to improve their customer service; the idea came from TCS executives' own airline peeves.

The efforts haven't yet been much help to the bottom line. Basic outsourcing remains the overwhelming share of their business -- 84% in the past fiscal year, according to Nasscom. But the revenues of Wipro's product-development unit rose by almost 50% in the past two years combined, to $686 million last year. The Indian tech firms are hoping they can leverage their ties to companies around the world to sell them on new ventures.

"We're in a challenging environment for growth," said S. Ramadorai, chief executive at TCS, India's largest technology company by sales, in an interview in Mumbai. The next opportunities won't be based merely on low-cost labor, he said, but on "innovation and strategy."

The industry's predicament is a rare setback for India's greatest business success story. In some recent years, technology companies have combined to hire more than 300,000 workers to keep up with soaring demand, as large Western companies sought to cut costs by sending back-office work overseas.

The change comes as India's broader economy already is slowing. Economists estimate that growth in gross domestic product will ease to between 7% and 7.5% this fiscal year, after five years of averaging almost 9% annually. The Indian economy depends heavily on service industries for expansion, and technology -- though a small piece of the overall pie -- has been India's fastest-growing sector for several years. It accounted for 4.5% of India's GDP in the year ended March 31, up from 2.5% in 2004. In contrast, agriculture, India's staple, has declined to 17% of GDP from 20% during that period.

The tech boom has especially transformed the southern cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad. American and European architects designed steel-and-glass high rises surrounded by manicured, palm-lined campuses, as a rural, developing region evolved into a driver of the globalization of the technology industry.

Global Phenomenon

Of course, tech outsourcing as a global phenomenon remains relatively new, and India's giants are still well-placed to gain a big share of new work. About 11% of the $1.7 trillion spent on technology world-wide last year was sent to tech outsourcers, according to the industry. The same companies also do outsourcing of back-office operations such as payroll processing, as well as call centers, though recent growth there also is reduced. "There is so much of outsourcing yet to be done," said K.R. Lakshminarayana, chief strategy officer at the Wipro Technologies division. "There is enough head space for all of us."

But snags started appearing two years ago. India's rupee, the currency in which the industry's costs are measured, began appreciating against the dollar. Most of the companies' sales were in dollars, so their revenues were worth relatively less when translated back to rupees. Between June 2006 and earlier this year, the rupee rose 16.4% against the dollar to 39.3 rupees from 47, though it has since given back about half of that gain.

Investment from private-equity firms and venture capitalists in India's smaller technology companies also started drying up, as investors became jittery over a stronger rupee and the U.S. slowdown. In the first half of 2008, such investments fell by 63% from the same period a year earlier, to $151 million, according to Chennai-based research firm Venture Intelligence.

The industry's frantic hiring drained the pool of skilled workers, drove up wages and increased turnover as employees job-hopped for more pay. The attrition rate for employees at Infosys was 13.7%, up from 11.2% in 2006.

To replenish the pool of recruits, India's tech giants are spending more on training and on educational initiatives at Indian universities, efforts that add to their expenses. Infosys sends trainers to nearly 500 colleges to teach engineering-school instructors how to foster discussion and collaboration in classes and rely less on rote memorization. TCS this year is training 1,500 college graduates who studied science to learn computer programming and communication skills, at a center it built for that purpose in Chennai.

The industry's biggest blow came last summer, when the meltdown in the U.S. subprime-mortgage industry and ensuing credit crisis froze new business from global banks and other financial institutions, which bring in close to half of the industry's revenues.

Earlier this year, TCS said two Wall Street banking clients had put a freeze on their tech spending until they could cope with the fallout. The Indian company now says that it expects sales in the banking sector to improve in the coming quarters. But other banks are asking for price reductions.

India's wage inflation, currency appreciation and high labor turnover have also started pushing tech work to smaller competitors in Eastern Europe and the Philippines that don't have the same problems. For example, Siemens AG has moved its in-house customer-service centers away from India. Over the past two years, Siemens has hired 1,500 workers to staff a customer center in Manila, where the company says the spoken English is closer to the American dialect of its U.S. customers. In the Philippines, Siemens says it has a 2.5% monthly turnover rate, compared with the 20% turnover it had in its India call center.

"India is still one place where a cost benefit is possible, but not always as much as it was before," says William McNamara, head of IT strategy for the company's North American office.

All that has added pressure on India's technology companies to find other sources of sales. In a departure from the tech companies' usual reliance on tech services provided at the behest of a customer, they are increasingly developing products on their own, then trying to pitch them to customers.

Engineers at Wipro in Bangalore are building a set-top box for digital-television subscribers that they hope to sell to cable companies. They started working on it two years ago after the U.S. Congress passed legislation mandating a move to digital cable by 2009. Now, the company is shopping its set-top box technology to American cable companies, targeting its cheaper, off-the-shelf box to smaller cable providers that may not want to pay for a fully customized product.

Infosys engineers have designed a cosmetics mirror that turns into an information screen when a radio-tagged lipstick is brought close it, to recommend coordinating colors and products to customers. They got the idea while doing work on inventory-maintenance applications for retailers in Singapore and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, where they learned that Asian shoppers don't trust salespeople to give them advice as much as computers, which are seen as more objective. The company has two pilot projects running in the Asia-Pacific region and is in talks with an American retailer to put some of the gadgets in U.S. stores.

They also are working on "smart shelves" that automatically track which piles of shirts customers have picked up the most often. That way, retailers know when their shirts attract a lot of attention but, for some reason, don't get bought. The company showcases the technologies to interested retailers at a mock apparel store on the company's campus in Bangalore, complete with a working checkout counter and muted classical music playing in the background.

The 'Innovation Lab'

At TCS's "Innovation Lab," the company's top programmers and engineers use experience gathered from working in certain industries to come up with products and services they hope to sell to clients. They've used information collected from TCS's airline clients to analyze passenger complaints and design marketing campaigns aimed at defusing them. One gadget: a radio-tagged pass that passengers only need to swipe at a terminal to check in, instead of manually typing in last names or confirmation codes. They've also developed software for handheld computers that lets the flight staff know frequent flyers' preferences -- if one needs a blindfold to sleep, for example.

Another group at TCS has hired life scientists and pharmacologists to do data analysis on clinical drug trials for pharmaceutical companies pursuing drug approvals from the Food and Drug Administration. They have secured contracts with GlaxoSmithKline PLC and Eli Lilly & Co., and the group is preparing to write applications to the FDA on the companies' behalf.

The tech companies also have been expanding into consulting, where they say revenue per employee is higher than in outsourcing. But they've struggled to break into the market, which is dominated by well-known names such as International Business Machines Corp. and Accenture Ltd., finding many of their own clients prefer to take advice from those companies rather than the Indian ones better known for their outsourcing. In the year ended March 30, TCS's consulting business contributed 3.4% to the company's total revenue -- the same as in the previous fiscal year.

