Kashmir separatists celebrate the withdrawal of the land transfer plan
"It came as a bit of a shock. No-one was expecting it."
Professor Noor Ahmad Baba of Kashmir University was as surprised as anyone else when the Kashmir Valley was suddenly rocked last week by what turned into nine days of the biggest Muslim street protests seen in the region for years.
Only when the state government abandoned a controversial plan to transfer land to the trust which runs a Hindu shrine did the demonstrations come to an end.
But they had already become a focus for wider protests about Kashmiri identity.
Who gained from the events of the last two weeks?
Well, Kashmiri separatist parties seem to have discovered a new-found unity. But the notable thing about the protests was that they encompassed Kashmiris of many political persuasions.
Map shows Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and Indian Occupied territory
'Opportunism'
"People are so frustrated," said Nawaz, a local businessman. "And the only thing they have left to defend is their land. That's why so many people came out and answered the call."
Tourists in Jammu - leaving!
The state government, though, is convinced that the demonstrations were all about political opportunism.
The land transfer, said government minister Abdul Gani Vakil, was only going to be temporary. But when the people protested, the government listened.
"We are going to the people on economic issues," Mr Vakil said.
"The other parties use sentimental and religious issues. We are fighting all these forces, because we want to make Jammu and Kashmir a prosperous state."
And in recent years there have been steps in the right direction. The talk is no longer of insurgency; it's of investment, jobs and career opportunities.
Until the protests were suddenly triggered, the tourist trade was booming.
But Kashmiri separatists insist that that's not enough. And the size of the recent protests suggests that on issues as sensitive as land and identity, plenty of people agree with them.
"Tulip gardens are being inaugurated, football matches are being held, yes all that is happening," said Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, one of Kashmir's main pro-independence politicians.
Hindus in Jammu have taken to the streets in recent days
"But the fact is that unless and until India addresses the sentiment for the resolution of the Kashmir issue I don't think you can have permanent peace in Kashmir."
For now, things have returned to normal in Srinagar. Shops have re-opened, and fuel supplies have been replenished.
But the repercussions of this new phase in Kashmiri protest are still spreading.
Hindu nationalist groups in Jammu, and elsewhere in India, have held angry demonstrations against the state government, accusing it of giving in to separatism.
On Thursday, protesters blocked roads and stopped trains in several Indian states.
The danger is that communal tensions focusing on Kashmir could intensify in the run-up to a series of state and national elections.
'Message to Delhi'
In Kashmir itself, people are wondering what will happen next. Enthusiasm for armed insurgency are there, but demands for political freedom have increased exponentially.
The outside world often looks at the situation in Kashmir through the prism of the long-running dispute between India and Pakistan, and that is certainly a factor.
But Kashmiris themselves want to have their say. And many of them feel they're being ignored.
"This is a message to Delhi," said Professor Noor Ahmad Baba. "Don't under-estimate the degree of resentment which exists here.
"Just because things are more peaceful now, it doesn't mean the problem of Kashmir has been solved."
Doris Duke could speak Arabic, collected Islamic artifacts from around the planet, built homes with Islamic Architecture, visited Muslim lands, owned a copy of the Quran, listened to Islamic music, wore Arab dress S9sometimes), built Islamic gardens, studied Islam, read Islamic books. and finally left her home to preserve her Islamic artifacts
Was Doris Duke a secret Muslim? or did they hide her Islamic beliefs?
Hawaii: Aloha Islam (+photos)
Shangri La, Doris Duke's home in Hawaii, is an astonishing mix of Middle Eastern and Western modernist styles. Photo / Graham Reid
At the end of her sometimes scandalous life, American heiress and socialite Doris Duke was unlikely to go into that great good night without some attendant controversy - and she didn't disappoint.
When she died in 1993, aged 80, at one of her homes - the so-called Falcon's Lair in Beverly Hills, which had belonged to Rudolph Valentino - she left her billion-dollar fortune to her charitable found ation. The catch was that it would be administered by her loyal butler, Bernard Lafferty, a gay Irishman often described as a drunkard and semi-literate.
Duke's was a singular life. When she was 12 she inherited a fortune and was dubbed by the press the Million Dollar Baby. She had two brief, high-profile marriages and serial lovers, and in 1988, at 75, she adopted a 35-year-old former bellydancer and Hare Krishna devotee, with whom some believed she was in a lesbian relationship. Always conscious of her looks, she had a facelift at 79.
With colourful locations, money to fritter and the cast of 20th-century public figures, Duke's life could be read as a script for a brash movie.
And indeed there has been a film made about her final days, Bernard and Doris starring Ralph Fiennes and Susan Sarandon.
Aside from gossip, lovers and a fortune, Duke left a more publicly tangible legacy - her home on the Hawaiian island of Oahu near Waikiki Beach, which she built in the late 1930s and has now opened to small groups of visitors. Few tourists who hit the bars, beaches and aloha-shirt shops on Oahu make it to Duke's ocean-front house. It is under-publicised and only 12 visitors at a time are allowed entry on four days a week.
Shangri La, as she called it, is all but invisible as you come down the driveway to the main entrance, which is simply wooden doors in a white, windowless wall.
Duke - who owned homes and apartments in New York, Rhode Island and Los Angeles, as well as a farm in New Jersey - considered the 2ha property her retreat.
Duke liked her privacy, says Charles, the guide who is showing just two mainland couples and myself around on this typically warm day.
Even when glimpsed from passing boats, little of Shangri La reveals itself. Its discreet low lines offer no hint of its inner opulence.
What makes Shangri La so interesting is that it is a monument to unconstrained wealth, eclectic taste, restless acquisition and eccentricity.
However, Duke's ocean-front home has a more singular focus in its elegant mix of Islamic art and design. Stepping through that wooden door - inscribed in Arabic: "Enter here in peace and security" - you walk into a world which is lavish yet minimal.
Over there are 17th-century ceramic tiles from Turkey, down there in the inner courtyard around the fountain are some from 13th-century Iran, here are light fixtures from Syria, and over there, a mosaic made by Duke in 1938 based on Iranian arabesques.
But in the enormous living room Duke used the modern technology of her time - a glass wall, 12m wide and 5m high, slides into the floor at the push of a button.