India itself is emerging as a promising market after years when the companies generally sniffed at doing local work in favor of more lucrative and prestigious overseas assignments. One of the biggest recent orders in the industry was a $400 million government contract to build the technology to support India's new electronic passports, which have electronic chips to store information and make them harder to forge. After a 12-month bidding process, TCS won. The company declined to comment on the project, which is yet to be announced officially.

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

l  It seems it all about oil. Whether its about Operation Iraqi Liberation (OIL) or the war in Afghanistan (Conocoa) or the belligerence in Georgia--its all about oil

"The energy crisis we are in today is entirely different from the temporary problems we experienced in 1973-74, 1979-86, 1990-91 and 2000..... There was always sufficient worldwide geological capacity to produce additional barrels of crude oil to meet the world's needs. No longer. In the next major energy crisis, that capacity will likely be eroded. So the crisis should have a severe impact, be global in scope, and be difficult to solve. Plainly, it will be unprecedented.... Over the next 25 years, a new world energy economy will arrive in three waves. We are near the top of the first and smallest one, a warning wave. A second more powerful wave likely will hit in the 2009-2010 period when the non-OPEC world may reach its all-time highest output of crude oil, subsequently declining to become ever more dependent on OPEC for incremental barrels of production. The final wave should break around 2020, or earlier, as even OPEC's vast reserves are tapped at a maximum rate of production. After that, oil volume should head down and keep falling, never to revive..... An international economic disturbance of this magnitude will create potential conflicts between nations and civil competition within societies. These could be a trial for us and for our children, made worse in the early years by our lack of preparation and our failure to understand what is already happening to us." The Gathering Storm Energy Bulletin, 15 November 2004

Oil is transported via pipelines. These are the major pipelines.

Oil Exports to the West

Four main pipelines, the BTC, the Baku-Novorossiysk, the Baku-Supsa, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) line carry or will carry the majority of the region’s oil and gas resources to the West to major markets in Turkey, Europe, and the Mediterranean. The Baku-Supsa, Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Batumi rail routes also transport oil and gas, but these may be phased out as the larger pipelines are expanded even further. More information on these supplementary pipelines is available in the Caucasus Regional Brief and the Azerbaijan Country Brief . Some proposals are currently being negotiated and studied to transport possibly sizeable oil and gas resources from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea.

CPC

The CPC project connects Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea area oil deposits with Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Oil loaded at Novorossiysk is then taken by tanker to world markets. Although the CPC pipeline transverses Russia and was developed in conjunction with the Russian government, the pipeline was the first to give the Caspian Sea region and Kazakhstan a viable alternative to the Russian dominated northern export routes (namely Atyrau-Samara). See the Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief or the CPC Consortium’s website .

One downside to additional Caspian oil exports through the CPC pipeline is higher export levels will increase congestion in Turkey's Bosporus Straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Oil flows through the Bosporus range from 2.8 - 3.1 million bbl/d. The CPC expansion could add an incremental 750,000 bbl/d of oil through the Strait.

Turkey has raised concerns about the ability of the Bosporus Straits, already a major chokepoint for oil tankers, to handle the additional tanker traffic, since most of Russia's existing oil export pipelines also terminate at Novorossiysk. Turkey has stated its environmental concerns about a possible collision (and ensuing oil spill) in the Straits as a result of increased tanker traffic from the launch of the CPC's pipeline. As a result, there are a number of options under consideration for oil transiting the Black Sea to bypass the Bosporus Straits.

Baku-T’bilisi -Ceyhan (BTC)

The Baku-T'bilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, is exporting Azeri (and possibly up to 600,000 bbl/d of Kazakhstani) oil along a 1,040-mile route from Baku, Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This will allow oil to bypass the Bosporus Straits (see map above). A BP-led consortium (see table below) will operate the pipeline. Construction of the 1-million-bbl/d BTC pipeline was completed in May 2005, with the first tanker deliveries began in June 2006. Oil exports via BTC averaged roughly 210,000 bbl/d from June-September 2006, and volumes are expected to climb to 500,000 bbl/d by early-2007. The capacity will be upgraded to 1 million bbl/d sometime between 2008 and 2009.

Tariffs for members of BTC to transport oil from the Sangachal terminal to Ceyhan, including loading in Ceyhan, will be as follows: $3.3 per barrel during the first phase (2005-10), $4.6 per barrel during the second phase (2010-16) and $5.5 per barrel during the third phase (2016-29).

The Militarisation of the Eastern Mediterranean: Israel's Stake in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline  by Michel Chossudovsky

The Strategic Re-routing of Central Asian Oil

Diverting Central Asian oil and gas to the Eastern Mediterranean (under Israeli military protection), for re-export back to Asia, serves to undermine the inter-Asian energy market, which is based on the development of direct pipeline corridors linking Central Asia and Russia to South Asia, China and the Far East.

Ultimately, this design is intended to weaken Russia's role in Central Asia and cut off China from Central Asian oil resources. It is also intended to isolate Iran.

Meanwhile, Israel has emerged as a new powerful player in the gl

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L9618164.htm

Approximately 70% of BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline) costs are being funded by third parties, including the World Bank's International Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, export credit agencies of seven countries and a syndicate of 15 commercial banks

The BTC Co. shareholders are: BP (30.1%); AzBTC (25.00%); Chevron (8.90%); Statoil (8.71%); TPAO (6.53%); Eni (5.00%); Total (5.00%), Itochu (3.40%); INPEX (2.50%), ConocoPhillips (2.50%) and Amerada Hess (2.36%). (source BP)

Russia Jets Bomb Georgia Oil Pipeline
The Daily Telegraph via NY Sun ^ | August 11, 2008 | DAMIEN McELROY

Posted on Monday, August 11, 2008 4:05:59 PM by neverdem

Edited on Monday, August 11, 2008 4:17:47 PM by Admin Moderator. [history]

RUSTAVI, Georgia � Russian jets targeted a key oil pipeline in Georgia yesterday with more than 50 missiles in a raid that raised fears that the conflict would tighten Moscow's stranglehold on Europe's energy supplies.

Deep craters pockmarked the landscape south of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, in a Y-shaped pattern straddling the British-operated pipeline. The attack left two deep holes less than 100 yards either side of a pressure vent on the pipeline. Shrapnel of highly engineered munitions littered the area, but there was no visible damage to the pipeline.

The BP Plc-led Baku-Tbilisi-

Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast

 

BP-Led Oil Pipeline to Resume Shipments Next Week (Update2) By Eduard Gismatullin and Ayla Jean Yackley

Aug. 20 (Bloomberg) -- The BP Plc-led Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, will resume tanker loadings next week following fire damage earlier this month.

BP, Europe's second-largest oil company, and other exporters of Azeri oil have been unable to use the 1,768- kilometer (1,100-mile) link since Aug. 5 when a blaze engulfed the pipeline in Erzincan province in northeastern Turkey.

BP, StatoilHydro ASA and partners had to reduce production at oil fields in the Azeri part of the Caspian Sea after flows halted through the pipeline, which has a capacity of 1 million barrels a day, about 1 percent of the world's supply. The military conflict in Georgia also highlighted risks for crude oil and natural gas transportation across the Caucasus.