Now you have an unimpeded view of Diamond Head beyond the Olympic-size pool, where Buster Crabbe and Johnny Weissmuller once swam.
Duke bequeathed this place to her foundation to promote the study and understanding of Middle East art and culture.
Duke saw what she liked, bought it, then placed it where it suited her. Although it draws on Islamic art, there is no consistency.
A beautiful 13th-century mihrab - a wall niche indicating the direction of Mecca - is on an east wall rather than facing northwest. To Duke, it simply looked better there.
Elsewhere, separate centuries and styles are juxtaposed. And in its heyday, Duke had Hawaiian knick-knacks - hula-girl glasses, surfboards - around the place. This was a home to be lived in.
Her collection of 3500 items is where the real treasure for a scholar might lie, but to peruse those you need special permission.
Shangri La rewards a visit on its own terms - and Duke had a bottomless well of money to create it. Her father, James Buck Duke, made his money from tobacco, property and energy companies and when he died in 1935 she inherited most of his estate - more than $1 billion in today's money.
The young Doris was by all accounts a smart and intelligent child, and although her wealth allowed her to indulge various passions such as a love of animals, the arts and travel, she was far from frivolous with her money.
As her third cousin Pony Duke noted, she didn't have hobbies, she had obsessions and she turned all her interests into businesses.
She made large donations to charities, but also took care of her own increasingly rapacious desires.
She married James Cromwell in 1935 and a lengthy honeymoon took them to India where Duke fell in love with the Taj Mahal.
She immediately commissioned a marble bedroom based on the designs of that exotic tomb.
The final stop on their 10-month honeymoon was Hawaii, where she began to conceive a retreat on the picturesque property at Kaalawai.
So, with more than 100 local workers and using designs by architect Marion Sims Wyeth, 100 workers started building the home, and it was occupied by 1938.
Duke used Shangri La - named for the Utopian kingdom in James Hilton's pre-war escapist novel Lost Horizon - as a seasonal retreat, more so after she and James divorced in 1943.
Although she was busy with the house Duke also had time for life.
She was briefly married to the notoriously well-endowed playboy-cum-diplomat Porfirio Rubirosa, entertained herself with travel, alcohol and drugs, played jazz piano, and enjoyed numerous lovers, parties and famous guests.
When she was on the island she surfed competitively and for pleasure - and pleasure, especially of the sexual kind, was something she knew well, as a few salacious biographies attest.
Charles, our guide, is circumspect when I ask whether there is a thorough biography of Doris Duke.
He leaves us in no doubt that any bad press and innuendo about Duke remain outside those wooden doors.
At the end she was left with Lafferty, her beloved dog and the house, with its strange collision of eclectic Islamic decor set on the Pacific island.
In 1938, a reporter for the Honolulu Star Bulletin wrote: "On all the face of the globe there is no other place like it, nor is there likely to be".
This is a draft article published for your convenience. It will be updated periodically
There is not not enough web presence of Pakistani newspapers. The newspapers who setup the sites about 10 to 15 years ago have not shown any new innovation that keeps up with the technology of the times.
Nondescript and virulently anti-Pakistan "web pages" like Thai Indian and Asian tribune and others hog the space when it comes to stories on Pakistan.
Pakistani newspapers publish AFP, AP and BBC stories verbatim without commentary or correction. Therefore the newspapers are nothing but clearing houses of "news" that is written thousands of miles away with an agenda
General criticism common to the six major Pakistani newspapers:
The Daily Dawn: The most sober and solid newspaper has a very disappointing presence on the web. the page was designed more than a decade ago does not allow any feedback or discussion forums and rarely appears on news.google.com searches on Pakistan. Dawn has very few graphics and hardly ever has any maps. A lack of correct Pakistani maps shown by Dawn and other Pakistani newspapers creates a problem for the American public. They only see the Indian maps and think them to be accurate. Many Pakistani newspapers including Dawn publish Indian maps.
For the longest times Ayaz Mir and Irfan Husain kept on regurgitating the Neocon version of events--blame Pakistan first for all evil.
We see almost no original research. World news stories are simply copied, mostly without comment. Many times "Orientalist" of Islamphoic vocabulary which was created to demean Pakistan ("Islamist") is used. No original graphics are created. No world class pictures are included. Dawn does not use site optimizers so Dawn news stories do not show up in google and yahoo researches at the top positions
The News: This is a good newspaper still stuck in 1980s technology. No feedback or discussion sessions are possible. Very few Graphics. No historical analysis of world events or deep insight into Pakistani history. For example the anniversary of the Battle of Plassy was totally ignored by The News and all Pakistani papers. Pakistani maps are now shown. Graphics are vew few and far in between. Some short stories are simply copied from the newsreader feed without correcting the wrong information about Pakistan. One might as well be reading news.google.com/pakistan which sorts all news items with Pakistan in it
The Daily news: Poor web presence. No discussion forum. Few graphics. Incorrect maps. Simple regurgitation of news feed stories. Few opinion columnists. Regional or local news is not highlighted. Original research on in depth analysis of issues are almost never presented. We have noticed that The Daily News and other papers have not presented the new research on the "Geographical Two Nation Theory" which says that "Pakistan existed 5000 years ago" as the Indus Valley Civilization. There are hundreds of books published, The Daily News has not found it fit to present Book
iStock an Indian site has carefully edited the full text of the newspaper article which was very critical of the US occupation. Only parts of the article are reproduced here. As we get a better unabridged translation the Pakistan Ledger will publish it
Text of article by Hamid Roshan entitled "Is the increase in US forces in Afghanistan the escalation of conflict or end of civil war?" published by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht- e Sobh on 6 July
Despite the fact that June was declared the deadliest and most difficult month for foreign forces in Afghanistan, US President George Bush plans to send fresh forces to Afghanistan. Even Barack Obama, whose success in the next presidential election is still not certain, has promised to ask the Europeans to send more troops for war in Afghanistan.
The foreign troop surge shows that the military option to win the war against the Taleban in the south and east is still a fundamental strategy. Maybe, George Bush believes in the effect of air strikes of American warplanes more than anyone else at the White House. Bush may think that the Europeans and Karzai will bear and carry on this costly war.
The Europeans are afraid of their wavering public opinion and death of their soldiers, and the Afghan government forces have turned into shields for the NATO forces in the country's south. It was very painful that eight Afghan policemen were killed in Panjwai District of Kandahar Province last week, but the deaths of these soldiers do not have any effect in improving the situation in the south. Despite that, the USA is hopeful that the Afghan security forces will be able to take over the war against the Taleban by 2011 and NATO will play a role of advisor in the war. This means that we will not be able to put an end to the war against the Taleban by 2011, but we will have an experienced Afghan army and police.
There is a very simple question: Does an increase in the foreign military in Afghanistan help Afghanistan's security and defeat the Taleban in the south and east?
Answering this question has both positive and negative aspects. The positive point is that the troop build-up fulfils the demand of NATO for more troops in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Mr Karzai can also remain assured that he enjoys enough military support in the war against the Taleban and still has the support of White House.
But this alone is not enough. The Taleban have been able to expand their influence and strengthen positions in different parts of the country, and their movements have not been reduced despite the offensives of the Afghan National Army and NATO forces in the wars such as in Arghandab. The Taleban, however, do not have the ability to wage a frontal war against the Afghan and foreign forces in the best time.
But the foreign troop surge means the continuation of war, and this surge shows more preparations are needed to defeat the Taleban.
As the foreign military build-up is not made to control Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and the Taleban can easily cross the border, the troop surge does not create much optimism. This policy [foreign troop surge] is effective if the Taleban do not enjoy financial and intelligence support on the other side of the border and if the Pakistan army stops supporting Taleban's prominent commanders in Afghanistan. If Pakistan's borders remain open to the Taleban, intelligence information is given to them, the Taleban continue treating their wounded soldiers in Pakistan, and the Pakistan religious schools provide the Taleban with fresh fighters, then what will be the big impact of the foreign troop surge against the Taleban?
It is only the Taleban that can gain victory in a guerrilla war and suicide attacks and then fleeing to another country. Boosting foreign military forces can have more effect only in a face-to-face war - an issue the Taleban cannot dare and do not have the ability to carry out.
More than 20 civilians were killed in an air strike in Nurestan Province. The UN in Afghanistan is speaking of a 60 per cent increase in civilian casualties. Military operations also harm ordinary people besides the Taleban in Afghanistan. By warning about civilian casualties, some people are saying that the USA should not make the mistake the Russians made. This means that civilian casualties can lead to a kind of general discontent. Therefore, many are concerned that civilians will suffer more casualties and financial losses with the increase of foreign troops and the prolonging of the war, and the country will once again be caught in a devastating civil war.
As long as the US strategy remains based on the wrong philosophy of forbearance towards Pakistan and fighting the Taleban in Afghanistan, the foreign forces will only contribute to the prolonging of the war, push Afghanistan towards another civil war, and considerably strengthen extremism in the south. The foreign forces are killing some Taleban, but more despotic Taleban are coming from Quetta, Karachi and North Waziristan and joining the war in Helmand, Kandahar and Konar Provinces after being told by Pakistani clerics that they will go to paradise.
Originally published by Hasht-e Sobh, Kabul, in Dari 6 Jul 08.
IT has been a bad two days on the terrorist front. Yesterday, in the Afghan capital a suicide attack on the Indian Embassy killed at least 41 people. Hours earlier in the Pakistani capital, a suicide bomb killed more than 10 Pakistani policemen while in the Somali capital gunmen murdered a top UN aid official.
The only civilized response to all three attacks is horror and revulsion - horror that once again innocent people have been murdered by evil-minded fanatics and revulsion at the warped thinking which drives them to such wickedness.
There is no factual link between these three killing sprees. Yet there is a broad political link, at least between the Kabul and Islamabad attacks. They were the work of so-called Islamic militants - a resurgent Taleban in Afghanistan and a similar movement in Pakistan. (Responsibility for the Somali attack is more difficult to pin down. It could be the work of a disgruntled war lord; on the other hand, attacks on aid agencies have noticeably increased in recent months and have been largely blamed on the local Al-Qaeda.)
The link between these militants is their twisted version of Islam that they use to justify their evil acts, as well as a sense of common cause and a hatred of everyone else who is not part of their movement.
It is a macabre irony that Indians and Pakistanis should be the joint targets of these fanatics. In the case of the Kabul attack, the Taleban were clearly out to make common cause with Kashmiri militants. That is a new development, but hardly surprising. Not that they will have any effect on that or on Indian relations with Afghanistan. They may have imagined that they could force a change of heart by Delhi - that it would end its program of aid and reconstruction - but they are as ignorant and foolish in that as they are cruel and evil. India, with its long experience of terrorists and its policy not to make concessions to them, will continue to maintain close ties with the Afghan government and provide it with aid.
The same with Pakistan. Sunday's killings will not deter the Pakistani police from doing their job any more than terrorist bombs deter the police in Spain or elsewhere. That is the one constant about terrorism. It never wins against a well-organized army or state. It is a thorn in the side of the state, painful and bloody, but not terminal. The only time terrorists can succeed is in a power vacuum. For all the problems, no one can say that about Afghanistan today. The Taleban may be resurgent but the country is not in chaos or on the point of collapse. Nor should anyone repeat the easy lie that it is forever a graveyard for foreigners. That is the very antithesis of what Afghanistan is. It is not the clash point of civilizations; it is, and has been for three thousand years, the crossroads of civilizations. It certainly was never the graveyard for the Arabs and Persians who introduced Islam to the country.
The embassy attack does not mean that Afghanistan is an impossible mess or that the international forces there are losing the battle. But it is a warning to President Karzai and Afghanistan's friends to redouble efforts to pacify the country. Ultimately that is not a military issue, it is a financial one. More roads, more schools, more infrastructure will mean more jobs, more trade, more business and more reason for ordinary Afghans to appreciate and support their government. That is President Karzai's urgent task.
Details about the attack in Kabul are begriming to emerge. The so called embassy was actually a military base run by Brigidier Ravi Mehta who not only provided help and logistical support to the Afghan Army, he also was part of an anti-insurgency effort that targeted the Taliban and other Pakhtuns and Pakistanis in and around Kabul.