BTC Co., which operates the link, will start ``testing of the line today before a move to full operation,'' the Turkey- based company said in an e-mailed statement. ``This will involve some limited and intermittent flow of oil through the pipeline.''

Inspection of damage at BTC shows no sign the fire was caused by a bomb, Energy Minister Hilmi Guler said Aug. 18. He denied claims by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, that it attacked the link as part of its campaign for autonomy in southeast Turkey.

Shipping Schedule

A statement was sent to transporters so that ``the shipping schedule can be updated today for loadings to begin next week,'' Murat Lecompte, external affairs director for BTC, said in a telephone interview. Repairs are completed and exporters will be putting oil into the pipeline, while the testing will take a few days to complete, he said.

Another pipeline, which pumps 100,000 barrels of crude a day from the Azeri capital of Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa, has been shut on security concerns because of the fighting in Georgia. Shippers declared force majeure on exports from the Supsa and Ceyhan ports, a legal clause that exempts them from meeting contracts because of circumstances beyond their control.

BP and partners also suspended for two days last week natural gas exports from Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey through the South Caucasus pipeline. Gas exports from the Shah- Deniz field in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea resumed on Aug. 14.

Russian Troops

Russia has started withdrawing its troops from Georgia after President Dmitry Medvedev announced the pullout Aug. 17. Fighting between Georgian and the Russian troops disrupted supplies of about 1.6 million barrels of oil equivalent a day from the Caspian Sea region to world markets, the Moscow-based brokerage Troika Dialog said this month.

BP isn't aware of any damage to any of its pipelines in Georgia because of fighting, Toby Odone, a London-based spokesman at the company, said today by phone.

Georgian Black Sea ports are running out of crude and oil- product supplies also because Russian military troops have blocked rail lines near the city of Khashuri, Vako Kavzharadze, a shipping agent at TeRo Co. Ltd. in the Georgian port of Batumi, said today in an e-mailed statement. Rail transportation will probably resume in three to four days.

BP, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, or Socar, and other exporters halted crude and product exports by rail through Georgia to the Black Sea after a bridge was blown up near the village of Grakali on Aug. 16.

Rail Links

An ``alternative bridge is fixed, however Russian troops blocked the railways near the city of Khashuri,'' about 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Tbilisi, Kavzharadze said.

Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of Russia's General Staff, denied his military was involved in the bridge attack or was blocking railways.

Azerbaijan will also export oil via Iran after routes through Turkey and the Caucasus were disrupted.

Socar awarded a tender for 300,000 tons, or about 2.1 million barrels, of Azeri Light crude for shipping to Iran by early October, an official with the Baku-based company, who declined to be identified, said by phone today

=========================

The confrontations taking place today in the Caucasus were triggered strategically in the Balkans few months before. Russia was ignored on the shores of the Mediterranean, it responded on the shores of the Black sea. To Moscow, Georgia's allies are also "too far" when the enclaves would move to separation.

Direct causes

But Georgia's Government realized the sense of Russia's statements and still decided to act preemptively. President Mikheil Saakashvili must have calculated that by moving fast on the ground he would avoid the repetition of a Kosovo-like declaration in South Ossetia. His strategic algebra is still unclear to me. Was he hoping for a blitz seizure of Tskhinvali and the formation of a pro-Georgian local government? Was he predicting a slow Russian reaction? Historians will tell. But the chain reaction is clear. Moscow gave the green light to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to follow the Kosovo model, and Tbilisi rushed to abort these moves. Hence Georgian forces were ordered by Saakashvili to "bring back constitutional order" to the breakaway republics -- 16 years after a status quo -- and Medvedev and Putin responded by sending Russian forces to drive the Georgians out of the two provinces. In its own response Russia was telling the West: South Ossetia is Kosovo and Georgia is Serbia; I am applying your doctrine in the Caucasus.

From August 6 on, the Georgian offensive attempted to seize the capital of the enclave and the Russian counter offensive pushed the Georgians out. Moscow accused Tbilisi's units of ethnic cleansing and Georgia's leaders counter-accused the Russians of invading all of their country. The fog of war is still too thick at this point

But on both sides of the Atlantic unease is spreading. Hard core critics of Russia, vestiges of the Cold war, still believe that the Soviet Union changed clothes but is still around. Others boil down the crisis to standing by Georgia as an ally, period. On the left, any alibi is good to demean American policy. In a sum, confusion reigns: how did the West get itself to face off with post Soviet Russia in an ethnic standoff in the Caucasus? Was the Kosovo episode too rushed? Did Washington and Brussels' East Policies fail in the middle of a war on terror? Or was the Atlantic West dragged by other world powers to re-clash with the East? Again, historians will have to investigate.

But beyond these geopolitical considerations the Kremlin also rejected the US-led Iraq campaign, the isolation of the Syrian regime and the containment of the Iran Khomeinist power. And here lies the distinction. If Moscow's politico-military establishment feels uncomfortable with NATO coming closer to Russia's borders, it can express that discontent and address it in bilateral relationships with Washington. The United States, for example, wouldn't be very comfortable seeing Russian missiles systems installed in Mexico or a strategic defense treaty signed between Haiti and China. These are classical moves in international relations, drawing tensions and counter moves.

But for Russia to actively arm Iran and Syria, this is a feature of cold war, inconsistent with present the international consensus against Terrorism. The Tehran-Damascus "axis" is in an active campaign to support Jihadi terror forces in the region and armed groups involved in the killing of US and Coalition personnel. It would be the equivalent of having the US arming and providing technology to Wahabi Chechen Terrorists operating against Russian cities and military. Hence, while Americans are as anti-terrorist as Russia is when it comes to the al-Qaeda Salafi threat, Russians are still feeding anti-Western forces in the Middle East. Hence there is a difference between Russian discomfort with NATO growth around the CIS and US concerns about Russia's protection of Iranian-Syrian efforts in the region. Moscow is backing a party at war with the US Coalition while Americans aren't assisting parties at War with Russia.

 

========================

The British Petroleum pipeline that brought Georgia into the international spotlight has been turned off after six days of sporadic Russian bombing in the country.

BP spokesperson Rusiko Medzmariashvili stated that the Baku-Supsa pipeline, the older of two BP pipelines that cross Georgia, has been shut down "as a precautionary measure." She did not specify a date for the decision.

The larger Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is also not operating due to a fire in eastern Turkey, she said.

Medzmariashvili confirmed that no oil is currently heading out of Baku for the Black Sea cost, although he added that "alternative routes are being considered right now." Among the alternatives are rail lines and other, smaller pipelines crossing Georgia.

The decision comes after nearly a week of fighting between Georgia and its northern neighbor, Russia.

Russian bombs have hit the western coast of Georgia, including the towns of Senaki, Zugdidi and Poti, which is just 13 kilometers from the Supsa terminal.