The so called embassy had a reinforced concrete bunker in it and was linked by satellite communication to the Indian Defense Department. Brigadier Ravi Mehta coordinated the working of the more than 2000 Indian soldiers who are supporting the Karzai government. The base also tracked the intelligence officers in the 4 Indian Consulates and the 13 "Information Centers" that occupy Afghan like a web
A story in the Times of India claims that Brigadier Ravi Mehta was specifically targeting for his role in providing strategic vision and combat operations advice to his Afghan counterparts who are in office.
Brig Mehta, on his part, was playing a key role in India's military training and logistical help to Afghanistan. Though India does not actually have soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, it has built bridges with the Afghan armed forces to counter any prospect of Pakistan regaining influence in the war-ravaged country through a resurgent Taliban
India has been regularly training Afghan officers and other ranks at its military training institutions, ranging from the National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla to the School of Artillery at Devlali, ever since the Karzai government came to office.
Apart from developmental projects like the construction of the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram road, India has also posted some army officers in Afghanistan to teach basic military fieldcraft and English skills to the Afghan army, apart from sending several military doctors to help at hospitals in Kandahar and elsewhere.
The site of a suicide attack in front of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. (AFP Photo)
NEW DELHI: The mastermind behind the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on Monday may not be immediately known, but it had been the favourite target of the Taliban before they entered the war-torn city on September 26, 1996, till they were driven out by the US-led coalition in November 2001.
So intense were the rocket attacks on the embassy at a time when Taliban were inching closer to Kabul waging bloody fights against the Northern Alliance forces led by legendary leader Masood, that officials had decided to construct a heavily fortified bunker right inside the embassy premises. So specific was the targeting of the Indian embassy that the officials used to leave their cars and other vehicles parked inside the Indonesian embassy, which is next to the Indian embassy, to keep them safe from the Taliban rockets.
The bunker, which was constructed after a BSF jawan on deputation was killed in one such rocket attack, had three small rooms with an attached kitchen and provided enough room for officials to dive in everytime there was a blast nearby.
But before the officials actually got used to a life in the bunker, the Indian government decided to close the embassy in September 1996 as the Afghan government was in no position to guarantee the security of the staff and building. The embassy closed on September 26, 1996, barely 12 hours before Taliban entered Kabul.
When this correspondent visited the embassy premises in December 2001, it still bore telltale signs of rocket attacks and the vandalism at the hands of the Taliban during the five-year reign, which ended in November 2001 through the 'war against terror' by US-led forces.
After then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh reopened the embassy on December 22, 2001, the day Hamid Karzai was sworn in as interim president of Afghanistan, the bunker was dismantled with a plan to fill the pit and make a landscaped garden over it.
Pak's new port has strategic implications for India: Navy chief, 22 Jan 08
CHENNAI: The Gwadar port being built by Pakistan with Chinese assistance in its Baluchistan coast has "serious strategic implications for India", Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta has said. "Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being bulit in Baluchistan coast, would enable Pakistan take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers," he said delivering T S Narayanaswamy Memorial lecture in Chennai on Monday night. The challenge for India was to balance relations with China in such a manner that competition for strategic significance of space in the Indian Ocean leads to cooperation rather than conflict, he said
"The pressure for countries to cooperate in the maritime military domain to ensure smooth flow of energy and commerce on the high seas will grow even further," he said speaking on "Oceanic Influence on India's Development in the next Decade." Talking about "Chinese designs on the Indian Ocean," Mehta said China had a strategy called `String of Pearls,' as per which it seeks to set up bases and outposts across the globe, strategically located along its energy lines, to monitor and safeguard energy flows.
"Each pearl in the string is a link in a chain of the Chinese maritime presence," he said. "Among other locations, the string moves Northwards up to Gwadar deep sea port on Pakistan's Makran coast. A highway is under construction joining Gwadar with Karachi and there are plans to connect the port with the Karakoram Highway, thus providing China a gateway to Arabian Sea," he said adding that this could pose a problem for India.
Indians think that Gwader is of no value to Pakistan becasue Pakistan already has two commercial ports of Karachi and Port Qasim. The Indian Naval Chief thinks that the Gwadar port is part of a Chiense strategy.
"Other "pearls" that China has been developing are naval facilities in Bangladesh, where it is developing a container-port facility at Chittagong; in Myanmar, where it is building radar, refit and refuel facilities at bases in Sittwe, Coco, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun; and in Thailand and Cambodia."
There are many reasons the embassy was targeted. To get to the bottom of the picture let us investigate the extent of the game played by India in Afghanistan. India is deeply involved in Afghanistan with troops and construction projects that isolate Pakistan and build direct links to Kabul. The Afghans despise the Indians because of New Delhi's links to the Northern Alliance and her support for the USSR and now to ISAF.
1) The sprawling Indian embassy has become a symbol of the Northern Alliance-Indian nexus which excludes the Pakhtuns from power. There is a lot of resentment in Afghanistan over this alliance in Kabul.
The Taleban have strong motives for targeting India. Many have lived in exile in Pakistan, where they absorbed not only the visceral hostility to India but also the fanaticism of those who see the ousting of India from Kashmir as a cause for Islamic Jihad. Pakistan was the main backer of the Taleban from their takeover in Afghanistan in 1986 until they were defeated by the allied coalition in 2001, when Islamabad officially dropped its support as a result of intense US pressure. Taleban insurgents are deeply suspicious of Indian support for President Karzai, who spent time in exile in India. India's close involvement in reconstruction is seen as underpinning the Western-backed Government and in recent months there have been frequent attacks on Indian offices and projects around the country. Times UK
2) The presence of Indian troops is disliked by most Afghans, especially if the troops taking part in actual operations or if the troops provide logistical support to the minority government in Kabul. It’s India’s profile that is bothering the extremists in Afghanistan. Prior to the killing of Political Counsellor V. Venkateswara Rao, Defence Adviser Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta, and ITBP staffers Ajai Pathaniya and Roop Singh, there have been three suicide attacks on Indian nationals this year
3) The Indian forces are now seen as collaborators of the occupation forces are therefore considered targets by the Afghan resistance. National Review reporter Jonathan Foreman writes that the involvement of Indian soldiers in Afghanistan has gone unreported in the West and "perhaps some of the journalists in Kabul need to get out of town more."
In fact there are at least 1,000 Indian paramilitary soldiers of the 'Indo-Tibetan Border Police' and the 'Border Roads Organization' — an adjunct to the Indian military similar to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers — operating in Afghanistan
4) All the attacks were on Indians working on the strategic $266 million Zaranj-Delaram road, which will provide an all-weather link from Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar. The 218-km Zaranj-Delaram road construction project by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Concerted Taliban attacks on the personnel as well as the equipment of BRO has pushed the project completion date from December 2007 to December 2008. The project cost, too, has zoomed up to Rs 682 crore, instead of the Rs 377.47 crore sanctioned for it by the Indian government. India, has also deployed 254 ITBP soldiers in Afghanistan to augment the ‘‘local security cover’’ provided to the 306 BRO personnel engaged in the project as well as their machinery deployed on the road, which traverses through the poppy-cultivation belt. India is building a new road connecting Zaranj to Delaram, which is on the main Herat-Kandahar road. These projects will shorten the transit distance between Chabahar and Delaram by more than 600 kilometers.
Iran, India and Afghanistan had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in January 2003, to improve Afghanistan's access to the coast. Under this agreement, Iran is building a new transit route to connect Milak in the southeast of the country to Zaranj in Afghanistan, and has already completed an important bridge over the Helmand River. (Kanchan Lakshman, Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution)
INDIA IS BUILDING THE CHABAHAR PORT IN IRAN AND ALSO THE RAIL AND ROAD LINKS TO AFGHANISTAN
Indian countermoves to Gawador include the base in Tajikistan and port in Chahbahar Iran.
1.Full exemptions from customs duties for machinery imports. 2 .Three year tax exemptions for raw material imports. 3. Fifty percent discounts on land to be utilized for industrial units. 4. Fifty percent discounts for a period of two years for products exported to the littoral states of the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman by transit vessels of the Free Zone. 5. Fifty percent discounts on land transportation fares for products exported to the Central Asian Countries , Pakistan and Afghanistan for a period of two years. 6. Discounts of up to fifty percent on the purchase or lease of commercial office space and warehouses. 7. Fifty Percent discounts on the price of land utilized for residential blocks for workers and the personnel of industrial units located in the FTZ. 8. Minimal red tape as evidenced by the issuance of construction permits, office registrations, land sales, import permits and supply of telephone lines within 48 hours.These incentives have been further buoyed by facilities such as social and cultural centers such as theaters, technical and vocational centers and the like, highlighted by the forthcoming establishment of an international university in the zone. In light of the above, over the past four years the Iranian private sector has invested over 500 billion Rials into the FTZ and over 1,600 investment permits have been registered , 65% of which pertained to the manufacturing sector.
"To counter the Gwadar port that is also called the Chinese Gibraltar by Washington, India has built Chabahar port in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran - just adjacent to Gwadar. India is also helping Iran in building a 200km road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. It will provide access via land to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly ship its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia." "China moved into India's backyard when it signed an agreement with Sri Lanka in March 2007 to develop Hambantota Development Zone, which includes a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other facilities. It is expected to cost about US$1 billion and the Chinese are said to be financing more than 85% of the project. The entire project is scheduled to be completed in the next 15 years. Counter Current Abus Sattat Ghazalli.
5) Apart from the BRO-executed project, some 2,000 Indians are involved in a diverse array of reconstruction projects, prominently including the building of a 220 KV double circuit transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri in eastern Afghanistan to Kabul ($111 million); a sub-station at Kabul; the reconstruction of the Salma dam power project in Herat province ($80 million) being executed by the Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd.
6) A story in the Times of India claims that Brigidier Ravi Mehta was specifically targeting for his role in providing strategic vision and combat operations advice to his Afghan counterparts who are in office.
Brig Mehta, on his part, was playing a key role in India's military training and logistical help to Afghanistan. Though India does not actually have soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, it has built bridges with the Afghan armed forces to counter any prospect of Pakistan regaining influence in the war-ravaged country through a resurgent Taliban
India has been regularly training Afghan officers and other ranks at its military training institutions, ranging from the National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla to the School of Artillery at Devlali, ever since the Karzai government came to office.
Apart from developmental projects like the construction of the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram road, India has also posted some army officers in Afghanistan to teach basic military fieldcraft and English skills to the Afghan army, apart from sending several military doctors to help at hospitals in Kandahar and elsewhere.
Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta
NEW DELHI: If the resurgent Taliban-ISI nexus in Afghanistan wanted to target some key Indian officials in Kabul, defence attache, Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta, was certainly one of them. A "bright and dynamic" officer who had developed "deep linkages" with the leadership of the fledgling Afghan army in the six months he had been posted in Kabul, Brig Mehta even had a "good relationship" with Afghan defence minister Abdul Rahim Wardak.
Brig Mehta, in fact, had accompanied Wardak when he came to New Delhi in April to hold discussions with his Indian counterpart A K Antony and visit Jammu and Kashmir for a first-hand look at the way Indian army conducted counter-insurgency operations.
"Brig Mehta was on the ball in Afghanistan. He was a confident, well-informed officer, who kept his ear to the ground and closely tracked the re-emerging strong links between Taliban and Pakistan's ISI, among other things," said a top defence official.
"The defence attache's post in Kabul is, after all, one of the top three or four Indian military postings abroad. Brig Mehta was selected for the posting after a deep selection process," he added. Brig Mehta, who was commissioned into the army in June 1976, had varied operational experience, including stints in counter-insurgency operations in both J&K and North-East.
Apart from his Kabul posting, another indicator that he was headed for at least a "two-star rank" (Major-General) was that he had done the prestigious National Defence College course around three years ago. The tragic incident on Monday came at a time when Brig Mehta's wife Sunita and two children, Flight Lieutenant Udit Mehta, a 24-year-old MiG fighter pilot posted at Jodhpur, and Bhavya Mehta, a 19-year-old MBBS student, were all at Kabul. "Sunita was staying in Kabul, a non-family station, for the last three months due to a special Afghan government request. She was teaching Afghan girls for higher studies at an institute run by the Afghan education ministry. The children were there to visit their parents on a short holiday," said an official.