Early on August 13, a land attack sank two ships adjacent to the port, according to Alan Middleton, chief executive officer of the Poti Port Corporation. The strike was the second Russian attack on Poti since full-scale hostilities began on August 8.

On August 9, approximately 20 bombs were dropped on the commercial port and the surrounding area. While the port was largely unharmed, the bombs reportedly killed 11 people and injured nearly 80 others. Port employees told EurasiaNet that the bombs disintegrated into shrapnel-like metal balls upon impact.

"[Russia] purely just dropped the bomb to try to kill people and cause mayhem, " Middleton said in an interview the following day. "[It] certainly did." The port, however, remains "fully operational."

Middleton estimated daily losses for both the Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA), which operates the port, and the government, at a "conservative" $1 million per day. Ras Al Khaimah, a United Arab Emirates concern, purchased a 51 percent stake in the port this past April; the government holds a 49 percent share. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive.]

During a recent guided port tour, no serious damage to facilities could be seen. The bombing resulted in some holes in metal cargo containers and broken windows in the customs office. Middleton said that the port is working at "limited capacity" because workers refuse to come back.
That sense of wariness can be felt throughout Poti. A day after the August 9 bombing, the usually busy central market was quiet. Most cars were headed out of town, after a government warning that more bombing was expected.

At the Maltaqza Hospital near Poti, doctors remained on high alert. All injured bombing victims were being relocated to other hospitals in the area in preparation for more wounded, according to hospital director Zeinab Charchalia.

Although the hospital had kept over 40 doctors and surgeons on call, the facility suffered from a lack of personnel and equipment, she said.

The attack, according to Nino Mcheglishvili, the assistant director of Poti’s health service, was a surprise for the town.

"We expected to take injured from Tskhinvali or Senaki. Not our own," she said, adding defiantly that "whatever happens, we will not leave town."

Middleton also expressed optimism that life at the port would soon return to normal.
RAKIA’s $200 million investment plans are still on track, including the development of a free economic zone near the port, he stressed.

"We are in it for the long-term," he said.

Editor’s Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter currently based in western Georgia.

=============================

RUSSIAN RESPONSE

Meanwhile, Moscow has responded to the US-Israeli-Turkish design to militarize the East Mediterranean coastline with plans to establish a Russian naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus:

"Defense Ministry sources point out that a naval base in Tartus will enable Russia to solidify its positions in the Middle East and ensure security of Syria. Moscow intends to deploy an air defense system around the base - to provide air cover for the base itself and a substantial part of Syrian territory. (S-300PMU-2 Favorit systems will not be turned over to the Syrians. They will be manned and serviced by Russian personnel.)
(Kommerzant, 2 June 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=IVA20060728&articleId=2847

Tartus is strategically located within 30 km. of the Lebanese border.
Moreover, Moscow and Damascus have reached an agreement on the modernization of Syria's air defenses as well as a program in support to its ground forces, the modernization of its MIG-29 fighters as well as its submarines. (Kommerzant, 2 June 2006). In the context of an escalating conflict, these developments have farreaching implications.

Mosul-Haifa pipeline has three US military bases protecting it

Here is why American kids are dying

H-3 has a combat regiment and an air wing

Camp Korean Village is located in a remote stretch of Iraq's western desert, close to the Syrian-Iraq border, and near the highway that connects Jordan with Baghdad. Ar Rutbah is the closest town to Camp Korean Village, also dubbed "Camp KV". Camp Korean Village is believed to be located at one of the H-3 facilities.
1st Marine Division's Regimental Combat Team 7, which help the Iraqis run checkpoints along the Syrian and Jordanian borders and patrol western Iraq.

H-2 is an Airbase

H-2 Airbase is located in Southern Iraq approximately 350 kilometers West of Baghdad. The airfield is served by two runways 12,600 and 8,800 feet long. H-2 occupies a 41 square kilometer site and is protected by a 26 kilometers security perimeter.

H-1 is an airbase

H-1 Airbase is located in Southern Iraq. The 2d Air Defense Sector, also known as the Western Air Defense Sector, had a SOC at H-3 Airfield, with IOCs at H-1 Airfield, H-3 Airfield, and Ar Rutbah.
The US Army's 75th Ranger Regiment captured H1 airfield in a night-time parachute assault on 25 March 2003.

H-1 US army base

H-2 US army base

H-3 US army base

Marines Suspect Intelligence

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

Bush calls Musharraf and Pakistan's prime minister

CRAWFORD, Texas (AP) — President Bush has expressed solidarity with Pakistan, which has been wracked by political turmoil and suicide bombings that killed dozens of people.

From his vacation ranch in Crawford, Texas, Bush called Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani.

Separately, Bush called former President Pervez Musharraf, who was forced from power this week. The White House says Bush thanked Musharraf for his efforts in the democratic transition of Pakistan, as well as the fight against al-Qaida and extremist groups.

Aides said Thursday that Bush expressed his sympathies to Gilani for the recent terrorist attacks, and that the president and prime minister reaffirmed their mutual support for going after extremists.

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

On one hand, the nomination of PPP Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari to replace Pervez Musharraf as president appears to be a rather decisive stroke, which in itself bids relatively well for the Pakistani coalition government. The balance-tipping middle parties between Zardari’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N seems to have largely lined up behind Benazir Bhutto’s widower, giving it an apparent clear majority in votes (Pakistani presidents are elected by its parliament (National Assembly), not directly through national vote.)

But on the other hand, decisive or not, Zardari is the very embodiment of corruption - the very reason Pakistanis cheered Musharraf’s bloodless coup in 1999. And the fight between the PPP and the PML-N over the reinstatement of judges is central to Zardari’s corruption. The corruption charges against Zardari and his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, were essentially dropped by the current set of judges installed by Musharraf. And the reinstatement of the original judges means Zardari (or Mr. Benazir Bhutto, if one prefers) may well see them come back to life. Thus, the fight within the PML-N/PPP coalition.

And for all his faults, the level of corruption under Musharraf - one of his stated reasons for taking power - was lower. A Zardari presidency is a return to the old in that regard, and one reason why this coalition government may have been popularly elected yet will remain both fractured and unpopular in the eyes of the general Pakistani population. ‘The same, only different.’

With that context in mind, and excerpt from Pakistan’s Daily Times report today.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the major coalition partner in the federal government, has decided to nominate its Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari as the next president of the country.

A source close to Zardari House told Daily Times that this decision had been taken by the top hierarchy of the PPP and the party’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) would formally announce the decision after its meeting on Friday (tomorrow).

“The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) will endorse and second the PPP CEC’s recommendation to nominate Asif Zardari as a presidential candidate,” the source said.

He said in return for its support to the PPP, the MQM would continue to hold the office of Sindh governor besides joining the coalition in the centre and accepting ministerial slots in the federal cabinet at a later stage.

It has also been learnt that the PPP expects the Awami National Party (ANP) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) to also support the PPP CEC’s recommendation.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), however, wants the next president from Balochistan or NWFP. But the PPP hierarchy insists that the top offices in the country are a right of the major political party.