Brig Mehta, on his part, was playing a key role in India's military training and logistical help to Afghanistan. Though India does not actually have soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, it has built bridges with the Afghan armed forces to counter any prospect of Pakistan regaining influence in the war-ravaged country through a resurgent Taliban-al Qaida-ISI nexus.
India has been regularly training Afghan officers and other ranks at its military training institutions, ranging from the National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla to the School of Artillery at Devlali, ever since the Karzai government came to office.
Apart from developmental projects like the construction of the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram road, India has also posted some army officers in Afghanistan to teach basic military fieldcraft and English skills to the Afghan army, apart from sending several military doctors to help at hospitals in Kandahar and elsewhere.
Afghanistan wants to build its own national armed forces, which has only around 50,000 troops at present, to gradually replace US-led Nato's International Security Assistance Force operating in the country.
It has sought India's help in "capacity-building" of its armed forces, which even includes training of its pilots and technicians in operating Russian-origin Mi-35 helicopter gunships, as well as sourcing supplies for its Soviet-era tanks and aircraft.
"Kabul is also interested in sending more officers for specialised training at the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram and High-Altitude Warfare School in J&K as well as the different commando and counter-terrorism courses run at Belgaum and Bareilly," said a senior official.
"The Afghan government says this is necessary since the Taliban is increasingly resorting to IED blasts and suicide bombings instead of direct face-to-face confrontations," he added
Iraq insists on U.S. withdrawal timetable Tue Jul 8, 2008 4:45pm EDT
By Ahmed Rasheed and Mohammed Abbas
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq will not accept any security agreement with the United States unless it includes dates for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the government's national security adviser said on Tuesday.
But the government's spokesman said any timetable would depend on security conditions on the ground.
Their differences underscore the debate in Baghdad over a deal with Washington that will provide a legal basis for U.S. troops to remain when a U.N. mandate expires at the end of the year.
But Washington played down calls from Baghdad for a firm withdrawal deadline, saying both sought greater Iraqi security.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Tuesday he expected to pull more U.S. troops from Iraq and stressed any decision to withdraw would be based on the ability of Iraqi troops to take responsibility for security and combat.
On Monday, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki suggested for the first time that a timetable be set for the departure of U.S. forces under the deal being negotiated, which he called a memorandum of understanding.
National Security Adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubaie appeared to go further on Tuesday.
"We can't have a memorandum of understanding with foreign forces unless it has dates and clear horizons determining the departure of foreign forces. We're unambiguously talking about their departure," he told reporters in Najaf after meeting Iraq's top Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
He said he had spoken to Sistani about the U.S. talks, but did not say if the cleric had an opinion on the negotiations. The revered cleric is routinely briefed on key national issues.
"I informed the (clerical leaders) about some of the advances in the talks ... There is a big difference in outlook between us and the Americans," Rubaie said, adding Iraq's 500,000-strong security forces had greatly improved.
Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, speaking on al-Hurra television, said it was an Iraqi demand to know when foreign forces would leave.
"Will this be through a timetable, a timeframe or time horizon? It depends on the situation on the ground. I think this will determine the dates or will affect whether it is possible to put (the departure) under a timetable."
A senior Shi'ite official added: "It is very soon to talk about details. The talks are in the early stages."
U.S. SEES "SHARED GOALS"
The Bush administration has always opposed setting any withdrawal timetable, saying to do so would allow militant groups to lie low and wait until U.S. troops in Iraq left.
Gates, speaking to reporters during a visit to the Fort Lewis Army base in Washington state said, "As the Iraqi security forces get stronger and get better then we would be able to continue drawing down our troops in the future."
"This transition of control and primary responsibility for security is a process that is well under way and, based on everything I've heard, we will be able to continue," the Pentagon chief said. "However, that really depends on the situation on the ground."
Washington was looking for an agreement "that satisfies both our needs," U.S. State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said.
"The U.S. government and the government of Iraq are in agreement that we, the U.S. government, we want to withdraw, we will withdraw. However, that decision will be conditions-based," he said.
In a further complication, Iraq's deputy parliament speaker Khalid al-Attiya said deputies must approve any deal the Iraqi government reaches and will probably reject the document if American troops are immune from Iraqi law.
It would be virtually unthinkable for the United States to allow its soldiers to be subject to Iraqi law.
Maliki's preference for a memorandum of understanding, which could be an attempt to bypass parliament, is in contrast to earlier talks which have all been leading to the signing of a formal Status Of Forces Agreement, or SOFA.
"Without doubt, if the two sides reach an agreement, this is between two countries, and according to the Iraqi constitution a national agreement must be agreed by parliament by a majority of two thirds," Attiya told Reuters in an interview.
Washington has SOFA pacts with many countries, and they typically exempt U.S. troops from trial or prison abroad.
Iraq said last week Washington was showing flexibility on some key issues, including dropping a demand for immunity for private contractors working for the U.S. government.
Control of military operations and airspace are other points of contention, along with the detention of prisoners.
The Pentagon has 146,000 troops in Iraq. That force level should drop to about 140,000 by the end of July under a planned reduction. Commanders will then assess security conditions before recommending further troop cuts.
(Additional reporting by Khaled Farhan in Najaf, Mariam Karouny in London, Jeremy Pelofsky in Toyako, Susan Cornwell in Washington, Caren Bohan in Powder Springs, Ga., Writing by Dean Yates and Jackie Frank, Editing by Richard Williams and Sandra Maler)
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — What a difference 100 days make.
Pakistan's new coalition government came to power after February's elections on a wave of public sympathy and hope. The two main parties pledged to work together on a range of issues, including the quick restoration judges fired by common rival President Pervez Musharraf.
But some 100 days after formally taking charge, the coalition is in disarray. The second-largest party left the Cabinet amid disputes over the judges and the fate of Musharraf, the former army chief who had dominated Pakistani politics since seizing the reins in a 1999 military coup.
Multiple power centers have emerged since the new civilian administration took over, making it unclear who is in charge. Critics worry the wrangling is distracting political leaders from tackling the sinking economy and relentless militancy in the South Asian nation of 160 million.
"The kind of coherence and focus and directness that we were expecting would emerge with a common sentiment for the restoration of democracy has not really come about," political analyst Rasul Bakhsh Rais said.