The PML-N, it should be noted, is thus seeking a president from a province currently wrestling with an insurgency directly afoot. This is not insignificant.

• Matt Wade
• August 22, 2008

A PUSH is under way to install Asif Ali Zardari, the controversial widower of Benazir Bhutto, as the next president of Pakistan following the resignation of Pervez Musharraf.

Senior members of the Pakistan People's Party, which Mr Zardari leads, are understood to be campaigning for his nomination. Several Pakistan newspapers say his candidacy will be formally announced by the PPP's central executive committee later today.

Altaf Hussain, the leader of fourth-biggest party Muttahida Qaumi Movement, has also called for Mr Zardari to be made president. "Keeping in view the sacrifice of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto for democracy … the office of the president is the right of Asif Ali Zardari," he said.

 

Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent in Islamabad | August 22, 2008

BENAZIR Bhutto's controversial widower, Asif Ali Zardari, long derided as the "Mr 10 Per Cent" of Pakistani politics, is set to become the nuclear-armed Islamic nation's next president after winning solid backing from MPs yesterday.

Mr Zardari's 19-year-old son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is expected to preside over a meeting in Islamabad later today of the dominant Pakistan People's Party central executive committee at which the decision by the party's members of the National Assembly will be formally endorsed.

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

Dr. Afia Siddiqui (labeled prisoner 650) lamented in a letter to "The dead Nation" that no one in Pakistan cared for their "sister" while she was brutally raped and tortured in Afghanistan. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Pakistani nation did not know about the disappearance and the dastardly behavior towards her. The pal of a dictator was doing the selling of the sisters and brothers for Dollars and to stay in office. As soon as the whereabouts of Dr. Siddiqui were discovered, good people from Pakistan, America and the world are discussing it, protesting it and trying to reverse it.

Prisoner 650 should know that if she is innocent the good people around the world will continue to fight for the innocent. The US had a good judicial system and the truth will come out.

Pakistan parliament demands repatriation of scientist held in US

ISLAMABAD (AFP) — Pakistan's parliament Thursday demanded the immediate repatriation of a female scientist held in the United States on charges of trying to kill US officials in Afghanistan, officials said.

A resolution moved by Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and adopted unanimously by the lower house also demanded immediate information on the whereabouts of Afia Siddiqui's three children, they said.

Siddiqui, 36, disappeared from the Pakistani port city of Karachi in 2003 and featured on a list of US suspects linked to Al-Qaeda the following year.

Parliament's move comes amid outrage in Pakistan over her arrest after members of her family insisted that the US-educated Siddiqui was innocent and accused US forces of secretly holding her for the last five years.

The house called upon the government to "take up the matter with the US government urgently to provide her necessary medical attention including hospitalisation and regular access to Pakistan embassy officials."

It demanded her "immediate repatriation."

Siddiqui, who graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was arrested on July 17 in Afghanistan, extradited to New York on August 4 and indicted the next day on a charge of attempted murder.

She was wounded during an alleged shootout with FBI agents and US military officers when she was questioned in Afghanistan. A US court put her in medical care. She was on a 2004 US list of suspects linked to Al-Qaeda.

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

The Sri Lankan battles are being won by the Sinhalese government forces despite the official and unofficial Indian support to the LTTE terrorists that cause murder and mayhem in the peaceful island. Pakistan has been supporting Sri Lanka in her just struggle to keep the island united and away from foreign influences. Sri Lankan leaders have been extremely happy with Pakistan. Buoyed by Pakistani support Colombo liberated Jafna, then the Northeast, and now is pushing to eliminate the last stronghold of Indian and Tamil remnants. Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse was all praise for Pakistan and has predicted that all Lankan territory will be liberated by the end of the year.

Pakistan to help in Colombo’s final battle against Tigers By Frances Bulathsinghala

COLOMBO, Aug 20: As India continues to call for a political solution to Sri Lanka’s 25-year-old ethnic conflict, reports indicate that Pakistan has decided to bolster what Sri Lanka military says its final push to defeat Tamil Tiger rebels and end their war for a separate state in the country’s north-east.

Pakistan has pledged to send a large quantity of ammunition to help the Sri Lankan government finish off the rebels in the final phase of Elam War IV, the Sunday Leader, a Colombo-based newspaper, said in a news report.

The paper said that Pakistan had promised one shipload of the wherewithal every 10 days in coming months, adding that it was Pakistan’s assurance of solid support which prompted Sri Lankan Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse to publicly state that Kilinochchi, the headquarters of the LTTE, would be liberated by the end of December.
Gotabhaya Rajapakse, brother of President Mahinda Rajapakse, declared last week that the rebel-controlled Wanni would be captured by the military by the end of this year.
“It’s possible by the end of this year,” the defence secretary was quoted as saying by the Times newspaper of London last week.

“You have to search for them and completely eradicate them. Only then can peace come.” Rajapakse’s comments come in the wake of Army Chief Lt-Gen Sarath Fonseka’s declaration that his forces had wiped out the conventional military capability of the LTTE and that the Tiger rebels were no longer able to resist security forces using conventional tactics and were resorting to hit-and-run attacks.

The reported assistance from Pakistan comes as government troops began forging ahead this month with heavy fire power coupled with continuous air raids on the last two remaining rebel bastions of Killinochchi and Mullativu

پاکستان لڈجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |   

Mr. Pervez Mushrraf is sticking to his guns and wants to stay in Pakistan--at least for the time being. There may be some truth to the bravado. He is staying in Pakistan, then headed for an Umra. After that he will reside aboard for a while, depending on who is in power. A Zardari government will be more amenable to keeping Mr. Musharraf.

 Musharraf invokes Rafi song, not to leave Pakistan چل اڑ جا پنچھي

()Islamabad (PTI): An old Mohammad Rafi number "Chal Urr Jaa Rey Panchi" (چل اڑ جا پنچھي  Come, fly away, O bird") is one of his favourites, but former President Pervez Musharraf has made it clear that he is no no "bird" and that he will stay on in Pakistan.

Listening to his favourite Rafi songs as a commoner on the first day out of office on Tuesday, he called a friend and told "I am here. I will not run away. I am not not a "panchi" (bird) who will fly away from Pakistan."

In the face of intense speculation about his future ever since he stepped down as President on Monday nine years after he had grabbed power in a bloodless military coup, Musharraf denied reports that her would leave the country and settle elsewhere.

"My resignation as President does not not reflect my defeat as I resigned in the interest of Pakistan its people," he was quoted Geo News channel as saying to several delegations that met him on Tuesday.

The former army chief, who quit to avoid impeachment by the Pakistan People's Party-led ruling coalition, told the delegations that called on him that he did not not intend to leave Pakistan as it was his "first love".

Musharraf described as "baseless" the media reports that he would move to the US, where his son runs a well-established business after a pilgrimage to Mecca.