Upon becoming prime minister in March, Yousuf Raza Gilani laid out a series of broad goals for the first 100 days. Tackling terrorism was the top priority.
But although violence is down since last year, militants appear to have gained sway in large parts of the northwest border along Afghanistan amid the political confusion. On Sunday, an attack blamed on a suicide bomber killed 18 people, mostly police, in the capital, Islamabad.
The new administration has sought to strike peace deals with militants, an approach that has faced criticism from the U.S. which warns it could give time for militants to regroup.
In late June, as militants increasingly threatened the key city of Peshawar, the government shifted to battle mode, deploying paramilitary forces to Khyber tribal region. The offensive, however, led Pakistan's top Taliban leader to suspend peace talks with the government.
The U.S. appears concerned that Pakistan's political infighting is distracting it from battling terrorism. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher pointedly said in a recent visit that the government needs to "focus" on critical issues, including militancy.
Farzana Raja, a leading member of the largest coalition party, the Pakistan People's Party of slain ex-Premier Benazir Bhutto, insisted the government is progressing. She noted the overall drop in violence and plans for housing and development projects. She also pointed to a much-criticized PPP proposal aimed at curbing Musharraf's authority and restoring the judges through constitutional reforms.
"It was not that we will complete everything in 100 days — of course, it's not possible," she said. "We don't have a magic stick that we can do what the previous government could not do in nine years."
Requests for an interview with Gilani were denied, but aides said he planned a speech to detail the government's accomplishments so far.
A vague statement released by his office assessed that in the first 100 days, "the government has taken numerous steps for providing food and energy security to every citizen in both short and long term perspective in addition to restoring the confidence of the investors."
Sadiqul Farooq, a spokesman for the PPP's disgruntled coalition partner, the Pakistan Muslim League-N of ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, said the government has accomplished less than it could have because of the PPP's intransigence on the judges issue and Musharraf's future.
Musharraf ousted dozens of judges last year during a burst of emergency rule, a move that appeared aimed at blocking legal challenges to his rule. The ousters infuriated Pakistanis, especially the nation's popular lawyers' movement, and strengthened opposition to the increasingly unpopular president.
The PML-N has argued the judges could be restored via an order from the prime minister, and has sought to de-link their return from a constitutional package. The two parties missed two deadlines set within the first 100 days to restore the judges.
The PML-N also wants Musharraf ousted or impeached, while the PPP has taken a softer tone. Still, Farooq said the ultimate blame for economic and other problems rests with decisions made when Musharraf and his allies were in charge.
"And he is still there, he is still there," Farooq said of Musharraf, who refuses to resign.
For ordinary Pakistanis, the political squabbling is growing unbearable as the sinking economy makes it harder to feed their families or fill up their gas tanks.
"The first problem they should take care of is inflation," said Mohammad Ejaz, 32, a butcher. "Then we'll see about the judges. What are the judges going to do for us? Will they bring down the prices? Will they come deliver flour at our homes?"
The coalition has taken some steps, such as increasing wheat imports, to ease burdens, but it also faces yawning budget and current account deficits and hasn't escaped rising fuel costs. Meanwhile, power shortages are crippling industry and irritating citizens.
Although some Pakistanis recognized economic problems would take time to fix, many felt the coalition was too distracted by the judges and Musharraf to tackle the issues effectively.
"All the political leaders are playing games with each other," said Saba Aziz, a 17-year old college student. "Our Pakistan is going down just because of our leaders. They are selfish."
Analyst Shafqat Mahmood said if he could give any advice to coalition leaders, it would be to "do away with the numerous centers of power" so people would at least know who is in charge.
The military, leaders of the two main political parties, the prime minister and the president are among the power points. Often it is uncertain who is making the ultimate decisions on key issues such as peace deals with militants.
Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower who now leads her political party, is widely considered Pakistan's most influential man and the true power behind Gilani, even though he is not elected.
The PPP came to power in part on the wave of sympathy that followed after Bhutto's December assassination. Analysts say it has squandered much of the goodwill since.
Farooq, of the PML-N, said his party had no intention of joining the opposition for now. Still, how much longer the coalition will survive is anyone's guess.
"I think it can last 100 days, but I don't think it will last 200 days," Rais said. "It's really frustrating to see what has happened."
Associated Press writer Manal Ahmad contributed to this report.
Official: Bhutto killed by sunroof lever (Xinhua) Updated: 2007-12-29 15:47
ISLAMABAD -- Former Pakistani prime minister and chairperson of People's Party (PPP) died after the sunroof lever hit her in the head, local newspaper DAWN quoted interior ministry spokesman as saying on Saturday.
A handout released on December 28, 2007 by Pakistan's Interior Ministry shows images of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto's skull. [Agencies]
Interior ministry spokesman Brigadier Javed Cheema said in a news briefing here that Benazir Bhutto was hit by sunroof lever on her right side, which caused her death.
Bhutto was killed on Thursday in a blast when she left her election campaign rally in a park in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, some 30 kms south from Islamabad.
Earlier, media reports suggested that gunshots or bomb blast could be the direct cause of Bhutto's death.
Cheema confirmed that three gunshots were fired but none of them hit Bhutto. A report signed by seven doctors showed that there was no bullet or shrapnel inside her body.
Bhutto was laid to rest alongside her father's mausoleum in the village of Ghari Khuda Baksh in the southern province of Sindh on Friday. Bhutto's husband Asif Zardari did not allow doctors to perform postmortem on Bhutto.
Cheema also disclosed that Al-Qaida operative Baitullah Mehsud was behind the assassination of Bhutto. He said, "We have recorded a telephone call of Baitullah Mehsud in which he congratulated a cleric for killing Benazir Bhutto."
Cheema said that Bhutto was on the hit list of Al-Qaida and she was receiving life threats from the same group since her arrival in Pakistan.
Baitullah Mehsud was also involved in suicide attack on Bhutto in the southern port city of Karachi on October 19 when she was leading a procession, he said.
Chronicle of the resurgence of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and central Asia
DESCENT INTO CHAOS — How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia: Ahmed Rashid; Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 11, Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi-10017. Rs. 495.
This topical book by a well-known Pakistani journalist is a well-informed and intimate account of the events leading up to and after the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on September 9, 2001. Ahmed Rashid, whose earlier work Taliban, which was published before 9/11, earned him a well-deserved reputation as a keen observer and analyst of Afghanistan and of the terrorist netw ork of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has written a racy and honest narrative of some of the momentous developments in south and central Asia, with repercussions going beyond what the author refers to as the “region”. He was part of a small expert group which advised Lakhdar Brahimi during his stewardship of the negotiations relating to the Afghan issue and, as such, had a ringside view of the happenings and excellent contacts with all the principal players involved in what he has called “descent into chaos.” The book has useful chapters on central Asia, but this review is confined to the situation in Afghanistan.
Lost opportunity
Rashid’s thesis is that since all the three external governmental players — the U.S., Pakistan and NATO — were following their own agendas, which were not in harmony with each other, and without any coordination among them, the experiment at nation building in Afghanistan has been a failure and the field has been left clear to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to regroup and reorganise themselves and to re-emerge as a potent force for destabilising the region. The Americans, who had abandoned Afghanistan once the Soviet Union was forced out of Afghanistan, and whose sole interest, after 9/11 was to capture Osama bin Laden and destroy his organisation, did practically nothing, at least until 2007, to check the growth of the Taliban. They systematically turned a blind eye, to put the matter charitably, to Musharraf and the ISI going to great lengths to protect the Taliban. At the battle of Kunduz in November 2001, hundreds of Pakistani military and ISI personnel were trapped. Musharraf made a personal plea to President Bush, following which nearly a thousand persons, including several hundred Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, were airlifted out of Kunduz into Pakistan. The Taliban were anxious to surrender to the Americans or to the U.N. or to the ICRC rather than to the Northern Alliance (NA). It seems that American General Tommy Franks could easily have deployed a few hundred men to accept the surrender of the non-Pakistanis, but refused, thus missing out a unique opportunity of capturing many key Al-Qaeda fighters. More Taliban and Al-Qaeda people escaped from Kunduz than from Tora Bora later. Pakistan had the measure of the Americans and drew the right conclusion that the Bush administration, particularly the Pentagon, desperately needed them on their side in their war on terrorism and that Pakistan could pretty much act as it pleased, so long as it satisfied the U.S. from time to time by capturing and handing over a few Al-Qaeda operatives.
Taliban’s comeback
For Pakistan, the priority was always India. The author asserts that Pakistan let go of a certain opportunity in 1988 to get the Durand line recognised by Afghanistan at the time of the agreement ending Soviet occupation, despite the U.N. prodding Pakistan to do so and mentions Yaqub Khan as stating that the military deliberately did not seek recognition in order to gain “strategic depth” against India. When the NA was poised for marching into Kabul, Musharraf prevailed upon the Pentagon to ask the NA not to take over Kabul, since it would be a great victory for India which, along with Iran and Russia, had consistently supported the NA. The NA, having promised not to take over Kabul, did just that, to the consternation not so of much the U.S. as of Pakistan. From then on, the ISI had only one interest—how to prevent India from consolidating its position in Afghanistan. In its bid to limit and eliminate what it regarded as India’s growing influence in its backyard, the ISI systematically helped the Taliban by letting it establish itself on the Pakistan side of the border, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The ISI distrusted Karzai, a sentiment fully reciprocated by the latter. Shortly before 9/11, the ISI asked Karzai to leave Pakistan, where he had been living since 1983, to oblige the Taliban which had assassinated Karzai’s father. Initially Karzai had been a supporter of the Taliban, and according to the author, had given them a sum of $ 50,000 and handed over a cache of arms which he had hidden near Kandahar. The ISI actively protected the Taliban, knowing fully well the nexus between them and the Al-Qaeda. Washington, which poured in $10 billion of aid between 2002 and 2006, refused to use its clout with Islamabad to weaken the Taliban, anxious as it was not to upset Musharraf at any cost.
Diminishing support
The author maintains that once the Bush administration declined NATO’s offer to collectively fight the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the members of the latter never got over their dislike of Washington’s arrogant attitude. The European governments also have had to deal with a more sceptical public opinion which remains indifferent and even hostile to the idea of putting their citizens in harm’s way in faraway Afghanistan. The number of caveats — 71 until 2007 — practically rendered their participation meaningless since they are tantamount to declining to serve in the south where all the fighting has to be done. The diminishing public support, coupled with the fact that those contingents that are deployed in the danger zones, such as Canada, are suffering significant casualties, has raised serious doubts about the possibility of the NATO members sustaining their engagement over the long term.
As for Karzai, the author basically admires him, especially for his courage in the early days of his taking on the Taliban. However, the author frequently expresses his disappointment with Karzai for his indecisiveness, his inclination to take the easy way out instead of squarely confronting the challenges and his failure to tackle corruption. He is particularly critical of Karzai for his compromises with the warlords to the point of sacrificing the authority of, and hence weakening the central government.
State of affairs in FATA
Rashid is objective in his references to India, which are not too many. He is open about ISI’s support to the cross border terrorist attacks being launched from territory under Pakistan’s control. He believes that Indian intelligence has been active in supporting anti-Pakistan dissident and insurgent activities in Pakistan, just as Pakistani intelligence agencies have been in India, he adds. He regards highly India’s aid effort in Afghanistan. In his words: “India’s success had stirred up a hornet’s nest in Islamabad, which soon came to believe that India was ‘taking over Afghanistan’. India had implemented a $500 million reconstruction strategy that was one of the best planned from any country. It was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with the Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage, and of course undercut Pakistan’s influence.” But, he adds: “Excessive Indian arrogance provided the complaints that Musharraf used with Western leaders to explain away his reluctance to befriend Karzai. The ISI generated enormous misinformation about India’s role…”
Rashid’s description of the state of affairs in FATA leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Taliban have complete control over them and, in effect, is a state within a state, more than the PLO ever was in south Lebanon in the 1970s. It is strange and ironical that the same Baitulla Mehsud, with whom the Musharraf regime signed a truce a little while before Benazir’s assassination, was held responsible for it by the regime. So long as the Taliban’s hold over FATA continues — and this is likely to continue for a long period — the West’s fight against Al-Qaeda will not be won. A frightening prospect not just for the U.S., western countries, the world at large and India, but most importantly for Pakistan.