The callers visited him at the President's camp office or lodge, the name given to the former army chief's residence in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. He had not vacated the army chief's residence even after doffing his military uniform late last year

ان لیجر | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا  |Aug 21, 08 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی |  

The farce of the divorce is self evident. Mr. Nawaz Sharif has announced the break up of the coalition. Let us examine the veracity of the claim and vacuity of the bluster. Mr. Nawaz Sharif's political party has not really participated in any legislative agenda in the past several months--which I may add is very representative of the working of his government even in the Abbajee (آبآ جي) days

By quitting the "coalition of the unwilling" he will recall the ministers in the central government who actually have either been "in resignation" or "missing in action" from any Federal responsibilities anyway. All that will change is that they will not be getting a paycheck.

Mr Zardari said the PPP wanted support of Mr Sharif in its bid to strengthen democratic institutions. “I want to take along Nawaz Sharif as there are immense difficulties ahead. Perhaps I cannot tell the whole truth to the nation,” he said, inviting Mr Sharif to join hands to “build a new Pakistan”. He said the PPP would not create any difficulties for the PML-N in Punjab and expressed the hope that they would also return with the same gesture. The Dawn

In the Punjab, Mr. Sharif has a government in conjunction with the PPPP. So the real battle will be in the Punjab. If Mr. Sharif had really quit the coalition, Mr. Shahbaz Sharif would have resigned his post and given up power in the land of the five rivers.

Mr. Asif Zardari has hoodwinked Mr. Sharif, whose tubelight has been flickering for half of the year. Not sure if it has finally come on or not. Mr. Zardari according to many eliminated Benazir Bhutto, got rid of Pervez Musharraf, and then pushed out Mr. Nawaz Sharif and has not become the dictator de jure.

There is clear and indisputable evidence now that Mr. Zardari has been working with the Americans from the very begriming and is part and parcel of an agenda to control Pakistan.

WASHINGTON — Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to the United Nations, is facing angry questions from other senior Bush administration officials over what they describe as unauthorized contacts with Asif Ali Zardari,

Mr. Khalilzad had spoken by telephone with Mr. Zardari, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, several times a week for the past month until he was confronted about the unauthorized contacts, a senior United States official said. Other officials said Mr. Khalilzad had planned to meet with Mr. Zardari privately next Tuesday while on vacation in Dubai, in a session that was canceled only after Richard A. Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South Asia, learned from Mr. Zardari himself that the ambassador was providing “advice and help.”

“Can I ask what sort of ‘advice and help’ you are providing?” Mr. Boucher wrote in an angry e-mail message to Mr. Khalilzad. “What sort of channel is this? Governmental, private, personnel?” Copies of the message were sent to others at the highest levels of the State Department; the message was provided to The New York Times by an administration official who had received a copy.

Helene Cooper & Mark Mazetti New York Times Augus 26th, 2008

The battle to end the PLMN government has already begun. Several dozen MPSs have already crossed over to the PPPP and at least four MNSs have also opted for the party in power.

Fractious Coalition in Pakistan Breaks Apart By JANE PERLEZ

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The five-month-old coalition government in Pakistan collapsed Monday when the head of the minority party, Nawaz Sharif, announced his members would leave the fractious alliance, citing broken promises by Asif Ali Zardari, the leader of the majority party.

“We have been forced to leave the coalition,” Mr. Sharif said in Islamabad. “We joined the coalition with full sincerity for the restoration of democracy. Unfortunately all the promises were not honored.”

The exit by Mr. Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League-N, had been expected in the last few days, and was finally spurred by the decision of Mr. Zardari to run for president, in an electoral college vote set for Sept. 6. President Pervez Musharraf resigned last week under threat of impeachment.

The departure of Mr. Sharif, whose party sat uneasily with Mr. Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party, is unlikely to result in immediate elections. Mr. Sharif said his members would sit in the opposition in the Parliament and try to play a “constructive” role.

The Pakistan Peoples Party holds the most seats in the Parliament, but not a majority. Political analysts said they expected it would be able to cobble together a new parliamentary coalition with smaller parties.

Still, Pakistan faces continued political instability that may distract from serious governance and serious efforts to turn back the growing strength of the Taliban in the northwestern parts of the nation.

The main problem between Mr. Sharif and Mr. Zardari was a profound disagreement over the future of the former chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, who was fired by President Musharraf in March 2007, reinstated by the court in July, and placed under house arrest in November. He was finally freed in March of this year, but has yet to be restored to the bench.

Mr. Sharif has insisted that Mr. Chaudhry along with some 60 other judges, who were also fired in November, when Mr. Musharraf declared emergency rule, should be restored to the bench.

To drive home the point about broken promises, Mr. Sharif, a former two-time prime minister, released an accord signed by the two men on Aug. 7.

The document shows that Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif agreed that all the judges would be restored by an executive order one day after Mr. Musharraf’s impeachment or resignation. But Mr. Zardari stalled.

In an interview with the BBC Urdu-language radio service on Saturday, Mr. Zardari defended his position, saying agreements with the Pakistan Muslim League-N were not “holy like the holy Koran.”

The Aug. 7 accord, signed as the two parties maneuvered to force Mr. Musharraf out, also said the two men would agree on a presidential candidate.

Instead, according to Mr. Sharif’s aides, Mr. Zardari went ahead to plan his own candidacy for the presidency, and arranged for the election to be held on Sept. 6 without consulting Mr. Sharif.

At the news conference in Islamabad, Mr. Sharif introduced his party’s candidate for president, Saeed-uz-zaman Siddiqui, a former chief justice. Mr. Siddiqui refused to take the oath of office to remain as chief justice after Mr. Musharraf took power from Mr. Sharif in a bloodless coup in 1999.

The presidential vote polls the national Parliament and four provincial assemblies. It is expected that Mr. Zardari will prevail.

There was no immediate official reaction from the Pakistan Peoples Party on the collapse of the coalition.

But a member of Parliament from the party, Fauzia Wahab, said the party would “conveniently and easily survive” without the support of the Pakistan Muslim League-N. She criticized Mr. Sharif for “holding the system hostage of one man,” meaning Mr. Chaudhry.

Mr. Zardari, the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December, has consistently opposed the reappointment of Mr. Chaudhry since the coalition came together after Feb. 18 parliamentary elections.

The basis of Mr. Zardari’s objection appears grounded in a fear that the judge would undo the amnesty granted to Mr. Zardari on corruption charges when he returned to Pakistan on the death of his wife after years in exile.

Mr. Zardari served in government in the 1990s, when Ms. Bhutto was twice prime minister in the 1990s. He spent more than eight years in jail on various corruption charges that were dropped on his return and which he says were politically motivated.

In the week since Mr. Musharraf resigned, Mr. Zardari has emerged as the chief political force in Pakistan, and he appears to have the backing of the Bush administration as he drives forward toward the presidency.

In the past two days, Mr. Zardari’s statements have increasingly coincided with Washington’s policies, particularly on the campaign against terror, the United States’ central concern here.

In the BBC radio interview, Mr. Zardari used unusually strong words against the Taliban, whose presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas has gathered steam in the last year. “The world is losing the war,” he said of the fight against the Taliban. “I think at the moment they definitely have the upper hand.”

Mr. Zardari said in the interview the Tehrik-i-Taliban, an umbrella group of the Taliban in Pakistan, should be banned. On Monday, the Interior Ministry announced the group would be added to the list of banned organizations. Other Islamic extremist groups are on the Interior Ministry’s list, but the listing appears to have had little effect.

Several months ago, the government in the North-West Frontier Province, which is allied with Mr. Zardari’s party, signed a peace agreement with an Islamic extremist group, in the province’s Swat Valley. That accord is now broken and the Pakistani Army has been fighting the group for the last several weeks.

Salman Masood contributed reporting.

| PAKISTAN LEDGER | August 20th, 2008 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی | The dog days of August suddenly became the dogs of war in the guns of August. NATO is in crisis. It already has two theaters of war open and is in no condition to open a third one.

 

Dr Pangloss, the philosopher and tutor in Voltaire’s Candide (1759), “All is for the best in the best of all possible worlds”. We are as profoundly sceptical of this philosophy as Voltaire intended us to be, since Dr Pangloss was old, pedantic and deluded, maintaining his misguided beliefs even after experiencing great suffering.

No amount of Panglossian gloss and no amount of spin cannot hide the emerging catastrophy and existing crisis in NATO. The troop strengths are not near the levels needed and most are not doing the job as it should be done.

It's a classic hero's quest tale -- a sort of ancient Greek mission impossible -- in which the hero embarks on a sea voyage into an unknown land, with a great task to achieve. He is in search of a magical ram's fleece, which he has to find in order to reclaim his father's kingdom from the usurper."

Our modern day Jasons are seeking the holy grail for peace in Afghanistan. Like the Biblical Jason they are searching for the 'arch of the covenant" so that they can go back to their lands and save their land.

Long before Georgia was on anyone's mind, though, the land had been regarded as strategically important. In days of yore it was the location of Colchis where Jason and his Argonauts found the Golden Fleece.

In modern terms the chances of success of NATO can be put in this picture

This fantasy that anti-Americanism stems from some deep-seeded evil bubbling forth from the Muslim soul has got to stop. When a country goes from ally to enemy after we destroy its two neighbors, we shouldn't be surprised that the people of that nation are nervous

Nato at pains to dismiss Afghan tensions By Caroline Wyatt and Rob Watson Defence Correspondents

Nato members say there is no troop allocation crisis in Afghanistan

Nato defence ministers have dismissed talk of a crisis over their operation in Afghanistan.

Meeting in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, the ministers are all keen to make clear that they believe progress is being made in Afghanistan, both at a military and civil level.

Nato Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer insisted Afghanistan was a vastly better place than when the Taleban were in charge.

While challenges remained, he said he was still cautiously optimistic about the country's future.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, meanwhile, said he had been encouraged by what he had heard from European allies about increasing their troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) deployed in Afghanistan.

Map of main troop deployments

It was his blunt words - and stern letters to some of the US's European allies in the run-up to the meeting - that had stirred fresh talk of crisis within Nato.

Divisions once again emerged between those nations which felt they were shouldering too much of the fighting - mainly the US, Canada, Britain and the Netherlands - versus those alliance members with either national caveats on their troops' location or their ability to take part in combat missions - namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Greece.

Crisis, what crisis?

Yet just a few hours after Nato defence ministers sat around the table for lunch together in Vilnius, the meeting ended in harmony, with everyone apparently singing from the same hymn-sheet - their chorus: "Crisis, what crisis?"

I don't think that there's a crisis, I don't think there's a risk of failure

Robert gates
US Defence Secretary

Q&A: Isaf troops

World effort under threat

Even Mr Gates said he felt that talk of a row had been overblown, insisting that progress had been made towards generating more contributions for Nato forces in Afghanistan.

"I don't think that there's a crisis, I don't think there's a risk of failure," he told a news conference.

"My view is that it represents potentially the opportunity to make further progress faster in Afghanistan if we had more forces there.

"But I'm realistic about politics here in Europe. My view is that governments here in Europe understand the importance of Afghanistan. They just aren't able to do certain kinds of things, and we understand that."

Despite those conciliatory words, Germany clearly felt it had been unfairly singled out ahead of the meeting over the Bundeswehr's contribution in the north of Afghanistan.

On Thursday, it insisted that its 3,200 troops in Afghanistan were doing important work supporting reconstruction in the relatively stable north.

German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung had already announced that Germany would send an additional 200 troops as a quick reaction force to help in the north, which could also in theory be called upon to help Nato allies in need in the south.

But he made it clear that Germany was not able to deploy combat troops to the south.

"Within Nato, we have agreed on a reasonable share-out of tasks, which in my view is very wise," said Mr Jung in Vilnius. "I think our contribution in Afghanistan is sufficient."

Thomas Raabe, the German defence ministry spokesman, amplified that message in an interview with the BBC.

"Our allies might think we should do more in Afghanistan, but our message is that we are already the third largest troop-contributing nation and we are doing other things for the whole of Afghanistan," he said.

"I think people in Britain should be aware that we lost two world wars, and we have a different attitude to the question of soldiers, wars and blood."

Changing stances?

As for Britain, Defence Secretary Des Browne insisted that talk of a crisis within Nato was overblown.

"Of the 25 countries who have deployable forces in the Nato alliance, 12 of them are represented in the south and south-east of Afghanistan," he told the BBC.

Nato's chief remains optimistic about Afghanistan's future

"We have now seen that the French have been prepared to deploy important forces into the south, in small but significant numbers.

"We're hearing today that other countries are prepared to increase their forces. I spoke recently to the Polish chief of the defence staff, and they are going to increase their forces. So this is a progression."

Mr Browne concluded that Nato, "the most successful political and military alliance in the world, will survive this and will improve".

There were several hints that France may be about to change its stance, and could be the nation that - by April - commits more combat troops to the south, as Canada has demanded in return for keeping its forces fighting in Kandahar Province.

French Defence Minister Herve Morin confirmed Paris was considering a greater role in Afghanistan, although he did not give exact details, suggesting only that President Nicolas Sarkozy could announce a change in French policy at Nato's summit in April.

"My message to the Canadian public is be a bit patient," Mr Morin said, when asked whether France would meet Canada's demand for reinforcements. "We are studying several options."

Real solidarity or diplomacy?

So is this apparent outbreak of Nato solidarity real, or merely good diplomacy?

Certainly, there is a real sense among Nato officials in Vilnius that the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan are not nearly as bad as often portrayed in the media.

There is also a feeling that genuine progress has been made since the days the Taleban were in power, progress for which the alliance is not always given credit.

All the alliance members say they are committed to Afghanistan for the long-term, whatever divisions there may be over how the burden is shared

But those internal tensions over burden-sharing have not gone away, and may never go away completely.

However, what is clear from the talks in Vilnius is that all the alliance members say they are committed to Afghanistan for the long-term, whatever divisions there may be over how the burden is shared.

Of course, the real test of all this apparent resolve will come at the Nato summit in Bucharest in April, where all will be waiting to see which nations finally come up with the extra combat troops to help fight the Taleban in the south.

And even then, major challenges remain for the alliance.

The operation in Afghanistan is a tough one and - most importantly - much still needs to be done to persuade the public in many Nato countries that the mission there is both achievable and worthwhile.

ISAF TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Countries contributing more than 1,000 troops as of December 2007

Canada 1,730

France 1,292

Germany 3,155

Italy 2,358

Netherlands 1,512

Poland 1,141

Turkey 1,219

UK 7,753

US 15,038

Source: ISAF

| PAKISTAN LEDGER | August 18th, 2008 | Moin Ansari |  معین آنصآرّی | The last days of the dictator are a reflection of his entire life. In the aftermath of 911, Musharraf reached out to Collin Powell. The phone call right after the coup was to bring legitimacy to his coup de etat.

"Musharraf had lost his utility as a useful asset for the 'war on terror',"

Like Field Marshall Ayub Khan , and General Zia ul Haq, General Pervez Musharraf used America to stay in power and America used him to fight its war on terror.

Many in American however believe that like Ayub Khan, and Zia ul Haw, Pervez Musharraf also double crossed the Americans.

General Gul Hamid said it best when he said, "Pakistani dictators become very patriotic in their old age". Ayub Khan was the American man in Asia--holding the fort for SEATO, and CENTO. President John did not like the mercurial Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in his cabinet and told Ayub "kick him out". Ayub obliged. However in his old age he wrote a book called "Friends Not Masters" and did not want the US in Pakistan. Ayub Khan kicked the Americans out of Pakistan and closed down the Badabar Airforce base.

Senator Biden, possibly a vice presidential candidate said it best. He said "the Pakistanis looked me in the eye and lied to me". He was referring to the American plant President Zia Ul Haq. Zia did the American bidding by eliminating the much hated Bhutto, but Zia did not stop the nuclear program. He kept on telling the Americans that he was not pursuing nuclear power, but he was. When the US found out how close he was to nuclear detonation, Zil Ul was eliminated with a case a exploding mangoes.

The third dictator kind of happened by accident--if you believe that the version of events narrated by Pervez Musharraf. If you believe the conspiracy theorists, Nawaz Sharif is hated by America, and was removed for his decision to detonate five nuclear bombs in response to India becoming a world power.

In a fascinating interview with General Hamid Gul of the ISI, Saleen Shezad of Asia Times shed some deep light on the demise of Pervez Musharraf.

Musharraf had lost his utility as a useful asset for the 'war on terror'," retired general Hamid Gul, a security analyst and former director general of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), told Asia Times Online.

"The Americans had been putting pressure on Islamabad since February for him to get its act together against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and Pakistan's foreign minister [Shah Mahmood Qureshi] and Pakistan's ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, always told Washington that the government could not move forward independently because of Musharraf," Gul said.

"Hence, Musharraf was politely told by Washington through various channels to gracefully resign, but he remained defiant and ultimately Washington pulled its support of him and the ruling coalition moved for his impeachment, which forced him to resign," Gul said.

"The army will play the same role it played from 1996 to 1998," Gul said, without elaborating. What he meant was that the military will maintain an independent and strong policy on Afghanistan in which the political government has no role or its role is restricted to giving political support to the military's operational policies.

"The American role has always been paramount in Pakistan's politics. The late General Zia ul-Haq was defiant of Washington's interests and he faced an accidental death [in a mysterious plane accident in 1988]. Had Musharraf tried to exercise [his constitutional powers to dissolve the assemblies], he would also have been obstructing American interests in the region and would have faced a Zia-like fate," said retired spy master Gul, who was in charge of the ISI at the time of Haq's demise.

"Now the Americans will have to use the two remaining national assets for their interests - the political parties and the army chief [Kiani]. Washington abhors Nawaz Sharif, so they will distance themselves from him and focus on Asif Zardari [the widower of Benazir Bhutto and head of the PPP].

"Zardari, because of corruption cases [that have been leveled against him] can be easily manipulated and therefore he will act obediently on their advice," Gul maintained, adding that the crucial role is that of the army chief, so the Americans will focus on him. "I suspect that Kiani is already part of their game."

If Musharraf's exit was a part of the American game, the US needs to make sure that its third asset in the country, along with the political parties and the military, is close to Washington.

Asfandyar fulfills this criterion. He is a grandson of "Frontier" Gandhi Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whose family has always been close to Delhi and Kabul and he would be the best connection in helping shut down the war theater in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun nationalist, he and his party are opposed to the Taliban.

 
Asfandyar was a flagbearer of the red revolution in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but he switched sides soon after September 11, 2001, after he visited the US under an international visitors' leadership program.

Gul comments, "Yes, he could be the one, but Asfandyar failed to uphold his promised role to control militancy in the tribal areas without [resort to] military operations. During the period his party [ANP] has governed North-West Frontier Province, military operations have been conducted in Khyber Agency, Bajaur [Agency] and South Waziristan. "In my opinion, Nawab Attaullah Mengal, a Baloch politician, should be the president of the country, given the recent mistreatments done in Balochistan province in the name of military operations," Gul said.

The few weeks before Musharraf's exit witnessed a major military operation in Bajaur Agency on the border with Afghanistan's Kunar province to root out al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. Such operations are not new in the troubled tribal areas, but this one was characterized by heavy aerial bombardment, eventually forcing the Taliban to pull back. They had targeted the agency to disrupt the flow of supplies into Afghanistan to support the Western coalition there.

"There was no reason to use such brute force in a tribal area like Bajaur," said Gul. Compared to North and South Waziristan, where militancy is deep-rooted, the terrain is much more hospitable in Bajaur.

"The only reason for such military action was to destroy the Taliban's approaches to Kunar, where American forces are all-out to get the Taliban. Kunar province lies in the northeast [and connects to Kabul]. Previously, the Taliban were focused only on southeastern provinces," Gul said.

"This is the role Washington wants the Pakistani army to play. The cost is paid by Pakistanis and 250,000 people were displaced during the Bajaur operation," Gul added, pointing to the fact that in terms of security issues, especially those relating to Afghanistan, Pakistan is still joined at the hip with the US, for which it has since 2001 received over US$10 billion in aid and military equipment.

Saleem Shehzad of The Asia Times brings good information to its readers. However he is not right all the time. Many of his predictions on the Summer offensive of the Taliban have not come true. Similarly, his discussion of Pakistan and Afghanistan is based upon opinions which may or may not come true.

These facts cannot be denied:

1) Pervez Musharraf is disliked by the USA. President Bush did not even return his phone called for several weeks.

2) Nawaz Shairf is abhorred by by America. The USA does not want him in power.

3) Asif Zardari is the darling on of the USA

These three factors will determine the future of Pakistani politics.